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General introduction 
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1.1. Motivation of the study 
The great achievement of the last century - the extension of people’s life expectancy - brings 
with it challenges for the health care systems. As people live longer, the need for long-term 
treatment due to chronic diseases becomes greater. New technologies have been developed to 
respond to the growing population’s health needs and expectations. Although they give more 
treatment opportunities, they also inflate the cost of health care (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000; 
Martins et al., 2006; Przywara, 2010).  
The increase in health care cost becomes a relevant problem when confronted with resource 
constraints. As a result of demographic changes, the share of the economically active 
population, which in most developed countries bears a vast majority of health care cost, is 
shrinking. To generate more resources for health care through taxes or social insurance 
contributions, people need to share more of their wealth. However, imposing a higher tax 
burden has its impact on a countries’ economy and might be politically difficult. There is also 
a question whether countries which already devote a high share of their wealth on health care, 
should further increase their health care spending or rather allocate resources to other goods 
and services which can bring greater welfare gains for society (Thomson et al., 2009). 
In face of the increasing health care cost and the limited capacity to spend on health, enabling 
the financial sustainability of the health care systems without jeopardizing the main health 
system objectives has been recognized as one of the biggest challenges facing governments 
(Thomson et al., 2009). During the past few decades, various strategies have been worked out 
to address this challenge (Rechel et al., 2009). In order to reduce the cost of health care, much 
emphasis is placed on health prevention, i.e. eliminating risk factors and improving control of 
chronic diseases. The attention of policy makers is also attracted by strategies to increase 
consumers’ individual responsibility for financing health care (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999; 
Thomson et al., 2009). It can be done by excluding some services and commodities from the 
statutory benefit package (usually those without significant contribution to the health of the 
population), or by limiting their number (waiting lists). In both instances, it can result in 
consumers being shifted to the private sector where they pay out-of-pocket the full price of 
goods and services (unless private insurance is available). Patients might be also asked to 
share the cost of services and commodities in the statutory benefit package 
1
.  
                                                          
1
 Cost-sharing might take different forms. Patient might be asked to pay a flat-rate fee (co-payment), percentage 
of the cost (co-insurance) or a given amount of money before the public coverage begins (deductibles). There is 
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The potential of patient cost-sharing to contribute to the sustainability of the health care 
system relies on two elements. First, cost-sharing is an additional source of funds. Hence, 
some of the health care cost might be shifted from public budgets to patients. Second, cost-
sharing promises to improve efficiency in publicly financed health care, as it is expected that 
patients when faced with a price would reduce the utilization of unnecessary and low-value 
health care (Robinson, 2002; Zweifel & Manning, 2000). It is also assumed that this could 
slow the growth of health care costs. However, opponents of cost-sharing question the 
potential of cost-sharing to improve efficiency and instead point to its potentially negative 
effects on equity in health care, documented by various evidence, among them the best known 
is the RAND health insurance experiment (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1993).  
Due to the ambiguity of the effects, the implementation of patient charges for publicly 
financed health care raises concerns. Patient cost-sharing is often the subject of public and 
political discourse, particularly in Europe where values like solidarity and equity are 
considered to be fundamental for the design of the health care systems (Maarse & Paulus, 
2003; Meulen et al., 2001). Despite the ongoing debates, the continuous growth of public 
health expenditure during the past few decades compelled many Western European countries’ 
governments to apply patient cost-sharing for commodities and services, as a cost-
containment measure (Abel-Smith & Mossialos, 1994; De Gooijer, 2007; Saltman & 
Figueras, 1998). In Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, following the collapse of 
communism, the reliance on out-of pocket payments has substantially increased compensating 
for the low public resources for health care (Björkman & Nemec, 2013; Kutzin et al., 2010). 
Patient cost-sharing in these countries broadly applies to pharmaceuticals. However, the 
implementation of obligatory patient payments for publicly financed health care services 
encounters public opposition and proved to be politically difficult in many CEE countries. 
Nevertheless, consumers in CEE countries frequently pay informally or quasi-formally when 
using publicly financed health care services. These non-regulated patient payments pose a 
threat to equity and efficiency in countries’ health care systems (Ensor, 2004). Thus, formal 
patient cost-sharing in CEE countries are also expected to eliminate these payments. 
To pursue a cost-sharing policy which responds to the challenges in the health care systems 
and remains without negative impacts on equity, empirical analyses are needed to support 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
also the possibility to ask patient to cover the cost of services over the rate of reimbursement from public 
coverage (indemnity/balance billing/extra billing), though this method is considered to be an indirect cost-
sharing as payment obligation occurs only if price of service charged by providers is higher than the 
reimbursement rate from the public payer. 
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policy makers in their decisions. However, there is relatively sparse empirical evidence to 
inform cost-sharing policy. Most available evidence concerns the effect of official patient 
charges on the consumption of health care services in the USA (e.g. (Chernew et al., 2008; 
Gibson et al., 2005a; Newhouse, 1993; Siu et al., 1986)). There are also various analyses on 
the quality and equity effects of official patient charges in developing countries, mainly in 
Africa (e.g.(Akashi et al., 2004; Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; McPake, 1993; Sepehri & 
Chernomas, 2001)). In Europe, the analyses to facilitate cost-sharing policy are more common 
in Western European countries, while in CEE countries health policy is rarely rooted in 
evidence.  
The research presented in this dissertation concerns patient cost-sharing for health care 
services in European countries, with the focus on CEE countries in the second part of 
dissertation. Although the main attention is given to formal cost-sharing for health care 
services included in the statutory benefit package, other forms of out-of-pocket patient 
payments are also considered in the analyses presented in this dissertation.  
 
1.2. Financing health care in Europe – trends and challenges 
Despite the growing European integration and convergence in the health care systems 
(Castilla, 2004; Leiter & Theurl, 2012), there are significant differences in how European 
countries finance their health care systems. The differences between countries of Western 
Europe and CEE countries are particularly evident and they reflect a diverse economic and 
political evolution of these two parts of Europe since the end of World War II.  
In Western European countries, the post-war economic prosperity brought the extension of 
welfare states and significant changes in health care financing (Flora, 1986; Golinowska et al., 
2009). The governments in their attempt to ensure universal health care, and as a response to 
advances in medical technology, have devoted more and more resources to health care 
(Mossialos et al., 2002). Consequently, in the 1960s and 1970s, the total health expenditure in 
relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increased dramatically (e.g. between 1960 and 
1980 by 4.1, 3.1 and 3.8 percentage points in Norway, Austria and Spain respectively) and in 
many of these countries reached 6-7% of GDP in 1980 (OECD, 2014). The increase was 
driven by the growth in public spending which became a predominant source of health care 
funding, accounting for as much as 90% of total health expenditure during the 1970s in 
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Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg and the UK. However, the economic crisis which occurred in 
the middle of 1970s, limited the governments’ capacity to finance health care (Mossialos et 
al., 2002). Thus, countries were compelled to reduce the state responsibility and seek for 
measures to ensure more sustainable health care financing. As a result, in the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, many of these countries extended patient cost-sharing (i.e. 
implemented obligatory payments for publicly financed health care services) and reduced the 
contribution from public resources to health care funding (Abel-Smith & Mossialos, 1994; 
Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999). Although this did not stop the increase of total health 
expenditure, the pace of its growth slowed down.  
On the other hand, in CEE countries during the post-war communist period, the resources 
spent on health care were kept at a relatively low level. In 1990, total health expenditure as 
percentage of GDP was 5.7 in Hungary, 4.6 in Poland , 2.7 in Romania, and 2.5 in Latvia 
(Mossialos & Dixon, 2002). Considering the lower GDP levels of the CEE countries 
compared to Western European countries, a great divergence in health care funding between 
the two parts of Europe existed. The underfunding of CEE countries’ health care systems 
largely resulted from the low public resources devoted to health. All communist countries 
adopted the Semashko model, where health care systems were centrally planned and 
administered by the states which funded health care by general tax revenues. The level of 
health expenditure was determined by the political bargaining process. Since the health sector 
was considered to be the economy’s non-productive sector, it received low priority in political 
decisions on government spending (Golinowska et al., 2006). The Semashko systems were 
also based on the principle of free-of-charges health care provision for the entire population 
(Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010). Thus, out-of-pocket expenditure had a marginal role in health care 
financing, i.e. low cost-sharing was applied to pharmaceuticals and devices. The underfunding 
of health care was exacerbated further by existing inefficiencies e.g. overcapacity, preferences 
for in-patients over out-patient treatment, no integration of care, poorly targeted investments 
(Davis, 2010; Rechel & McKee, 2009). As a consequence, patients received low quality 
health care, while health care professionals were poorly remunerated. In this situation, 
informal patient payments (mostly in-kind gifts), which allowed to satisfy both patients and 
providers’ needs, became a common phenomenon in CEE countries under the communist 
regime (Lewis, 2002; Stepurko et al., 2010). Yet, their size and extend were not measured.  
In the second half of the 1990s, in Western Europe, the share of GDP devoted to health care 
stabilized (see Figure 1.1). Yet, in some countries, the stabilization did not reflect the success 
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in controlling the growth of health expenditure but rather the greater dynamics of GDP 
growth (GDP grew faster than health spending). The structure of health expenditure did not 
undergo substantial changes as well, i.e. the contribution of public resources in total health 
care funding remained stable at a relatively high level (approximately 72% on average) and 
the share of out-of-pocket expenditure, though a commonly applied form of cost-sharing, did 
not increase (Figure 1.2). In some countries, private health insurance to cover patient 
payments has been developed (Thomson & Mossialos, 2009). 
On the other hand, the collapse of the communism resulted in significant changes in the 
structure of health expenditure in CEE countries (Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). A sharp 
economic decline at the beginning of the 1990s, and decreasing public expenditure on health, 
provoked major health care system reforms aimed at the establishment of social health 
insurance in most CEE countries. The shift towards an insurance-based system with market-
oriented features was expected to ensure more stable and sufficient funding for health care, 
and to improve efficiency (Björkman & Nemec, 2013; Kutzin et al., 2010; Preker et al., 2002; 
Rechel & McKee, 2009). The outcomes of the reforms were far from expected, though. The 
insurance systems suffered from institutional shortcomings. For example, to avoid a high tax 
burden for employers and employees, in many countries, the contribution rates were 
established at relatively low levels, while the benefit packages remained generous. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness in collecting contributions was low, particularly in the first 
years of the new system. As a consequence, deficits in the health insurance system became a 
common problem in CEE countries (Baji, 2012; Golinowska et al., 2012; Kutzin et al., 2010). 
The lack of public resources available for health care was balanced by patient payments 
(Balabanova et al., 2004). In the first years of the transition period, in CEE countries, the 
share of out-of- pocket expenditure dramatically increased above the level of the Western 
European countries (Figure 1.2). The rise in out-of-pocket payments was largely driven by 
increasing expenditure on pharmaceuticals for which a broad system of cost-sharing was 
applied while no effective mechanisms to regulate prices and consumption were in place. 
There was also an increase in out-of-pocket payments for services, however mostly informal 
cash payments, which served as a means to assure health care quality for the patients and to 
generate additional income for the medical personnel. Also, so-called quasi-formal payments 
appeared, i.e. unregulated charges or donation paid to health care institutions. Formal and 
regulated cost-sharing for services was less often introduced and mostly in countries which 
suffered the most severe economic decline, like Bulgaria (Atanasova et al., 2011). The spread 
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of different forms of patient payments, on the one hand, and increasing income inequalities 
and poverty, on the other hand, led to a significant deterioration of equity in health care in 
CEE countries during the transition period (Shakarishvili, 2006).  
The differences between Western European countries and CEE countries were not 
significantly reduced also after 2000 (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2). The countries of West 
Europe continued to slightly increase their health care spending as a proportion of GDP and 
kept the share of out-of-pocket expenditure at a low level. CEE countries, after the difficult 
transition period, tried to increase the role of public funding to enhance equity in health care. 
The reforms to improve the health insurance systems and the favorable economic situation in 
this period contributed to the increase of public health expenditure, though compared to 
countries’ GDP it was rather a slight growth. As a result, in some countries, a decrease of the 
share of out-of-pocket expenditure in the total health spending was observed. The substantial 
reduction was not achieved, though. In this period, various CEE countries attempted to 
implement obligatory cost-sharing for health care services, hoping for additional resources for 
health care and replacing still existing informal patient payments. Yet, due to the public 
opposition towards these payments, the attempts were not always successful (Baji et al., 2011; 
Sowada, 2004; Szalay et al., 2011).  
Also, other reforms to increase efficiency in the health care systems of CEE countries were 
not always successful (Golinowska et al., 2006; Rechel & McKee, 2009). Although the 
excessive and inefficient hospital infrastructure inherited from the communist period has been 
substantially reduced, the reduction was not always supported by the analyses of population 
needs or country-level planning strategies, e.g. in Ukraine, the reduction affected mostly small 
rural hospitals due to a relatively low resistance to their closure while the number of tertiary 
level facilities remained virtually unchanged (Lekhan et al., 2010). The primary health care, 
neglected in the Semashko systems, despite the reforms to strengthen its role, has not gained 
relevance as much as it was expected. In the face of no coordination of care and inadequate 
financial incentives for providers, patients in CEE countries are often shifted to more 
expensive specialists care, e.g. in Ukraine unnecessary hospitalizations are estimated to 
account for nearly a third of all hospitalizations (Lekhan et al., 2010), in Poland the rate of 
avoidable hospitalizations is among the highest for Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries (OECD, 2010). 
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Figure 1.1. Total and public health expenditure (% of GDP), 1995-2011 
 
Note: Figure presents unweighted mean values calculated for 21 Western European countries and 14 CEE 
countries (for the list of countries see Figure 1.3). 
Source: World Health Organization (WHO) data (14 August 2013, date last accessed) 
 
Figure 1.2. Share of public and out-of-pocket expenditure in the total health expenditure, 1995-2011 
 
Note: Figure presents unweighted mean values calculated for 21 Western European countries and 14 CEE 
countries (for the list of countries see Figure 1.3).  
Source: WHO data (14 August 2013, date last accessed)  
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From 2004, CEE countries had to face a new challenge, i.e. the outflow of health care 
professionals to Western European countries, which was intensified after the EU enlargement 
(e.g. in 2007, 3% of practicing medical doctors in Romania left the country, mostly from the 
poorest regions) (Wismar et al., 2011). The income related incentives together with working 
conditions (e.g. access to infrastructure, terms of employment) have been identified as the 
most important in the decision to migrate. Migration and poor human resources planning 
resulted in a significant shortage of health care professionals and their unequal territorial 
distribution, which are now recognized as one of the most urgent problems in CEE countries. 
The number of practicing physicians per 1000 population in 2011 equals 4.2 in Bulgaria, 5.2 
in Poland and Romania while for example in Belgium it is 15.4, and in the Netherlands 11.8 
(Eurostat, 2013; OECD, 2013). This prompted some CEE countries to increase salaries of 
health care professionals. In Poland in 2006 a law was passed to increase salaries by 30% 
from the state budget resources. In Lithuania, the reforms to improve working conditions and 
remuneration took place in 2005-2008 and resulted in a 20% increase in wages for physicians 
and nurses (Wismar et al., 2011). However, the economic situation has not allowed for such 
measures in all CEE countries which struggle with this problem.  
The economic crises of 2008 have again affected the health expenditure in European 
countries, shrinking the resources available for health care. The tightened budget constraints 
compelled many European governments to shift health care costs to patients. As a result, out-
of-pocket expenditure gained relevance in both Western and CEE countries, also due to the 
introduction or increase in cost-sharing (Mladovsky et al., 2012). Yet, the growth in the 
contribution of out-of-pocket expenditure in the total health care spending was greater in CEE 
countries, creating more divergence between the two parts of Europe. 
Data on health expenditure for 2011 (Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4) show that among 35 
European countries, the highest per capita health expenditure is in Luxemburg. However, the 
Netherlands occupies the first place among the European countries ranked by the share of 
GDP spent on health (with 12% of GDP). The Netherlands is also the country with the lowest 
contribution of out-of pocket expenditure in the total health care spending (limited also due to 
the presence of private health insurance). On the opposite end, we observe Romania which is 
characterized by the lowest total health expenditure in relation to GDP and Ukraine with the 
lowest per capita expenditure. Moreover, in Ukraine, a substantial share of funds (41%) 
comes from patient payments. 
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Figure 1.3. Total health expenditure per capita (Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Int. $) and as 
percentage of GDP in 2011 
 
Source: WHO data (14 August 2013, date last accessed) 
 
Data for the OECD countries (Figure 1.5) indicate that, while in Western Europe, households 
devote resources on health care services (curative care and dental care), in CEE countries, the 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals tends to dominate, with the highest share of pharmaceutical 
expenditure i.e. 60%, in Poland. However, out-of-pocket payments for services (both public 
and private) in some CEE countries are also common, e.g. in Hungary spending on curative 
services accounts for 39% of total out-of-pocket expenditure. Moreover, the scale of out-of-
pocket payments for services in many CEE countries is likely to be underestimated, if one 
considers the difficulties in measuring common in these countries informal patient payments.  
Relatively low resources for health care and high contribution of different (often unregulated) 
forms of out-of-pocket payments result in deteriorated quality and access to health care 
services for patients in CEE countries. The unmet health care needs due to payments as well 
as other barriers such as long waiting list and far distance to travel are more frequently 
reported in these countries than in wealthier health care systems of Western European 
countries (Figure 1.6).  
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Figure 1.4. Structure of health expenditure in 2011 
 
Source: WHO data (14 August 2013, date last accessed) 
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Figure 1.5. Structure of out-of-pocket expenditure on health care in 2011 (or nearest year) 
 
Source: OECD. (2013). Health at a Glance 2013: OECD indicators 
 
Figure 1.6. Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination for reasons of barriers of 
access (too expensive or too far to travel or waiting list) in 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat data (14 August 2013, date last accessed) 
59 
53 
39 39 35 34 31 29 28 28 26 26 25 
19 18 18 
12 
8 
28 
18 
8 11 16 
26 
20 
29 
21 30 
8 
28 
11 17 17 24 
30 
14 
27 50 
31 
37 
32 
34 
27 
27 
30 
37 
46 
34 
51 
60 59 
3 3 
14 
2 
23 
14 11 
16 15 
23 
15 
28 
1 
31 
13 
5 5 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
B
el
gi
u
m
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
A
u
st
ri
a
H
u
n
ga
ry
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
Fr
an
ce
Sw
ed
en
Fi
n
la
n
d
D
en
m
ar
k
G
e
rm
an
y
Sp
ai
n
Sl
o
va
ki
a
Ic
el
an
d
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
P
o
la
n
d
Es
to
n
ia
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l o
u
t-
o
f-
p
o
ck
et
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 
Curative care Dental care Pharmaceuticals Therapeutic appliances Other
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
A
u
st
ri
a
Sp
ai
n
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
M
al
ta
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
Sw
ed
en
B
el
gi
u
m
N
o
rw
ay
G
e
rm
an
y
Ir
el
an
d
Sl
o
va
ki
a
Fr
an
ce
H
u
n
ga
ry
Li
th
u
an
ia
Ic
el
an
d
C
yp
ru
s
Fi
n
la
n
d
C
ro
at
ia
It
al
y
Es
to
n
ia
G
re
ec
e
P
o
la
n
d
B
u
lg
ar
ia
R
o
m
an
ia
La
tv
ia
W
es
t 
Eu
ro
p
e
C
EE
%
 o
f 
su
rv
ey
ed
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
  
Introduction 
19 
Given the demographic trends, ensuring sustainable health care financing in the future is a 
great challenge for European countries. Projections show that the old-age dependency ratio 
will be increasing constantly and by 2060 the number of persons aged 65 and over will be 
more than half that of the working population (average not weighted ratio among 30 European 
countries) (Eurostat, 2013). The dependency rate is even higher for CEE countries (60%), 
where the total population will be decreasing due to particularly low fertility rates as well as 
migration (Chawla et al., 2007). In the view of these changes, public health expenditure is 
projected to rise across Europe (Przywara, 2010). It is also projected that CEE countries 
which are already struggling how to balance their public health care systems, will experience 
even more severe economic difficulties and financial imbalance (see Figure 1.7).  
 
Figure 1.7. Projected public funding surplus/deficit as % of GDP  
 
Note: Projection based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) social budget model taking into account demographic 
changes, health status changes and utilization pattern, macroeconomics factors as well as changes in labor market.  
Source: Golinowska, S., Kocot, E., Sowa, A. (2008). Development of scenarios for health expenditure in the new 
EU member states: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. CASE network Reports 77/2008. Warsaw.  
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1.3. Patient cost-sharing – potential and threats  
Patient cost-sharing is one of the policy options to improve the sustainability of health care 
financing. It has potential to affect health consumers’ behavior for more efficient use of health 
care resources. As cost-sharing is a fiscal measure, it also allows to generate financial 
resources. In CEE countries where patients pay informally for health care services, formal 
charges are also expected to eliminate the informal payments. Whether the potential of cost-
sharing can be realized without threatening equity and consumers financial protection depends 
however on various context-specific factors and the design of the cost-sharing system.  
 
1.3.1. Efficiency improvement and cost containment  
Economic theory provides the rationale for the application of patient cost-sharing for the 
purpose of efficiency improvement. Since the price is a major determinant of the quantities of 
goods or services demanded, providing health care free-of-charge at the point of use (as it is 
in case of pure public financing) increases the quantity demanded (Arrow, 1963, 1968; Pauly, 
1968). Part of this demand is considered to be excess demand since the marginal benefits of 
the consumption of these additional units of health care are lower than the marginal costs of 
their provision. From an economic point of view, efficiency is deteriorated as the best value 
for resources spent is not obtained (Manning & Marquis, 1996). Thus, economic theory 
predicts that if consumers have to pay, they would be more cost-conscious, i.e. they would 
evaluate the expected benefits before the actual service use and would utilize only those 
services whose benefits exceed the cost for them (Chernew et al., 2007; Zweifel & Manning, 
2000). Imposing prices on the use of health care services is expected to affect also other forms 
of health-related behavior of health care consumers, i.e. provide incentives for healthier 
lifestyle and prevention which also might lead to efficiency gains in health care (Rezayatmand 
et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, the potential of cost-sharing to improve efficiency and further contain the costs, 
relies on the assumptions, that the demand for health care is price sensitive and the decision 
on the use of services is made by consumers. Moreover, when making decisions consumers 
are able to adequately value the services, i.e. estimate short- and long -term clinical benefits 
from the service consumption and the consequences of their behavior (Braithwaite & Rosen, 
2007). While the first assumption is typically met, i.e. the quantity demanded for most health 
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care services reacts to changes in price (the exemption can be for example lifesaving surgical 
procedures), the other assumptions call for some doubt (Mwabu, 1997). 
First, the decision to use health care services is often not a patients’ choice but rather a 
physician decision and in such case implementing prices on services cannot be expected to 
change the quantity demanded. The evidence indicates that even if cost-sharing reduces the 
number of patient visits, the intensity of services provided remain unchanged, as it is largely 
driven by the providers (Swartz, 2010). Therefore, cost-sharing alone without adequate 
supply-side measures i.e. incentives for health care providers, has poor effectiveness in 
controlling the cost of health care (Dawson, 1999).  
Second, given the existing information issues (consumers' insufficient medical knowledge, 
uncertainty), it is questionable whether consumers, are able to adequately value the services 
and distinguish between low- and high-value services. Particularly in case of services with 
positive externalities or merit goods (e.g. preventive services), it is well recognized that 
individual or social benefits from their consumption are not fully recognized and considered 
by individual consumers (McPake, 1993). Thus, it is likely that when uniform charges are 
applied, costumers will reduce the use of both low-value and high-value services (particularly 
consumers who are more price sensitive) which consequently might increase the health care 
cost. This was confirmed in various studies, including the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiments conducted in 1970s and more recent studies, which showed that an increase in 
patient cost-sharing results in the reduction of not only ineffective care but also of medically 
appropriate and essential care, and the low income and chronically sick are disproportionally 
affected by cost-sharing (Chandra et al., 2010; Chernew et al., 2008; Gibson et al., 2005b; 
Goldman et al., 2007; Newhouse, 1993; Trivedi et al., 2008). Therefore, the efficiency gains 
from cost-sharing depend largely on the design of the patient payment system i.e. service and 
patient targeting, which does not threaten the use of essential services for those who benefit 
the most from their consumption.  
 
1.3.2. Resources generation 
The ability of cost-sharing to generate revenues for the health sector is of particular interest to 
policy makers in countries with a poorly financed health care system where the lack of 
sufficient resources impedes the provision of health care services with an adequate quality and 
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access. However, the possibility to shift some health care cost to patients gets on relevance 
across all countries in a context of increasing fiscal pressure e.g. due to the demographic 
changes or economic decline.  
Empirical evidence indicates, however, that revenues from patient cost-sharing for services in 
the statutory benefit package do not always present a significant contribution to public health 
care funding, particularly at the macro-level. The gross revenues generated from patient cost-
sharing in Sub-Saharan African countries has been estimated for not higher than 15% of the 
ministry health budgets with an average of 5% (Creese, 1991). In Vietnam, revenues from 
user charges accounted for 30% of public hospital revenues (Sepehri et al., 2005), while in 
Germany, the 10 Euro charges per first patient visit to the medical doctor in each calendar 
quarter, generated a net revenues of nearly 2 billion Euro a year (approximately 1% of public 
health insurance expenditure) (Stafford, 2012).  
The potential of cost-sharing to generate resources for health care is strongly affected by the 
cost-sharing arrangements and by the consumers’ willingness and ability to pay. High charges 
and a more extensive coverage (services and population covered by cost-sharing), indicate a 
greater potential for revenues. Yet, such cost-sharing system might prevent people from using 
health care services, particularly if the demand is highly price sensitive. This limits the 
revenues generated, and also might adversely affect the population’s health status. For this 
reason, policy makers rather opt for cost-sharing to be sufficiently low to assure that the 
majority of consumers are able to pay the fees while offering even lower or no charges for 
those who cannot pay or who use health care frequently (Björkman & Nemec, 2013). When 
more significant cost-sharing is applied (e.g. when patients pay percentage of health care 
cost), private complementary health insurance, which offers the reimbursement of cost-
sharing costs, is often present.  
Another relevant factor, which should be considered when the fiscal objective of cost-sharing 
is discussed, is the administrative cost of the system. The high costs related to collection of 
fees and their management might substantially decrease the yield of the cost-sharing system 
(Björkman & Nemec, 2013; Robinson, 2002). Hence, particularly in countries with low 
administrative capacity, a non-complex system with limited management of generated 
resources, i.e. when resources retained at the level of providers, is a more rational policy 
option. Moreover, resources from cost-sharing might constitute a significant additional source 
of funding for an individual provider, even if they have negligible macro-level significance.  
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1.3.3. Informal patient payments eradication 
Informal patient payments are an undesirable phenomenon in health care systems. The 
evidence indicates that they are highly unequitable, i.e. low income individuals are burdened 
disproportionally (Balabanova et al., 2004; Szende & Culyer, 2006). Their presence also 
adversely affects the efficient use of health care resources as informal payments might create 
incentives to provide less cost-effective services, or services not for those who benefit the 
most but for those who pay informally. Moreover, informal payments benefit individual 
providers and remain unregistered, hinder the estimation of professionals’ income, health 
expenditure and funding requirements of the health sector.  
The existence of these payments is often associated with underfunding of health care. 
Informal payments provide a means for patients to obtain the services they desire (e.g. get 
quicker access) and for physicians to obtain a satisfactory income. Yet, governance failures in 
health care (lack of adequate norms and legal sanctions, non-transparency and poor 
accountability) as well as cultural context are also seen as contributing factors to the presence 
of these payments (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2002). 
From a theoretical point of view, the implementation of cost-sharing can be seen as an 
opportunity to convert informal patient payments into formal health care charges. This relies on 
the assumption that patients would not like to pay a double fee, and also that patients’ and 
providers’ needs, which lead to informal payments, would be satisfied after the implementation 
of formal fees. Hence, the effectiveness of this strategy largely depends on the elimination of 
the reasons for informal payments. For instance, the elimination of informal payments cannot 
be expected if patients pay informally to get better quality (attention) or quicker access but 
formal charges do not serve the same goal. The development of an appropriate patient 
payment policy aimed at dealing with the informal patient payments requires thus, reliable 
data on the magnitude and pattern of these payments, and reasons for their presence.  
 
1.3.4. Equity and consumers’ financial protection 
The presence of obligatory cost-sharing entails potential adverse effects on equity in health 
care and consumers’ financial protection. Fees which are uniform across the population 
groups, impose a greater burden for individuals with a lower ability to pay (inequity in health 
care financing). This might further compel households to reduce expenses to satisfy other 
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basic needs and cause their impoverishment (deterioration of financial protection). Moreover, 
patients who are in need of using health care but are not able to pay, might forego or delay 
seeking care (inequity in access) (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008).  
The adverse effects of cost-sharing can be mitigated by linking fee levels to the ability to pay 
and health care needs (Russell & Gilson, 1997). The extent to which cost-sharing fees are 
differentiated based on consumers ability to pay and their health care needs, largely depends 
on data availability and administrative capacity of the health care system. Low- and middle- 
income countries often lack policies to promote access for vulnerable groups within cost-
sharing system (Russell & Gilson, 1997). Wealthier countries, accompany the introduction of 
patient charges with some equity protection measures. However, despite the intentions of 
policy makers, the mechanisms are often ineffective in targeting the most vulnerable groups 
and the adverse effects on equity and financial protection are still observed (e.g. (Gemmill et 
al., 2008; Lostao et al., 2007; Sepehri & Chernomas, 2001; Wagstaff et al., 1999; Xu et al., 
2003)).  
The failure of the protection policy can be caused by various factors which are related either to 
the design of the equity protection measures or their implementation (Arsenijevic et al., 2014; 
Gilson et al., 1995; Russell & Gilson, 1997). The absence of reliable data to grant exemption 
(e.g. data on income) is an important obstacle. Often, the exemption arrangements do not reflect 
consumers’ ability to pay but the entitlement is granted rather based on other general 
considerations, and under the pressure or different interest groups (e.g. exempting health care 
workers). Information on the exemption entitlement might also not be available for patients, 
due to poor transparency or health care providers’ reluctance to grant the exemption.  
 
1.4. Research aims and objectives 
As outlined above, in the last decades, patient cost-sharing for health care services has been 
implemented in many European countries. The challenges faced by European countries, 
indicate that in the future, cost-sharing will get even more attention among policy makers. 
There is an urgent need for empirical evidence to support cost-sharing policy making. Despite 
the common researchers’ interest and an increasing body of evidence on patient cost-sharing 
worldwide, the various aspects of cost-sharing and other types of patient payments are not 
well recognized at the European level.  
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With regard to the above, the first research aim of this dissertation is to study the patient 
payment mix in European countries.  
In the preceding section, it has been outlined that the ability of cost-sharing to meet its 
objectives (i.e. efficiency improvements and resources generation) is highly affected by the 
design of payments system. Therefore, it is important to investigate what cost-sharing 
arrangements European countries choose and to what extent these choices are influenced by 
existing conditions and features of a given health care system.  
Moreover, the literature suggests that factors affecting cost-sharing policies are not limited to 
health care system characteristics and economic needs but they also include other non-
economic contextual factors, e.g. social values, governance. Yet, the hypotheses on the 
determinants of cost-sharing policy in Europe are poorly tested. There is also little evidence 
on the causes of informal patient payments which represent an important obstacle for their 
formalization.  
Hence, within the first research aim, the following objectives have been specified:  
a) To review the formal cost-sharing arrangements in European countries in the context 
of health care system characteristics.  
b) To review the formal-informal patient payments mix in European countries and to 
outline factors associated with this mix  
To meet these research objectives, country level data are collected in a desk research and 
analyzed, using both, quantitative and qualitative methods. In contrast to previous studies, the 
research addresses a broad range of factors (incl. economic, governance, social-cultural) and 
covers the vast majority of European countries, including both Western European countries as 
well as CEE countries. The study fills the gap in knowledge on patient payments in Europe 
and provides more insight into the presence and determinants of formal and informal patient 
payments. This allows outlining the strengths and the weaknesses of cost-sharing systems 
applied by European countries, and indicates directions for their improvements. The research 
provides also evidence to facilitate developing strategies for the successful implementation of 
formal cost-sharing and the elimination of informal patient payments. 
In CEE countries, the need for sustainability measures is particularly evident. Increased 
reliance on cost-sharing, though under policy consideration, meets various barriers and has 
Chapter 1 
26 
proven a challenging task. Research evidence may facilitate the cost-sharing policies in these 
countries, however such evidence is rarely available and used by policy makers. Thus, the 
second part of this dissertation is focused on CEE countries and is aimed to provide evidence 
on the potential of formal cost-sharing for health care services in CEE countries.  
One of the existing barriers to implement cost-sharing for health care services in CEE 
countries is public opposition. Despite various examples on its harmful effects on cost-sharing 
policy, such as a withdrawal of fees shortly after their introduction, there is little knowledge 
on the actual reasons for the lack of public support for cost-sharing in these countries. 
A further problem which cannot be neglected when implementing formal cost-sharing in CEE 
countries, is the presence of various patient payments for health care services (informal, 
quasi-formal, payments for privately purchase services) which might substantially burden the 
households and limit the room for the implementation of cost-sharing. The cross-country 
comparative data on the frequency and level of patient payments (including informal 
payments) and their effects on the use of services and household budgets in CEE countries are 
scarce. 
As was discussed earlier, the effects of cost-sharing (on the use of health care services, 
generated resources, equity) largely depend of consumers’ willingness and ability to pay for 
services. Although data on the willingness to pay for health care services and their 
determinants could allow for more adequate cost-sharing systems, they are rarely available in 
CEE countries.  
The three above aspects of cost-sharing policy in CEE countries were investigated within the 
second research aim of this dissertation in accordance with the following objectives: 
a) To study the acceptability of formal patient payments in CEE countries 
b) To study the financial barriers to the use of health care services in CEE countries 
c) To study the willingness to pay for publicly financed health care services in CEE 
countries 
The analyses to meet these objectives draw upon primary data collected between 2009 and 
2010 in six CEE countries, based on identical methodology. The comparable micro-level data 
from CEE countries constitute an important contribution of this research. The countries 
included in the study are Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. These 
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countries constitute a good base for comparison. Although they share a similar communist 
past, the transition period brought some discrepancy between these countries in terms of 
economic development, health care system characteristics, or experience with cost-sharing 
policy. Hence, the conclusions on how these aspects affect consumer behavior and perception 
can be drawn from the presented research. 
Different research methods are applied to respond to the research objectives. The acceptability 
of formal payments is investigated primary using qualitative methods which allows for a more 
comprehensive picture and in-depth understanding of the problem. On the other hand, to 
study the financial barriers caused by patient payments and patients’ willingness to pay for 
services, quantitative data are collected in the representative surveys among health care 
consumers. Along with well-established research techniques, we apply relatively new 
methods from the field of health economics, such as stated preferences techniques, which has 
not found a wide application in cost-sharing studies so far. Hence, the study also contributes 
to research on the usefulness of this method for health policy making. 
A wide range of evidence provided by the research is a step towards more evidence-informed 
policy making in CEE countries. The research results are relevant not only for the six 
countries included in the analysis but also for other CEE countries which share similar 
challenges. They can be used to build more equitable and acceptable cost-sharing policy in 
countries which consider cost-sharing implementation as well as for the amendment of cost-
sharing systems in countries which have already introduced patient payments for health care 
services.  
 
1.5. Dissertation outline 
Following the introductory chapter, the main body of the dissertation is divided into five 
chapters in accordance with the research objectives.  
In Chapter 2, we present the review of patients cost-sharing for health care services in 27 
European Union (EU) countries (all EU countries for year 2008). The review is focused on 
patient payment arrangements in these countries in 2007-2008, as well as the changes in cost-
sharing policy since 1990. The chapter provides also evidence on the link between cost-
sharing arrangements and health care system characteristics (i.e. model of health care funding, 
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provider payment mechanisms, presence of gate-keeping function, level of public health 
expenditure, presence of informal patient payments). 
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 is extended in Chapter 3 where we review the formal-
informal patient payment mix in 35 European countries (including non-EU countries). 
Moreover, to explain the cross-country differences in the formal-informal patient payment 
mix we search not only in the health care system characteristics, but also in governance and 
social-cultural factors. Comparative quantitative analysis is supported by qualitative 
description of selected country experiences with the implementation of patient cost-sharing.  
Chapters 4-6 are devoted to the analysis of primary data collected in six CEE countries 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Ukraine) and are aimed to meet the second 
research aim of the dissertation i.e. to provide evidence on the potential of formal cost-sharing 
for health care services in CEE countries. 
Chapter 4 is focused on the acceptability of cost-sharing for health care services among 
health care system stakeholders (health care consumers, health care providers, policy makers 
and insurer representatives) in the six countries. To outline respondents’ opinions and 
expectations from cost-sharing policy in their country, we analyze qualitative data collected in 
2009 in focus groups discussions and in-depth interviews as well as quantitative data gathered 
among the same participants. The conclusions on how to increase the consumers’ 
acceptability of formal patient payments in CEE countries and build the consensus on cost-
sharing policy is drawn from the research.  
Chapter 5 includes the analysis of consumers’ inability to pay for health care services based 
on the quantitative data collected in 2010 in the nationally representative surveys in the six 
countries. We present evidence on the frequency and level of patient payments for out-patient 
and hospital health care services and on the two indicators of inability to pay, i.e. the need to 
borrow money or sell assets to pay for services, and foregoing the use of services due to 
inability to pay. The differences between the countries and across socio-demographic groups 
of respondents are analyzed and discussed in the chapter.  
In Chapter 6, we present the study on consumers’ willingness to pay for publicly financed 
health care services using a stated willingness to pay technique, i.e. contingent valuation 
method. Just as Chapter 5, the analysis draws upon data collected in the representative 
surveys conducted in 2010 in the six CEE countries. We elicit information on the consumers’ 
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willingness and ability to pay for two types of health care services, i.e. consultation with 
medical specialists and hospitalizations, if provided with good quality and access. We also 
investigate the reasons for consumers’ unwillingness to pay, i.e. objection to pay and inability 
to pay. The presented analysis allows us to draw some conclusions on the determinants of the 
stated willingness to pay for services. We also discuss the application of contingent valuation 
results for cost-sharing policy making in CEE countries. 
The dissertation is completed with Chapter 7 where the main findings are summarized and 
discussed. The recommendations to strengthen cost-sharing policy, particularly in CEE 
countries are formulated. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Diversity and dynamics of patient cost-sharing for 
physicians’ and hospital services 
in the 27 European Union countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter draws upon: 
Tambor, M., Pavlova, M., Woch, P., & Groot, W. (2011). Diversity and dynamics of patient 
cost-sharing for physicians' and hospital services in the 27 European Union countries. 
European Journal of Public Health, 21, 585-590. 
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Abstract 
 
Background: Patient cost-sharing has been increasingly applied in health care systems in 
various countries across the world. Also, the European Union member states rely on patient 
payments for publicly financed health care.  
Objective: To review patient cost-sharing arrangements for health care services in 27 EU 
countries and to outline the relations of patient cost-sharing designs with health care system 
characteristics. 
Methods: Data were collected in a desk research, including multiply sources i.e. international 
data bases, national laws and regulations, as well as scientific and policy reports. The analysis 
presents a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques.  
Results: Patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU have been changing considerably over 
the past two decades (mostly being extended) and are quite diverse at present. There is a 
relation between patient cost-sharing arrangements and some characteristics of the health care 
system in a country. In a few EU countries, a mix of formal and informal charges exists, 
which creates a double financial burden for health care consumers.  
Conclusions: The adequacy of patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU countries needs to 
be reconsidered. It is essential to deal with informal patient payments (where applicable) and 
to assure adequate exemption mechanisms to diminish the adverse equity effects of patient 
cost-sharing. Close communication with the public is needed to clarify the objectives and 
content of a patient payment policy in a country.  
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2.1. Introduction 
During the past decades, many governments have introduced patient cost-sharing in their 
public health care system (Sepehri & Chernomas, 2001; Smith, 2005). This trend toward more 
cost-sharing by patients has affected the EU member states as well (Lostao et al., 2007; 
Robinson, 2002; Rovira et al., 1998; Saltman & Figueras, 1997). As outlined in the 
introductory chapter, the objective of patient cost-sharing is to increase the efficiency of 
health care utilization by making consumers more cost-conscious (Irvine & Gratzer, 2002; 
Pauly, 1968). The introduction of patient cost-sharing is also a method to generate additional 
health care revenues and to shift health care costs to consumers (Sepehri et al., 2005). 
Although the achievement of these objectives is disputed (Creese, 1991; Creese & Kutzin, 
1995; Newhouse, 1993; Sepehri & Chernomas, 2001; Van De Voorde et al., 2001), the 
current context of increased fiscal pressure and sustainability problems within the European 
public health care systems brings patient cost-sharing on the policy agenda (Scherer & 
Devaux, 2010).  
The policy objectives assigned to patient cost-sharing, are found to influence the design of 
patient payment mechanisms (Saltman & Figueras, 1998). However as suggested by Ros et al. 
(Ros et al., 2000) there are also relations between patient cost-sharing designs and the 
characteristics of the health care system (e.g. method of system funding, provider payment 
mechanisms and the role of general practitioners (GPs) as gate-keepers). Comparative 
analyses between the patient cost-sharing mechanisms in Europe could help to outline their 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as to indicate strategies for improvements.  
Although comparative analyses on this issue have been done (Jemiai et al., 2004; Ros et al., 
2000), they are limited only to Western and some Southern EU countries prior to the 2004 EU 
enlargement. In this chapter, we review the forms of patient cost-sharing for health care 
services in 27 EU countries (all EU countries for year 2008). We extend the existing analyses
 
by including the new 12 EU member states of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe as a 
result of the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. Moreover, we present data not only on the 
current patient cost-sharing mechanisms in the EU but also data on their dynamics.  
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2.2. Methods 
For the purpose of our analysis, we defined patient cost-sharing as an official arrangement 
that is specifically aimed to involve patients in the payment for public health care services 
provided to them (Saltman & Figueras, 1997). By public health care services, we meant 
services that are funded from general tax revenues, payroll taxes or social health insurance 
contributions, provided by public and/or private health care providers. This included: co-
payments (flat-rate fees), co-insurance (fees equal to a given percentage of the actual service 
cost) and deductibles (payments of the actual service cost up to a given limit).  
We focused on out-patient physician’s and in-patient hospital services and we excluded 
additional patient payments for diagnostics, tests, pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
Although these additional payments are common in the EU countries and equally relevant to 
policy, they are rather diverse and should be the focus of separate studies. Moreover, in case 
of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, a different theoretical framework is required because 
they are commodities and thus, distinctive from the health care services analyzed in this 
chapter. Further, we considered only those patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU 
countries that are formal and obligatory, and concern services included in the statutory benefit 
package in a country. Thus, we excluded the optional patient cost-sharing in exchange, for 
example, for lower insurance premiums or luxury hospital accommodation, as well as 
provider-determined patient payments, such as extra billing. 
Given the results of previous studies on the same topic (Ros et al., 2000), we expect that the 
existence and main elements of patient cost-sharing may be related to the characteristics of 
the health care systems, i.e. health care funding model, presence of gate-keeping function and 
health care provider payment mechanisms.  
In particular, a tax-based funding of the health care system implies stronger social values for 
equity than an insurance-based funding mechanism (Chinitz et al., 1998; Wagstaff et al., 
1999). Therefore, it is expected that patient cost-sharing (which implies inequity) is less often 
applied in tax-based health care systems. Moreover, when patient cost-sharing is applied, 
exemptions of vulnerable groups of populations or essential services from patient cost-sharing 
are expected to be more common in tax-based than in insurance-based systems.  
Patient cost-sharing is a measure to reduce unnecessary use of health care services, (Akin et 
al., 1987; Bennett & Ngalande-Banda, 1994; Chernew et al., 2007; Rubin & Mendelson, 
1996).
 
However, unnecessary use of health care services can be also filtered through supply-
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side arrangements, such as GPs acting as gate-keepers to specialized care. The mechanisms 
acting on the providers’ side are being recommended as more effective and equitable 
compared to cost-sharing (Dawson, 1999; De Gooijer, 2007; Van De Voorde et al., 2001). 
Thus, less cost-sharing can be expected in countries with well-developed gate-keeping 
function. Nevertheless, countries that are focused on increasing health care efficiency and 
containing public expenditures, may apply both supply- and demand-side measures to 
eliminate unnecessary use of health care services. 
The cost-related information generated by the provider payment mechanism may also 
influence the type of patient cost-sharing (Ros et al., 2000). It is expected that countries where 
physicians are paid by capitation or are salaried employees, rely more on non-cost-related 
cost-sharing, i.e. co-payments. On the other hand, in countries that apply output-based 
provider payment mechanisms (fee-for-service or case-based payment) the introduction of co-
insurance or deductibles is technically possible as the information on the cost/price of services 
is available.  
We extend the analysis by Ros et al, with two additional system characteristics, namely the 
existence of informal patient payments and the level of public expenditure on health. 
Widespread informal patient payments and low public health expenditure are features of most 
of the new EU countries which might also affect the existence and design of patient cost-
sharing.  
The data for our analysis were collected in a desk research. In order to assure the validity of 
the data, we applied the method of triangulation (Creswell & Miller, 2000), i.e. cross-
checking data from various groups of sources: (1) comparative databases and reports provided 
by international institutions (namely EU, OECD and WHO), (2) national laws and regulations 
(when available in English), and (3) papers published in peer-reviewed journals (using 
PubMed, Medline and ScholarGoogle). For each country, several sources of information were 
obtained and compared to confirm the validity of the data. The objective was to outline a 
comprehensive description of the patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU for 2007-2008, 
the major changes in these arrangements since 1990, and the basic characteristic of the EU 
health care systems. In order to assure comparability of data on the existence of informal 
patient payments in all EU countries, we used results of the Health Consumer Powerhouse 
survey on informal payments reported in the Health Consumer Index 2008 (Björnberg & 
Uhlir, 2008). Data on the level of health expenditure were from the OECD Health Data 2009.  
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We analyzed the data qualitatively in order to search for typical combinations of patient cost-
sharing arrangements and the characteristics of the health care systems. However, we also 
statistically tested these relationships using partial correlations (software: StataSE 8).  
 
2.3. Results 
The review of the characteristics of health care systems can be found in Table 2.1, while 
patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU countries are summarized in Table 2.2 and Table 
2.3. 
 
2.3.1. Overall characteristics of the EU health care systems  
Our review (see Table 2.1) suggests that, in the EU, the insurance-based mechanism of 
funding the health care slightly prevails over the tax-based system. The presence of a GP 
gate-keeping function is rather common. In most countries, the provider payment mechanisms 
for GPs’ services are only partly based on output (i.e. capitation, salaries and budgets or their 
combination with other methods), while for out-patient specialists’ and in-patient hospital 
services, the provider payment mechanisms based on output (i.e. fee-for-service and case-
mix) are most prevalent. Informal patient payments are reported in more than half of the 
countries (as widely prevalent in eight countries). We also find a large variation in public 
expenditure on health within the EU (from 363 to 4992 per capita; PPP International dollar 
for 2006). 
 
2.3.2. Patient cost-sharing mechanisms in the EU health care systems  
The review (see Table 2.2) indicates that in more than half of the EU countries, there is formal 
patient cost-sharing for GP’s, out-patient specialists’ and in-patient hospital services. The 
most common type is co-payment, followed by co-insurance, and a mixture of these two 
types. Among the 27 EU countries, only the Netherlands applies deductibles. 
In some EU countries, patients meet higher payment obligations when visiting a specialist 
than when visiting a GP. In most countries, patients who visit a specialist without a referral 
when a referral is required, meet higher payment obligations. Only 5 out of 27 countries do 
not apply such regulation.  
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Table 2.1. Basic characteristics of the EU health care systems (2007-2008) 
Country 
Predominant  
mechanism of 
health care 
funding a 
GPs’  
gate-keeping 
function b 
Provider payment mechanisms c Informal  
patient  
payments 
Public health 
expenditure 
[per capita 
PPP Int.$]  
GPs’  
services 
Specialists’ 
services 
In-patient 
hospital care 
        
Austria Insurance based 
No gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based 
Some 
incidents 
2737 
Belgium Insurance based 
No gate-
keeping 
Output based Output based Output based Not present 2194 
Bulgaria Insurance based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based 
Widely 
spread 
421 
Cyprus Tax based 
No gate-
keeping 
Not output 
based 
Not output 
based 
Not output based Not present 1232 
Czech 
Republic  
Insurance based 
No gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Widely 
spread 
1329 
Denmark Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based Not present 3239 
Estonia Insurance based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based 
Widely 
spread 
702 
Finland Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Not present 2018 
France  Insurance based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Output based Output based 
Partly output 
based 
Some 
incidents 
2727 
Germany Insurance based 
No gate-
keeping 
Output based Output based Output based Not present 2664 
Greece Mixed funding 
No gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Widely 
spread 
1580 
Hungary Insurance based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Widely 
spread 
1058 
Ireland Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Not output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Not present 2431 
Italy Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based 
Some 
incidents 
2031 
Latvia Tax based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based 
Some 
incidents 
603 
Lithuania Insurance based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based 
Widely 
spread 
687 
Luxembourg  Insurance based 
No gate-
keeping 
Output based Output based Not output based 
Some 
incidents 
4992 
Malta Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Not output 
based 
Not output 
based 
Not output based 
Some 
incidents 
3254 
Netherlands Insurance based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Output based Output based Not present 2785 
Poland  Insurance based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based 
Widely 
spread 
643 
Portugal Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Not present 1552 
Romania Insurance based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Widely 
spread 
363 
Slovakia Insurance based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based 
Some 
incidents 
903 
Slovenia Insurance based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Output based 
Some 
incidents 
1490 
Spain Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Not output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Not present 1757 
Sweden Tax based 
Partial gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Not present 2583 
United 
Kingdom  
Tax based 
Full gate-
keeping 
Partly output 
based 
Not output 
based 
Partly output 
based 
Not present 2457 
a Mixed system funding: the share of tax expenditures and insurance expenditures in total public health expenditures is almost equal. Data 
sources: Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) database; European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, HiT 
Country Profiles; OECD Health Data;  
b Full gate-keeping: patients are always obliged to get referral from their GPs unless they pay higher fee or use private health care. Partial 
gate-keeping: gate-keeping does not apply to all specialists and/or patients can have direct access to specialists in some cases. Data sources: 
MISSOC database; Euro Health Consumer Index 2008; European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, HiT Country Profiles;  
c Not output based: salaries or budgets, Partly output based: salaries and budgets combined with other methods, capitation, per diem, per 
admission (also if combined with other methods), Output based: fee-for-service, case-mix or combinations of these two. Data sources: 
MISSOC database; European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, HiT Country Profiles; The Supply of Physician Services in 
OECD Countries, OECD Health Working Papers no. 21. 
Chapter 2 
38 
Table 2.2. Patient cost-sharing arrangements in 27 EU countries for three types of services
 a
 
(2007-2008) 
Country 
Type and indicative magnitude of patient cost-sharing b 
GPs’ services  
(office visit) 
Specialists’ services 
(visit with referral) 
In-patient hospital care 
(day hospitalization) 
Visit to specialist 
without referral 
when required 
     
Austria  Co-insurance  
20% 
Co-insurance  
20% 
Co-payment 
€ 10.00 
Higher payment 
Belgium  Mixed  
€ 14.86 + 25% co-
insurance 
Mixed  
€ 14.86 + 40% co-
insurance 
Co-payment 
€ 55.55 
The same payment 
Bulgaria  Co-payment € 1.23 Co-payment € 1.23 Co-payment 
€ 2.46 
Full payment 
Cyprus Co-payment  
€ 8.16 
Co-payment 
€ 11.66 
Co-payment 
€ 52.45 
Full payment 
Czech 
Republic  
Co-payment  
€ 1.16 
Co-payment  
€ 1.16 
Co-payment 
€ 2.33 
The same payment 
Denmark  No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Group change and 
payment 
Estonia  No cost-sharing Co-payment € 3.20 Co-payment 
€ 1.60 
Higher payment 
Finland  Co-payment  
€ 11.00 
Co-payment  
€ 11.00 
Co-payment 
€ 26.00 
Higher payment 
France Mixed  
€ 1.00 + 30% co-insurance 
Mixed  
€ 1.00 + 30% co-insurance 
Mixed  
€ 16.00 + 20% co-insurance 
Higher payment 
Germany Co-payment  
€ 10.00 
Co-payment  
€ 10.00 
Co-payment 
€ 10.00 
Higher payment 
Greece No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Possibly payment 
Hungary No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Ireland Co-payment  
€40.00 
Co-payment  
€40.00 
Co-payment 
€75.00 
Higher payment 
Italy No cost-sharing Co-payment  
€ 36 
No cost-sharing Full payment 
Latvia Co-payment  
€ .71 
Co-payment  
€ 2.84 
Co-payment 
€ 7.09 
The same payment 
Lithuania  No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Higher payment 
Luxembourg Co-insurance  
20% 
Co-insurance  
20% 
Co-payment 
€ 12.60 
The same payment 
Malta No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Netherlands No cost-sharing Deductibles  
€ 150 
Deductibles  
€ 150 
Full payment 
Poland No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Portugal Co-payment  
€ 2.15 
Co-payment  
€ 4.40 
Co-payment 
€ 5.10 
Full payment 
Romania No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Slovakia No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Slovenia Co-insurance  
ca.25% 
Co-insurance  
ca.25% 
Co-insurance  
ca.25% 
Full payment 
Spain No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
Sweden Co-payment  
€ 18.90 
Co-payment  
€ 28.30 
Co-payment 
€ 7.55 
The same payment 
United 
Kingdom  
No cost-sharing No cost-sharing No cost-sharing Full payment 
a Patient cost-sharing for visits to GP, visit to specialist and in-patient hospital services excluding additional payments for diagnostics, tests 
and pharmaceuticals, as well as patient payments for luxury and private health care services, and informal patient payments;  
b In case of variations in the magnitude of patient cost-sharing during a calendar year, first office visit to a physician and first day 
hospitalization per year is considered.  
Data sources: MISSOC database, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, HiT Country Profiles; The Commonwealth Fund, 
Health Care System Profiles, Schneider P. Evidence on cost-sharing in health care: applications to Hungary. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 2008 (see also Appendix A). 
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Table 2.3. Patient cost-sharing arrangements in 27 EU countries - equity protection 
mechanisms that accompany patient cost-sharing  
Country 
Equity protection mechanisms accompanying patient cost-sharing 
Limits that 
apply to all 
individuals 
Exclusion of 
maternity, 
preventive, 
emergency 
care a 
Exemptions/ 
reductions for 
children 
Exemptions/ 
reductions for 
elderly/ 
pensioners 
Exemptions/ 
reductions for 
low-income 
people 
Exemptions/ 
reductions for 
chronic/severe 
cases 
       
Austria  Some limits Only emergency 
care not excluded 
Partly present Partly present Partly present Present 
Belgium  Some limits All three types 
not excluded 
Partly present Partly present Partly present Present 
Bulgaria  Some limits All three types 
excluded 
Fully present Partly present Partly present Present 
Cyprus No limits Only emergency 
care excluded 
Not present Partly present Partly present Present 
Czech 
Republic  
Total limit Only preventive 
care excluded 
Partly present Partly present Fully present Present 
Denmark  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Estonia  Some limits Only maternity 
care excluded 
Partly present Not present Not present Present 
Finland  Some limits Only preventive 
care excluded 
Partly present Not present Not present Present 
France Some limits Only maternity 
care excluded 
Partly present Partly present Fully present Present 
Germany Total limit Only emergency 
care not excluded 
Fully present Not present Partly present Present 
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ireland Some limits Only emergency 
care not excluded 
Partly present Partly present Fully present Present 
Italy Some limits Only emergency 
care not excluded 
Partly present Partly present Fully present Present 
Latvia Some limits All three types 
excluded 
Fully present Partly present Fully present Present 
Lithuania  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg Some limits All three types 
excluded 
Partly present Not present Partly present Present 
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands Total limit Only maternity 
care excluded 
Fully present Not present Not present Present 
Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Portugal Some limits Only maternity 
care excluded 
Partly present Partly present Fully present Present 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia No limits All three types 
excluded 
Fully present Partly present Fully present Present 
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sweden Total limit All three types 
not excluded 
Fully present Partly present Partly present Not present 
United 
Kingdom  
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
n.a.= not applicable since no cost-sharing for all three types of services. 
a Three types of essential services provided by GPs, medical specialists and hospitals. 
Data sources: MISSOC database, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, HiT Country Profiles; The Commonwealth Fund, 
Health Care System Profiles, Schneider P. Evidence on cost-sharing in health care: applications to Hungary. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 2008 (see also Appendix A). 
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It is difficult to compare the actual magnitude of patient cost-sharing because in case of co-
insurance and deductibles, the size of payment depends on the actual service cost, which in 
turn depends on the nature of health care services provided. However, if we look at co-
payments (when this is the only type of patient cost-sharing), the size of co-payments varies 
considerably ranging from about 1 Euro (in Bulgaria, Latvia and the Czech Republic), up to 
40 Euro for the first visit to GPs and specialists per year, and up to 75 Euro for the first day of 
hospitalization per year in Ireland. 
In virtually all EU countries where patient cost-sharing is implemented, there are some cost-
sharing limits that apply to all patients (see Table 2.3). Maternity and preventive services are 
often excluded from patient cost-sharing. In all countries, there is some form of exemption or 
fee reduction for the key vulnerable population groups. These are most often children, 
elderly/pensioners, low-income individuals (or unemployed) and those with selected health 
conditions (chronic or severe illnesses, disabilities). Yet, the entitlement for 
exemption/reduction is also granted to other groups e.g. war veterans (e.g. France, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria), individuals persecuted for their political beliefs (Latvia), or medical professionals 
(Bulgaria). 
We find that the proportion of the population to whom patient cost-sharing actually applies 
can vary considerably, for example, from about 92% in France to 60% in Italy, and 50% in 
Portugal. In some countries (e.g. Slovenia, France, Germany), individuals can purchase 
private health insurance that covers their cost-sharing obligations. The collection and use of 
cost-sharing payments also takes various forms. In some countries, fees paid by patients are 
transferred to the state or the health insurance fund (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia), while in 
other countries, the fees are collected and retained locally at the point of service provision 
(e.g. Belgium, France, Sweden). Another source of diversity among the EU countries, which 
affects patient payments obligation, is the content of the statutory benefit package. Thus, a 
service provided in one country with a certain degree of patient cost-sharing, could require 
full-coverage of service costs by the patients in another country if this service is not included 
in the statutory benefit package.  
 
2.3.3. Results of the statistical analysis  
The results of the partial correlations between patient cost-sharing arrangements and the 
characteristics of the 27 EU health care systems can be found in Table 2.4. The only system 
Patient cost-sharing in the EU countries 
 41 
characteristic that we find to be significantly correlated with the existence of patient cost-
sharing, is the presence of informal patient payments. In countries with informal patient 
payments, patient cost-sharing is less frequent. Patient cost-sharing that is not related to 
service cost (i.e. co-payments), is more common in the EU health care systems with tax-based 
funding and in systems with less gate-keeping by GPs, while patient cost-sharing that is 
related to service cost (co-insurance and deductibles), is more frequently observed in 
insurance-based health care systems and where the GPs’ gate-keeping function is stronger. 
We do not find any significant correlation between the characteristics of the EU health care 
systems and the presence of equity protection mechanisms. 
 
Table 2.4. Partial correlations between patient cost-sharing and health care system 
characteristics 
Explanatory variables 
 
Presence of cost-
sharing (0= not 
present; 1= present) 
Type of cost-sharing  
(0= not cost-related;  
1= cost-related) 
Presence of equity protection mechanisms 
 (0= no; 1= partially; 2= fully) 
G
P
s 
S
p
ec
ia
li
st
s 
H
o
sp
it
al
 c
ar
e 
 G
P
s 
S
p
ec
ia
li
st
s 
H
o
sp
it
al
 c
ar
e 
 A
n
n
u
al
 l
im
it
s 
 
E
ss
en
ti
al
 c
ar
e 
C
h
il
d
re
n
 
P
en
si
o
n
er
s 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
 
              
Health system funding  
(0= taxes; 1= mixed;  
2= insurance) 
-.040 .011 .185  .559 .603* .625*  -.089 .003 .072 -.186 -.302 
              
Presence of GPs’ gate-
keeping  
(0= no; 1= partial; 
2= full) 
-.297 -.229 -.247  .281 .229 .642*  -.108 .414 .381 -.035 .103 
              
Output based payment – 
GPs 
(0= no; 1= partly; 
2= yes) 
.133 .019 -.046  -.317 -.279 -.179  .056 -.202 -.022 .065 .405 
              
Output based payment – 
specialists 
(0= no;1= partly;  
2= yes) 
.277 .191 .265  .285 .281 .185  .118 .372 .402 .059 -.090 
              
Output based payment – 
hospitals 
(0= no; 1= partly; 
2= yes) 
-.258 .000 .154  -.106 -.076 -.326  .166 -.305 .156 -.210 -.257 
              
Informal patient 
payments 
(0= no; 1= some; 
2= spread) 
-.392* -.304 -.455*  -.301 -.306 -.420  .009 .410 -.117 .055 .254 
              
Public expenditure on 
health [per capita PPP 
int.$]  
-.277 -.079 -.197  .373 .402 -.114  .155 .026 -.078 -.321 -.231 
N a 27 27 27  14 17 16  17 17 17 17 17 
a For the analysis of the type of cost-sharing and presence of equity protection mechanisms, only countries which introduced patient cost-
sharing were included;* p< .1 
  
Chapter 2 
42 
2.3.4. The dynamics of patient cost-sharing in the EU 
Our review suggests that the reliance and design of patient cost-sharing mechanisms in the 
EU are continuously being modified. The overview of major changes in patient cost-sharing 
since 1990 is presented in Table 2.5. Patient cost-sharing has experienced a transformation in 
many countries, ranging from minor changes in the fee levels mostly due to adjustments for 
inflation (e.g. Belgium, Finland and Sweden) to more radical changes involving its 
introduction (e.g. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic) or its re-introduction (e.g. Portugal and 
the Netherlands), to even more drastic changes of abolishing patient cost-sharing shortly after 
its introduction (e.g. Hungary and Slovakia). We observe that changes in patient cost-sharing 
were often related to the political process like the election of a new government. 
The overview also suggests that some countries that do not rely on patient cost-sharing 
discuss its introduction, even though this discussion could be quite prolonged (as it is in 
Poland), due to strong opposition to patient payments. In other countries (e.g. Bulgaria and 
Latvia), the existence of patient cost-sharing has been questioned on several occasions mostly 
on equity grounds, although they have preserved it.  
 
Table 2.5. The dynamics of patient cost-sharing in 27 EU countries 
Country Major changes in patient cost-sharing for physician’s and hospital services since 1990 
Austria  Periodic increases in existing patient cost-sharing. New fees were introduced in 1996/1997/2001 for GPs’ and 
specialists’ services. From these, the out-patient clinic fee was withdrawn in 2005 due to administrative costs and 
public resistance.  
Belgium  No essential changes in the patient cost-sharing mechanism but constantly increasing patient fees. The increase 
was slow until 1993, but in 1994, patient cost-sharing obligations raised dramatically (approximately 50%) 
followed by periodic increases in fee levels.  
Bulgaria  Patient cost-sharing was introduced in 2000 with the establishment of social health insurance. The fee levels are 
periodically adjusted with the increase of the minimum salary in the country. Patient cost-sharing is questioned 
due to informal payments.  
Cyprus  No essential changes in the patient cost-sharing. Only periodic increases in the fee levels.  
Czech 
Republic 
Patient cost-sharing for physician and hospital services was implemented in 2008.  
Denmark  No obligatory patient cost-sharing. No changes. 
Estonia  Co-payments for physician’s services were introduced in 1995-2002, together with co-insurance for only few 
hospital services. In 2004, co-payments for visits to GPs were abolished (except for home visits) while fees for 
hospital stay were introduced.  
Finland  No essential changes in patient cost-sharing. Only periodic increases in co-payment fees.  
France  Patient cost-sharing was re-introduced in the 1990’s. Prior to 2004, it was mainly in the form of co-insurance 
(constantly increasing) during the last two decades. Since 2004, new co-payments have been introduced in 
addition to co-insurance.  
Germany  Patient cost-sharing for hospital services was introduced prior to 1990 and was fluctuating during the years. In 
1994, fees for hospital care were made uniform (health insurance law). Patient cost-sharing for physician’s 
services was introduced in 2004.  
Greece  Traditionally, no patient cost-sharing, except for out-patient hospital visits without referrals. However, widely 
spread informal patient payments, according to some estimations, 36% of patients in public hospitals pay 
informally.  
Hungary  Patient cost-sharing was introduced in 2007 in a context of widely spread informal payments. It met a strong 
public opposition and was abolished in 2008 after a referendum, by the same government that introduced it.  
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Ireland  Only periodic increases in the fee levels paid by those who do not have medical card and thus, are not eligible for 
exemptions (about 70% of the population after 2001 when those aged 70 or over received also entitlement to a 
medical card). 
Italy Patient cost-sharing for visits to specialists was introduced in 1990. Attempts to introduce patient cost-sharing for 
hospital services in 1989 and for emergency services in 1994 have failed due to public discontent.  
Latvia Patient cost-sharing (co-payments) was first introduced in 1995. Patient fees are regularly updated and extended. 
There are concerns among the public and health care providers about the negative effects of patient cost-sharing.  
Lithuania No patient cost-sharing for physicians’ and in-patient hospital services, except for fees for GPs’ home visits, visits 
to specialists without referrals and some diagnostic services (legislation 1991). Little public support for patient 
cost-sharing.  
Luxembourg No essential changes in the patient cost-sharing (co-insurance). Only, constantly increasing fees.   
Malta No patient cost-sharing. There are policy perceptions that cost-sharing could help to reduce unnecessary care.   
Netherlands Patient cost-sharing (co-insurance and co-payments for specialists’ and hospital services) was introduced in 1997 
and then abolished in 1999. In 2008, obligatory patient cost-sharing for specialist’s and hospital care was re-
introduced as deductibles. 
Poland No patient cost-sharing. No changes. Prolonged discussions on possible introduction of patient cost-sharing but 
still no actual policy plans. There are informal patient payments.  
Portugal Patient cost-sharing was introduced in 1982 and abolished after the 1986 elections mainly because it was thought 
to contravene the constitution. After the constitution was changed, patient cost-sharing was re-introduced in 1992.  
Romania No patient cost-sharing. Plans to introduce fees. However, widely spread informal patient payments.  
Slovakia Patient cost-sharing (co-payments) was introduced in 2003 and abolished in 2006, even though it is suggested that 
formal payments by patient might have helped to reduce the informal patient payments.  
Slovenia Patient cost-sharing (co-insurance) was introduced in 1992 after changes in the health insurance legislation. At the 
same time, voluntary private insurance for covering cost-sharing obligations was implemented and neutralized the 
effects on demand.  
Spain No patient cost-sharing. Government attempted to introduce patient cost-sharing in 1991, but failed due to public 
opposition.  
Sweden No essential changes in the patient cost-sharing mechanism. Only periodic increases in the co-payment fee levels 
by each municipality in accordance with limits set by the government.  
United 
Kingdom  
No patient cost-sharing. No changes. Discussions on the potential role of patient cost-sharing. 
Source: See Appendix A 
 
2.4. Discussion  
Our results suggest that in nearly all countries in the EU, patients pay a fee for the use of 
public health care services either formally or informally. Only few countries in the EU 
provide public health care services that are truly free-of-charge at the point of consumption. 
However, in some countries, the implementation of patient cost-sharing has resulted in a mix 
of formal and informal charges, which creates a double financial burden for health care 
consumers. Therefore, it is important to deal with informal patient payments (where 
applicable), for example, by assuring adequate service provision and provider remuneration 
(Lewis, 2000; Thompson & Witter, 2000). Patient cost-sharing revenues could be reinvested 
in the health sector with such purpose.  
Our findings do not suggest a significant relation between the existence of patient cost-sharing 
for health care services in the EU countries and the role assigned to the GPs. Apparently, 
some countries are more efficiency oriented and use a mixture of demand- and supply-side 
mechanisms to improve efficiency and to contain public expenditure on health care, while 
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other member states are less focused on the implementation of such mechanisms. Yet, it 
should be recognized that there is an overall attempt among the EU countries to encourage an 
efficient use of health care services by implementing higher payment obligations for 
specialized out-patient care (mainly in case of no referral) than for primary care. 
Countries in the EU, which have introduced patient cost-sharing for health care services, most 
often, rely on co-payments for broad categories of services (visit to a physician, day of 
hospitalization). Co-payments are easy to apply and result in relatively low administrative 
costs but they are less effective in reducing excess demand for health care services since they 
do not provide price signals to consumers to moderate the utilization of services for efficiency 
improvement (De Gooijer, 2007; Fendrick & Chernew, 2006).
 
 This may indicate that the 
simplicity of the payment mechanism and low administration costs might be guiding policy 
when implementing patient cost-sharing.  
Overall, patient cost-sharing for health care services in the EU are quite diverse. We identify 
only few relations that could explain this diversity from the perspective of the health care 
systems. However, general contextual factors may also affect the specificities of the patient 
cost-sharing (Ros et al., 2000; WHO, 2006). There are underlying cultural values deeply 
rooted in societies that determine whether free access to health care services is seen as a 
patient right in a given country and how acceptable patient cost-sharing is. Thus, contextual 
factors may further explain the diversity in patient cost-sharing in the EU. 
Still, we find one important common feature. That is the broad range of equity protection 
mechanisms that accompany patient cost-sharing in the EU. Apparently, policy makers take 
care to consider the adverse equity effects of patient cost-sharing. As suggested by the 
empirical evidence, the introduction of patient cost-sharing mainly reduces the utilization of 
health care service by children, poor individuals, chronically sick and in areas where other 
costs (e.g. travelling costs) are significantly high (Creese & Kutzin, 1995; Deininger & 
Mpuga, 2005).
 
Yet, the equity protection mechanisms implemented are not always effective. 
Recent studies suggest that even in high-income Western European member states (like 
Belgium, Finland and Sweden) patients have difficulties in paying the cost-sharing 
obligations and thus, avoid or delay seeking health care (De Gooijer, 2007; Lostao et al., 
2007; Mielck et al., 2009). 
As indicated by our results on the dynamics of patient cost-sharing for health care services, 
the reliance on patient payments in the EU is increasing. The level of fees for health care 
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services is increasing as well as is the number of countries where patients are obliged to pay 
such fees. The limitations to the implementation of patient cost-sharing for health care 
services in some EU countries, appears to have its ground in a strong public opposition. A 
lack of public acceptance of patient cost-sharing in a country is a factor which influences cost-
sharing policies and restrains policy makers from the introduction of patient cost-sharing or 
even contributes to its abolishment. However, a counteracting force is the fiscal pressure and 
sustainability problems within health care systems, which lately seem to prevail. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that some countries have already extended their reliance on patient cost-
sharing (e.g. Latvia, Romania (Holt, 2010; Thomson & Mossialos, 2009)), while for others, 
the introduction of patient cost-sharing is recommended as a measure to ensure sustainable 
health care financing (Economou & Giorno, 2009; Møller Pedersen et al., 2011).
 
 
Our research does not remain without limitations. Although we use the method of 
triangulation to assure validity of our results from the desk research, we recognize that we 
might fail to show the latest developments in the patient cost-sharing arrangements in the EU 
since the EU health care systems undergo continuous reforms. Moreover, the categorization 
of the data collected in our study, is simplified for the sake of comparability. We might miss 
some of the more refined aspects of various health care systems and patient cost-sharing 
arrangements. Also, the results of our quantitative analysis should be interpreted with caution, 
given a small sample size (27 countries). 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests some key issues relevant to policy. Given the results of our study and 
previous research (Robinson, 2002; Ros et al., 2000), there is a relation between patient cost-
sharing arrangements and some characteristics of the health care system in a country. Thus, 
any attempt to harmonize patient cost-sharing within the EU should be part of the overall 
harmonization of health care delivery in the EU countries. It could be a considerable 
challenge for EU policy makers to find patient cost-sharing arrangements that are effective in 
terms of policy objectives and feasible for all EU countries. If this obstacle cannot be 
overcome, it may be impossible to unify patient cost-sharing in the EU.  
A more practical implication of our study concerns the patient cost-sharing policy in each of 
the EU countries. As indicated by our discussion above, the adequacy of patient cost-sharing 
arrangements in EU countries need to be reconsidered. It is essential to deal with informal 
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patient payments (where applicable) and to assure adequate exception mechanisms to 
diminish the adverse equity effects of formal patient cost-sharing arrangements. Given the 
influence of public opposition to the introduction of patient cost-sharing in a country, a close 
communication with the public is needed to clarify the objectives and content of a patient 
payment mechanism or its amendment. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The formal-informal patient payment mix in European 
countries. Governance, economics, culture or all of these? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter draws upon: 
Tambor, M., Pavlova, M., Golinowska, S., Sowada, C., & Groot, W. (2013). The formal-
informal patient payment mix in European countries. Governance, economics, culture or all 
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Abstract 
 
Background: The implementation of cost-sharing for health care services has triggered 
fierce debates in many countries across Europe. The adverse equity effects are the main 
concern, especially in countries where patients already pay, informally, for health care 
services. The evidence on factors which contribute to the presence of cost-sharing and 
informal patient payments in European countries, might facilitate building effective strategies 
for the elimination of informal payments and successful implementation of formal charges.  
Objective: To review the formal-informal payment mix in Europe and to outline factors 
associated with this mix.  
Methods: The study is based on secondary data. We applied quantitative analyses of macro-
data for 35 European countries and a qualitative description of selected country experiences 
with the implementation of cost-sharing.  
Results: The results suggest that the presence of obligatory cost-sharing for health care 
services is associated with governance factors, while informal patient payments are a multi-
cause phenomenon, influenced by governance, economic and social-cultural factors.  
Conclusions: A consensus-based policy, supported by evidence and stakeholders’ 
engagement, might contribute to a more sustainable patient payment policy. In some 
European countries, the implementation of cost-sharing requires policy action to reduce other 
patient payment obligations, including measures to eliminate informal payments such as 
improving transparency and accountability in health care system, ensuring better quality of 
care and creating social opposition towards informal payments. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Compelled by the need for austerity measures governments in Europe have shifted more of 
the health care costs to patients by increasing patient cost-sharing (Gené-Badia et al., 2012; 
Healy et al., 2010; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2011; Mladovsky et al., 2012). In Chapter 2, 
we show that in most European countries, there are patient payments for publicly financed 
physician consultations or hospitalization. Nevertheless, the implementation of patient cost-
sharing has triggered fierce debates in many countries across Europe (Baji et al., 2011; De 
Gooijer, 2007; Robinson, 2002). The barriers to access to basic health care services due to 
user fees and the excessive financial burden for households are often the greatest concerns 
(Balabanova et al., 2004; Shakarishvili, 2006; Xu et al., 2003). These concerns are relevant, 
particularly in countries where patients already bear a substantial part of health care cost, i.e. 
pay for pharmaceuticals and also have to make informal payments to health care providers in 
the public sector (Ensor, 2004; Lewis, 2010; Stepurko et al., 2010; Szende & Culyer, 2006). 
Attempts to formalize informal patient payments often result in a mix of both, formal and 
informal payments (Baji et al., 2012b; Belli et al., 2004; Gaál et al., 2010). This confronts 
policy makers with the challenge to deal with informal patient payments prior to the 
implementation of formal patient charges. Building effective strategies for the elimination of 
informal payments and the successful implementation of formal patient charges can be 
facilitated by evidence on factors which contribute to the presence of these payments.  
The literature provides some hypotheses to explain the phenomenon of informal payments 
(Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Ensor, 2004; Gaal & McKee, 2004, 2005; Lewis, 2000). They 
include: the economic situation (underfunding of the health sector in the face of growing 
health care needs and expectations), governance failures (lack of adequate norms and legal 
sanctions, non-transparency and poor accountability) as well as social-cultural factors (the 
social custom of tipping and expressing gratitude through small payments and gifts). 
Nevertheless, the impact of these factors is poorly examined at a cross-country level.  
The systems of formal patient charges for publically financed health care in European 
countries are found to be related to characteristics of health care system (see Chapter 2). 
However, the literature suggests that broad contextual factors might determine the presence 
of cost-sharing as well. Likewise informal payments, the potential determinants of formal 
charges can be found in the area of economics, governance and social-cultural factors. 
Specifically, economic factors i.e. the need for additional resources for health care or for 
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improving efficiency in their use, are the driving forces behind the implementation of cost-
sharing (Saltman & Figueras, 1998). Nevertheless, the quality of the policy making process, 
the actors involved in this process and their goals, influence the feasibility of successful 
health care reforms (Buse et al., 2005; Walt & Gilson, 1994). The policy decision on health 
care funding is also affected by social-cultural factors (e.g. social values) (Saltman, 1997; 
Saltman & Figueras, 1997; Ter Meulen & Maarse, 2008). Patient charges can be conflicting 
with solidarity and equity values. Therefore, they might be socially unacceptable in countries 
where the free-of-charge provision of basic health care is perceived as an important value and 
is a fundamental feature of the health care system.  
This chapter aims to review the formal-informal payment mix in European countries and to 
outline factors associated with this mix. We consider three dimensions of the formal-informal 
payment mix: the scope of formal patient payments for publicly financed health care 
(specified based on the presence of any types of obligatory cost-sharing i.e. co-payment, co-
insurance, deductibles for out-patient and/or in-patient services), the spread of informal 
patient payments (defined as any payment made by the patient in addition to the official cost-
sharing fee), and the total level of out-of-pocket expenditure. We use comparative 
quantitative analyses of macro-data for 35 European countries. Additionally, we present a 
description of selected country experiences with the introduction of cost-sharing for health 
care services.  
 
3.2. Methods  
Our analysis is based on secondary country-level data for 35 European countries. It consists 
of three phases: (1) classification of the countries into groups based on the formal-informal 
patient payment mix in each country; (2) comparative quantitative analyses of selected 
economic, governance and social-cultural indicators across groups of countries; 
(3) qualitative description of selected country experiences. The data collection and analysis 
applied in each phase are subsequently described.  
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3.2.1. Country classification  
Given the available data on patient payments in European countries, we classified countries 
into groups based on three dimensions of the formal-informal payment mix: the scope of 
formal patient payments for publicly financed health care, the spread of informal patient 
payments, and the level of total out-of-pocket expenditure.  
We distinguished two categories in the scope of formal payments: 1 (narrow scope) - 
obligatory/unavoidable charges (e.g. co-payments, co-insurance, deductibles) for out-patient 
and/or in-patient services in the statutory benefit package are not present (though other 
formal charges exist e.g. for pharmaceuticals, devices, luxury services); and 2 (wide scope) - 
obligatory/unavoidable charges for out-patient and/or in-patient services in the statutory 
benefit package are present, in addition to other formal charges. The two categories were 
distinguished as the review of the country patient payments systems (see Chapter 2) shows 
that in all countries, patients co-pay for pharmaceuticals, devices, tests are present, and in 
most countries, there are some optional payments. Thus, the presence of obligatory payments 
for out-patient services (GPs or specialists other than dentists) and hospitalization is the 
major difference between countries. The main data sources for the review were: databases 
and reports of international institutions, national laws and regulations (when available in 
English), as well as scientific papers.  
Due to the scarcity of data on informal patient payments, we used the results of a cross-
European survey on informal patient payments (the Health Consumer Powerhouse (HCP) 
survey) conducted among national health care agencies. An informal payment is defined as 
any payment made by the patient in addition to the official cost-sharing arrangements. Data 
for 2009 were cross-checked with the data for 2008 (Björnberg et al., 2009; Björnberg & 
Uhlir, 2008) as well as with empirical evidence published in peer-reviewed journals 
(Stepurko et al., 2010). For countries that were not included in the 2009 HCP survey (i.e. 
Albania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine), evidence from research papers was used (Stepurko et al., 
2010). Following the results of the HCP survey, we distinguished three categories along the 
informal-payment dimension: 1 - no informal payments reported; 2 - some incidences of 
informal payments reported; and 3 - widespread informal payments reported. 
To reflect on the level of patient payments in European countries, total out-of-pocket 
expenditure as a percentage of a country’s GDP (source: WHO, data for 2009) was taken as 
the third dimension of the formal-informal patient payment mix. However, this ratio includes 
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not only formal and informal payments for publicly financed services and commodities 
(informal payments are largely underestimated) but also payments outside the publicly 
financed health care system. These might include direct payments for services and 
commodities excluded from the statutory benefit package, or services which are included in 
the package but purchased privately, e.g. to decrease waiting time, or payments by 
individuals not covered by the public system. For the purpose of the country classification, 
we distinguished two categories along this dimension: 1 - comparatively low total out-of-
pocket expenditures (equal and below the median value in our sample); and 2 - comparatively 
high total out-of-pocket expenditures (above the median value in our sample). 
 
3.2.2. Comparative quantitative analyses 
To examine the link between formal and informal patient payments and the economic, 
governance and social-cultural factors, comparative quantitative analyses were performed. 
For this purpose indicators representing the three groups of factors, were selected in a desk 
research, based on the criteria of adequacy (adequate representation of a given factor) and 
data availability (if the values are available for virtually all European countries). Highly 
correlated indicators were excluded (correlation coefficient ≥ 0.6). The final list of indicators 
and the expected relations with formal and informal payments are presented in Table 3.1.  
The values of selected indicators were compared statistically between the groups of countries 
classified by three dimensions of the payment mix i.e. the scope of formal patient payments, 
the spread of informal patient payments, and the level of total out-of-pocket expenditure. 
Considering data characteristics, parametric tests (t-test and analysis of variance) as well as 
nonparametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U test) were used (software: 
SPSS 19).  
 
3.2.3. Qualitative description of selected country experiences 
For the selection of country cases, we applied two criteria: (1) countries characterized by a 
different mix of patient payments; (2) countries with interesting experiences which illustrate 
the different contexts of cost-sharing implementation. The final list of cases includes five 
countries (one per each group formulated based on two dimensions – the scope of formal
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Table 3.1. Indicators included in the analysis 
Group of 
factors 
Indicators Description and data source Expected relations 
Formal patient payments  Informal patient payments 
     
Economic Public 
expenditure 
on health  
(% of total 
health 
expenditure) 
The sum of outlays by government 
entities to purchase health care services 
and goods. It comprises the outlays on 
health by all levels of government, 
social security agencies, and direct 
expenditure by parastatals and public 
firms.  
Source of data: WHO (data for 2009) 
http://apps.who.int/ghodata/ 
+/- 
A positive relation is expected 
since a high share of public 
expenditure might incline 
governments to implement cost-
sharing to contain the growth of 
public expenditure.  
A negative relation is expected 
since in countries with low 
public resources, patient 
payments might serve as a 
measure to fill the gap between 
cost and too low public funding. 
- 
The hypothesis on economic 
shortage as a reason for 
presence of informal payments 
allow us to expect that these 
payments are more spread in 
counties characterized with low 
share of public expenditure on 
health.  
     
Governance Government 
effectiveness 
score 
(performance 
indicator) 
It presents the perceived quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies; quality of 
public and civil services. Higher values 
indicate higher quality of policy. 
Source: World Bank (data for 2009) 
www.govindicators.org 
+ 
Since the successful formal 
patient payment policy requires 
a high quality of policy 
formulation and 
implementation, we expect a 
positive relationship between 
governance effectiveness and 
presence of formal charges 
- 
Informal payments are expected 
to be more present in countries 
with low governance 
effectiveness since governance 
failures (lack of adequate 
norms, non-transparency and 
poor accountability) are 
considered to be reasons for 
their presence. 
Political 
Constraint 
Index 
(process 
indicator) 
 
The index estimates the feasibility of 
policy change, based on the number of 
independent government branches with 
veto power, over policy change, and the 
distribution of preferences within those 
veto players. Higher index indicate 
more extensive system of checks and 
balances.  
Source: POLCON (country average for 
1997-2007) http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ 
+/- 
We expect a negative relation 
since a lower index (less veto 
players) indicates a greater 
feasibility of policy 
implementation. Yet, a more 
extensive system of checks and 
balances, forces to seek 
commonly acceptable solutions 
which consequently might lead 
to more stable policy outcomes. 
Thus, a positive relation can be 
expected as well.  
No prior expectations 
     
Social-
cultural 
 
Perception of 
responsibility 
for satisfying 
basic needs.  
The mean of respondents’ answers to 
the question: How would you place 
your views on the scale? (1- People 
should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves; 10 - The 
Government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is 
provided for).  
Source: World Values Survey (country 
average for 1996-2008) 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/ 
- 
Since patient charges are 
conflicting with solidarity and 
equity values, we expect a 
wider scope of payments in 
countries with less government 
responsibility (and more 
individual). 
No prior expectations 
Justifiability 
of accepting 
a bribe 
 
The mean of respondents’ answers to 
the question on how justifiable is 
accepting a bribe in the course of duties 
(1-never →10-always).  
Source: World Values Survey (country 
average for 1996-2008) 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/ 
No prior expectations + 
We assume that in countries 
where accepting bribes is more 
justifiable, there is also more 
positive attitude towards 
informal patient payments and 
thus, these payments are more 
common.   
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patient payments and the spread of informal patient payments), namely Denmark, 
Netherlands, France, Slovakia and Latvia. 
To collect information for each country-case, we reviewed secondary data from various 
sources, namely comparative databases and reports provided by international institutions and 
papers published in scientific journals. The data collected were subjected to content analysis 
to outline the most important facts and to draw conclusions on the role of different factors in 
shaping patient payment policy.  
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. The formal-informal patient payment mix in Europe  
Figure 3.1 presents the classification of European countries based on the formal-informal 
patient payment mix. The applied classification scheme results in nine groups of countries.  
There are only four countries (Denmark, the UK, Spain, Malta) where patients do not make 
informal payments and do not meet obligatory formal charges for out-patient visits and 
hospitalizations (Group 1 and Group 2, Figure 3.1). Nevertheless, in Spain and Malta out-of-
pocket expenditures (as % of GDP) are relatively high. In Spain, these are largely co-
payments for pharmaceuticals while in Malta, these are mainly payments for privately 
purchased health care (García-Armesto et al., 2010; Muscat, 1999). It should be also noted 
that the implementation of obligatory formal payments for services has been discussed in 
some of these countries (see Box 1: Denmark) (De Gooijer, 2007; Gené-Badia et al.; Tanner, 
2008).  
The countries with a broad scope of obligatory formal charges (for commodities and also for 
services in the statutory benefit package) but with no informal patient payments, are Western 
European countries with the exception of Slovenia. In the majority of these countries, despite 
the broad scope of formal cost-sharing, the level of total out-of-pocket payments is 
comparatively low (Group 3). This is either due to the relatively small magnitude of patient 
payments or the presence of private insurance to cover cost-sharing (e.g. Slovenia) (Thomson 
& Mossialos, 2009). The implementation of obligatory patient payments for services in the 
benefit package was not without obstacles, e.g. in Portugal and the Netherlands, service 
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charges were abolished for some time and then reintroduced (De Gooijer, 2007; Leu et al., 
2009) (see Box 2: Netherlands).  
 
Figure 3.1. Country groups based on the formal-informal patient payment mix 
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Countries with a broad scope of formal charges and rare informal payments (Group 5 and 
Group 6) are the most diverse in terms of the countries’ economic development and historical 
background. These are former-socialist countries (Croatia, Estonia and the Czech Republic), 
which have succeeded in reducing the spread of informal patient payments. Formal charges 
for services and pharmaceuticals in the statutory benefit package, although present, do not 
result in high out-of-pocket expenditures relative to GDP. Other countries in this group are 
Western European countries. Among them, Luxembourg and France managed to keep out-of-
pocket payments at a relatively low level due to the availability of private complementary 
insurance (Thomson & Mossialos, 2009). Austria, Cyprus and Italy, on the other hand, are 
classified in the group with a relatively high household health expenditure. However, not 
only cost-sharing contributes to a high burden of health care spending for households. In 
Austria, payments for services and products not included in the benefit package, are 
prevailing, while in Cyprus, payments by those not covered by public system because of their 
high income (approximately 15% of the population) and payments for private services 
(purchased due to long waiting lists for publicly financed care) are common (Hofmarcher & 
Rack, 2006; Theodorou et al., 2012). Although no empirical study has reported on the 
presence of informal patient payments in these Western European countries (Stepurko et al., 
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2010), the HCP data show that patients may occasionally pay informally to skip waiting lists 
or to access new medical treatments (Björnberg et al., 2009; Björnberg & Uhlir, 2008). Since 
in these countries, formal charges are paid directly to providers creating a cash flow between 
patients and physicians, a question arises whether this has contributed to the occurrence of 
informal payments.  
The countries with widespread informal patient payments and a narrow range of obligatory 
cost-sharing (Group 7 and Group 8), are mostly former-socialist countries. However, Greece 
and Turkey also fall in this group. In some of these countries, namely in Hungary and 
Slovakia, obligatory patient charges for services were implemented, but then withdrawn due 
to public opposition and the lack of political consensus (Baji et al., 2011; Schneider, 2008) 
(see Box 4: Slovakia). In other countries (e.g. Poland, Ukraine, Romania), patient cost-
sharing for services has been under policy consideration but no adequate law had been 
implemented till the time of this study (Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010; Holt, 2010; Sowada, 2004). 
Despite the lack of obligatory formal charges for services, the level of total out-of-pocket 
payments in many of these countries is high. This is because of other payment obligations 
common in these countries i.e. payments for pharmaceuticals and privately purchased 
services, as well as informal and quasi-formal payments (Bazylevych, 2009; Gaál et al., 
2010; Murauskiene et al., 2010). 
Three former-socialist countries in our study i.e. Albania, Bulgaria and Latvia are 
characterized by a wide scope of formal cost-sharing (for services and commodities) as well 
as by widespread informal patient payments (Group 9). Although obligatory cost-sharing has 
been implemented in the 1990s, patients in these countries often pay informally either at the 
providers’ request or as a means to obtain better services (Atanasova et al., 2011; Balabanova 
& McKee, 2002; Schneider, 2008; Tomini et al.). Consequently, the level of out-of-pocket 
expenditure is high in all these countries. 
 
3.3.2. Results of the comparative quantitative analyses  
The values of economic, governance and social-cultural indicators were compared between 
country groups of a different spread of informal patient payments (3 groups: no; some; 
widespread), scope of formal patient payments (2 groups: narrow scope; broad scope), and 
level of total out-of-pocket expenditure (2 groups: low; high) (Table 3.2). The comparative 
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analyses were also performed for the nine groups of countries classified according to all three 
dimensions of formal-informal patient payment mix together (Table 3.3).  
In line with our expectations, the results show that countries with a different spread of 
informal patient payments significantly differ (p≤ 0.05) in the values of indicators from all 
three groups (economic, governance and social-cultural). Countries where informal payments 
are widespread, are characterized by having the lowest share of public health expenditure and 
the lowest government effectiveness. However, they score the highest on the acceptance of 
bribes (the differences in this indicator are significant at p≤ 0.1) and on the social perception 
of responsibility to provide basic services (more government responsibility is expected in 
these countries).  
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics and comparative analyses across country groups classified by 
informal patient payments’ spread, forma patient payments’ scope and level of total out-of-
pocket expenditure 
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   N= 15 N= 8 N= 12  N= 13 N= 22  N= 18 N= 17 
Public health expenditure  
(% of THE) 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
74.9 
(6.3) 
75.7 
73.1 
(13.3) 
76.1 
64.1 
(9.9) 
65.9 
.004  70.8 
(7.9) 
69.6 
70.8 
(11.9) 
75.0 
.463  76.9 
(5.2) 
78.0 
64.3 
(10.8) 
68.3 
.000 
Government effectiveness  
(-2.5-weak → 2.5-strong) 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
1.6  
(.4) 
1.5 
1.2  
(.4) 
1.2 
.3  
(.5) 
.5 
.000  .7  
(.8) 
.7 
1.3  
(0.6) 
1.4 
.014  1.2 
(.7) 
1.4 
.9  
(.7) 
.9 
.231 
Political Constraint Index  
(0-no checks and balances 
→ 100-extensive checks 
and balances) 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
50.2 
(9.8) 
50.4 
47.2 
(5.0) 
47.9 
42.4 
(10.4) 
42.9 
.145  41.4 
(10.2) 
42.5 
50.1 
(7.8) 
49.7 
.014  46.0 
(10.3) 
46.1 
47.7 
(9.0) 
46.9 
.869 
Perception of responsibility 
(1-individual → 10-
government) 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
5.1  
(.8) 
4.8 
5.2  
(1.0) 
5.1 
6.0  
(.4) 
6.1 
.030  5.7  
(.7) 
6.1 
5.3  
(.9) 
5.0 
.260  5.3  
(.9) 
5.1 
5.6  
(.8) 
5.6 
.156 
Justifiability of accepting a 
bribe  
(1-never →10-always) 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
1.6  
(.3) 
1.6 
1.8  
(.3) 
1.8 
1.9 
 (.5) 
1.9 
.084  1.8  
(.6) 
1.8 
1.7  
(.3) 
1.7 
.830  1.6  
(.3) 
1.7 
1.8  
(.5) 
1.7 
.153 
a For indicators government effectiveness and justifiability of accepting a bribe, p-value refers to the t-test ( when a two 
groups comparison) and analysis of variance (when a three groups comparison). For other variables, Mann-Whitney U test 
and Kruskal-Wallis test were applied accordingly. 
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We find significant differences between countries with a different scope of formal patient 
payments only for the governance indicators, i.e. countries where formal payments are 
broadly applied, have a higher government effectiveness score and a more extensive checks-
and-balances system (higher political constraint index). On the other hand, significant 
differences between countries of low and high out-of-pocket expenditure (as a percentage of 
GDP) are observed only for the economic indicator i.e. a share of public expenditure in total 
health expenditure is significantly lower in countries with relatively high out-of-pocket 
expenditure. 
The results of the comparison across the nine groups of countries (Table 3.3) are consistent 
with the above findings. For example, countries in Group 9 (Albania, Latvia, Bulgaria) and 
Group 8 (Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Ukraine) i.e. countries with widespread 
 
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics and comparative analyses across country groups classified 
based on formal-informal payment mix 
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  N= 2 N= 2 N= 7 N= 4 N= 5 N= 3 N= 4 N= 5 N= 3 N= 35 
Public health 
expenditure  
(% of THE) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
81.9 
(2.5) 
81.9 
73.8 
(2.3) 
73.8 
77.5 
(3.8) 
78.6 
67.5 
(5.5) 
69.2 
78.3 
(4.3) 
76.6 
64.3 
(20.1) 
74.5 
71.7 
(6.6) 
71.7 
64.5 
(6.1) 
67.3 
53.5 
(10.9) 
59.0 
70.8 
(10.4) 
74.2 
.003 
Government 
effectiveness  
(-2.5-weak → 
2.5-strong) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
1.8  
(.5) 
1.8 
1.0  
(.1) 
1.0 
1.6  
(.3) 
1.6 
1.7  
(.4) 
1.7 
1.2  
(.4) 
1.2 
1.2  
(.6) 
1.3 
.1 
(.4) 
.1 
.4  
(.7) 
.7 
.2  
(.4) 
.1 
1.0  
(.7) 
1.2 
.002 
Political 
Constraint Index  
(0-no checks and 
balances → 100-
extensive checks 
and balances) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
44.4 
(11.9)  
44.4 
40.3 
(9.3) 
40.3 
51.6 
(6.9) 
50.4 
55.5 
(12.2) 
54.9 
46.5 
(6.3) 
46.3 
48.5 
(2.1) 
49.6 
36.5 
(14.5) 
42.9 
44.7 
(7.2) 
42.0 
46.6 
(7.9) 
44.2 
46.9 
(9.6) 
46.3 
.322 
Perception of 
responsibility 
(1-individual →  
10-government) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
4.4  
(.0) 
4.4 
5.8  
(.9) 
5.8 
5.3 
(1.0) 
4.7 
4.9  
(.2) 
4.9 
4.9  
(.8) 
4.9 
5.6 
(1.4) 
6.2 
6.1  
(.2) 
6.1 
5.9 
(.4) 
6.1 
6.1  
(.8) 
6.4 
5.4  
(.9) 
5.4 
.125 
Justifiability of 
accepting a bribe  
(1-never →10-
always) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Median 
1.5  
(.4) 
1.5 
1.4  
(.4) 
1.4 
1.6  
(.2) 
1.6 
1.7  
(.2) 
1.7 
1.9  
(.2) 
1.9 
1.5  
(.2) 
1.6 
1.4  
(.3) 
1.4 
2.3  
(.4) 
2.1 
1.9 
(.4) 
1.7 
1.7  
(.4) 
1.7 
.018 
a P-value for Kruskal-Wallis test comparing nine country groups. Additionally, a Mann-Whitney U test for pairwise 
comparisons was applied. 
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informal payments and relatively high out-of-pocket expenditures, are characterized by the 
lowest median share of public expenditure, and one of the lowest values of government 
effectiveness and opposition towards bribes. Countries at the opposite end, Group 1 
(Denmark and the UK), have on the other hand, the highest share of public funding and the 
highest government effectiveness.  
Also other European countries with no informal patient payments yet, with broadly applied 
formal charges (Group 3 and Group 4), are characterized by a high government effectiveness 
(significantly higher than in countries with widespread informal payments) and additionally 
by the most extensive checks-and-balances system (the highest political constraint index).  
 
3.3.3. Qualitative result - selected country experience 
The descriptions of the selected countries’ experiences are provided in boxes (1-4). 
In all presented countries, the driving force for the implementation or the extension of formal 
cost-sharing was the financial deficit in the health care system, often made worse by a 
difficult economic situation in the country. This was the case in countries with relatively low 
public funding, e.g. Slovakia and Latvia, and also in better funded health care systems, like 
France and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Danish example, where cost-sharing has not 
been implemented, shows that when economic needs are not urgent, they might give way to 
equity values and a long tradition of free-of-charge health care provision.  
Our results also show the importance of political and stakeholders support in a successful 
cost-sharing implementation. In the Netherlands, the need to obtain support for the reforms 
led to postponing policy plans for many years till a consensus was achieved and a more 
acceptable cost-sharing system was introduced. In Slovakia, though the reform was not that 
prolonged and the implementation of formal patient payments was politically feasible, strong 
opposition to this policy resulted in attempts to abolish the fees from the very beginning of 
their existence. The groups which oppose cost-sharing, are health care consumers but also 
providers if their economic interests are not satisfied.  
In some of the countries, the reforms were supported by information and evidence, which 
were provided by an appointed committee or by experts. The purpose was to facilitate a 
problem diagnosis and also to promote stakeholders engagement and public debate.  
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Box 1: Denmark 
Introduction of obligatory cost-sharing for services was proposed in 2005 by the Danish Welfare Commission (independent 
experts’ body set up in 2003 by the Danish government) as one element of the Danish welfare system’s reform to face the 
future challenges. The suggested cost-sharing system included a fee per consultation by a GP (75 DKK) and specialist (100 
DKK, 125 DKK in out-patient hospital department), per day of hospitalization (50 DKK), with the yearly limit of payments 
equals to 1% of patient annual income. The anticipated effects of the cost-sharing were the reduction of demand as well as 
the generation of additional revenues, all in total bringing 3.4 billon DKK. 
The proposal which would have ended a long history of free-of-charge health care provision in the Danish health care 
system, was however rejected by the center-right liberal government. The main reason was the fear that charges could have 
violated equity and solidarity, i.e. the principles which govern the Danish tax-based health care system.  
In 2011, the charges were again proposed to the same ruling parties and again found little support. The government however 
(after the heavy debates) implemented in 2011 co-payments for three types of hospital treatment, mainly related to infertility 
treatment. After the change of government in 2011, the fees were partly abolished by the new left-wing government.  
Data source: 
Møller Pedersen K, Bech M, Vrangbæk K. The Danish Health Care System: An Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats Health Economics Papers: University of Southern Denmark, 2011. 
Olejaz M, Juul Nielsen A, Rudkjøbing A, Okkels Birk H, Krasnik A, Hernández-Quevedo C. Denmark: Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition 2012; 14:1-192. 
 
Box 2: Netherlands 
In the publicly financed system, obligatory user charges for GPs visits and hospitalization were implemented in 1997 to 
improve efficiency in the use of health care services. However, the charges aroused controversy. Moreover, the system was 
very complex and after it turned out that it did not meet its objectives, it was abolished in 1999.  
Compulsory patient payments (in the form of a compulsory deductible) were again applied in 2008 as a measure to eliminate 
moral hazard and shift costs to patients. Their implementation was part of the structural health care reform. The market-
oriented reform began in 2006 but the origin of the idea can be traced to the 1980s in the Dekker report. The structural 
changes of health care system were being postponed for many years due to the lack of political majority to implement the 
reform and opposition of various stakeholder groups (insurers, employers and employees, providers) which have a great 
influence on political decision making in the Dutch health care system. In 2001, the employer federations and the trade 
unions supported by a panel of independent experts who are members of an advisory body (the Socio-Economic Council), 
issued a report to facilitate the consensus on the reform.  
When in 2006 the market-oriented reform started, the deductibles did not get the political support. Thus, as a political 
compromise, another measure to increase cost-awareness was implemented, a so-called no claim refund arrangement (those 
who use no or little care during an entire year get a partial refund of the premium). The instrument was however not effective 
(due to the time lag between use of services and financial benefits) and it was administratively complex. It was also 
considered as unfair since those who needed health care frequently did not benefit. Given the failure of this mechanism, the 
deductible became a politically acceptable alternative. The system of deductibles is assumed to be more effective in reducing 
unnecessary demand and also more fair, as deductibles are accompanied by mechanisms to protect vulnerable population 
groups. The chronically ill and disable are partly compensated. There are also options to exempt patients when they use 
services of preferred providers or when they follow selected prevention programs, although few insurers actually offer these 
options. GP care, obstetric care, maternity care and child dental care (under the age of 22) are excluded from the deductible 
system. The financial crises of 2008 and low share of out-of-pocket expenditure in the Netherlands compared to other 
counties, prompted the government to increase deductibles from 150 Euro first to 220 Euro and from 2013 to 350 Euro.  
Data source: 
Maarse H. Health Insurance Reform 2006. Health Policy Monitor, March 2006. Available at: http://www.hpm.org/survey/nl/a7/1 
Maarse H. Mandatory deductible in basic health insurance. Health Policy Monitor, April 2008. Available at: 
http://www.hpm.org/survey/nl/a11/3 
Peelen A, Holland J, den André E. No-Claim refund arrangement. Health Policy Monitor, November 2004. Available at: 
http://www.hpm.org/survey/nl/b4/3 
Schäfer W, Kroneman M, Boerma W, Van Den Berg M, Westert G, Devillé W, Van Ginneken E. The Netherlands: Health system review. 
Health Systems in Transition 2010; 12:1-228. 
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Box 3: France 
In the French public health care system, cost-sharing is widely applied and takes the form of co-insurance, co-payments and 
additionally extra billing. The system is very complex which contributes to the lack of transparency and consequently, 
inequity in access for French patients (though presence of various protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups).  
The cost-sharing for services was first introduced in the form of co-insurance. Patients cover 30% of the reimbursement rate 
for out-patient visits to a physician and 20% for hospitalization. Additionally, patients pay a daily hospital co-payment to 
cover catering cost. The above patient payments can be subject to complementary private insurance coverage, which is 
commonly purchased by patients. There are also certain exemptions from co-insurance, mostly based on patient health status 
and type of treatment. The poor are not exempted, however they are entitled to free or subsided complementary health 
insurance. 
Since the reimbursement by public insurance (in most out-patient cases it takes place after the patient pays the bill) is based 
on the reference price and physicians might charge a higher price, French patients are confronted also with extra billing 
(unless private insurance to cover extra billing is present). The extra billing is a very common practice and its level 
significantly varies across physicians, which raises discussions for their regulation and limitations. The extra billing is not 
allowed in case of low income patients who are entitled to free complementary insurance (providers are directly paid by 
insurance). There are indicators that this creates barriers in access to health care for the poor as physicians are reluctant to 
treat such patients.  
Due to the increase in the insurance deficit and total public deficit above the threshold of 3% of GDP, additional patient 
payments have been implemented. In order to facilitate the government negotiations and consultations, in 2003, the High 
Council for the Future of Health Insurance was established. It includes stakeholders’ representatives which work together to 
diagnose the problems and propose solutions. In 2004, a voluntary gate-keeping system (preferred doctor scheme), with a 
higher co-insurance rate for visits without referral from gate-keeper, was introduced. In the next years, additional cost-
sharing was implemented in the form of flat fee per visit, prescription, and later on for expensive hospital treatment. Since 
these payments are not subject to private insurance coverage, annual ceiling and exemptions for the poor and children were 
applied.  
The economic downturn in 2008, compelled the French government to implement further measures to curb health care cost 
including reducing in public coverage and an increase in co-payment for expensive hospital treatment. There was also a plan 
to increase co-insurance rate for consultation from 30% to 35%, however it has been abandoned in result of private health 
insurance lobbing.  
Data source: 
Chevreul K, Durand-Zaleski I, Bahrami S, Hernadez-Quevedo C, Mladovsky P. France: Health system review. Health system in Transition 
2010; 12:1-291 
de Looper M, Lafortune G. Measuring Disparities in Health Status and in Access and Use of Health Care in OECD Countries. OECD Health 
Working Papers, 2009. 
Or Z. Measures for curbing health expenditure. Health Policy Monitor, October 2010. Available at http://www.hpm.org/survey/fr/a16/2 
Polton D. High Council on the future of sickness insurance. Health Policy Monitor, April 2004. Available at: 
http://www.hpm.org/survey/fr/a3/3 
Sandier S, Paris V, Polton D. Health care systems in transition: France. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2004. 
Thomson S, Osborn R, Squires D, Reed SJ. International Profiles of Health Care Systems, 2011. The Commonwealth Fund, 2011. 
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Box 4: Slovakia 
Obligatory formal charges for physician consultations, prescriptions (approximately .7 Euro), hospitalizations 
(approximately 1.7 Euro per day) and emergency care visits (approximately 2.0 Euro) were implemented in 2003, as a part 
of broader market-oriented health care reforms. The reform was provoked by the high deficit in the health care system. The 
declared objective of the charges’ implementation was to increase patient responsibility and to reduce excessive demand for 
health care services and commodities. It was also expected that informal patient payments would be reduced.  
The system of charges found relative support among providers, though in their opinion charges should be aimed at 
generating additional resources for quality improvement in health care. However, the charges were highly unpopular among 
the public and the opposition. The latter referred the law on charges to the constitutional court arguing that it violated the 
constitutional right to free-of-charges health care. Although the constitutional legitimacy was confirmed by a court decision 
in May 2004 (the charges were regarded as an administrative fee), the system was preserved only for the next two years. In 
2006, the parliamentary elections which were dominated by the discussion on patient cost-sharing, resulted in the victory of 
the left-wing opposition party and consequently fees for out-patient care and hospital care were abolished.  
During the period charges were present, a decrease in the number of visits and consequently, the volume of prescribed and 
purchased pharmaceuticals, was observed. There is no clear evidence on the equity effects of this change, though charges 
were regarded by many household as a financial burden. The system was accompanied by protection mechanisms for 
selected groups of the population e.g. low-income individuals paid reduced fees and later to facilitate the administration of 
the system, the reduction was replaced with a monthly compensation for the poor households. However, there were no upper 
limits of payments to protect frequent users of health care.  
Data source: 
Schneider P. Evidence on Cost-Sharing in Health Care: Applications to Hungary. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008 
Szalay T, Pažitný P, Szalayová A, Frisová S, K. M, Petrovič M, van Ginneken E. Slovakia: Health system review. Health Systems in 
Transition 2011; 13:1-200. 
Zajac R, Pažitný P, Marcinčin A. Slovak reform of health care: from fees to systemic changes. Czech J Econ Finance 2004; 54:9-10 
 
Box 5: Latvia 
Patient cost-sharing, in the form of co-payments was implemented in 1996 as a result of a financial crises and a sharp drop in 
public financing. The declared objective was to increase resources for health care as well as to reduce unnecessary 
utilization. In the late 90’s, additional payments for the use of specific services (tests, procedures) were implemented which 
allowed patients to be charged up to 25% of service costs. This created the room for the development of voluntary private 
insurance to cover patient payments. Nevertheless, the calculation of total patient payment was complicated. Patients did not 
understand the payment system. The providers were not able to collect the full amount of payment from the patient and since 
only 75% of cost was reimbursed to providers by the public payer, they run into financial difficulties.  
Thus, in 2004, the system of formal charges was simplified and unified with only flat co-payments remaining. To maintain 
the overall level of patient cost-sharing, the fees were increased. Additionally payments for home visits and unjustified calls 
for emergency care were implemented. Due to the pressure of different groups, a broad exemption policy is applied 
(approximately one third of population is exempted from payments). Despite this, low income individuals in Latvia are more 
likely to face catastrophic or impoverishing expenditures, which might be attributed to difficulties in identifying the poor 
when applying protection mechanisms, as well as the presence of informal patient payments and payments for services and 
commodities excluded from the statutory benefit package. Nevertheless, formal co-payments were substantially increased in 
2009 due to the serious recession in Latvian economy.  
Data source: 
Tragakes E, Brigis G, Karaskevica J, Rurane A, Stuburs A, Zusmane E, Avdeeva O, Schäfer M. Latvia: Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition 2008; 10:1-253. 
WHO. Latvia: Health Care Systems in Transition. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2001.  
Xu K, Saksena P, Carrin G, Jowett M, Kutzin J, Rurane A. Access to health care and the financial burden of out-of-pocket health payments 
in Latvia Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009 
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In Denmark, it was the Danish Welfare Commission which proposed the implementation of a 
cost-sharing system and provided analyses of its potential effects. In the Netherlands, the 
basis for the reform, which included also cost-sharing, were the Dekker report in 1987 and 
the report by the Socio-Economic Council in 2001. The Dutch experience also illustrates that 
evidence on the actual effect of the cost-sharing is used to align the reform (replacing the no 
claim refund arrangement by a deductible). 
The country cases presented here indicate that the content of the cost-sharing policy also 
matters. The complexity of the system and non-transparency contributed to the abolishment 
of patient payments (Latvia and the Netherlands) but also to the abuse of the system and 
adverse equity effects (France and Latvia). 
 
3.4. Discussion 
This chapter focuses on the formal-informal patient payment mix for publicly financed health 
care in European countries. Using a quantitative macro-data analysis as well as a qualitative 
analysis, we outline the association of the payment mix with economic, governance and 
social-cultural factors. Both analyses have certain limitations. In particular, the quantitative 
analyses rely on a relatively small sample size (35 countries) which might limit the accuracy 
and robustness of the results. Due to the lack of comparable data on the level of cost-sharing 
and informal patient payments in European countries, we classify countries based on the 
prevalence of these payments (data are obtained in a desk research). This leaves some space 
for subjectiveness, though we apply clear criteria for the country classification (explained in 
the methods section). To reflect on the level of patient payments, we additionally analyze the 
total level of out-of-pocket expenditures. However, this indicator should be interpreted with 
caution as it includes not only cost-sharing but also spending for privately purchased health 
care. The scarcity of quantitative indicators of contextual factors significantly restricts the 
selection of the most suitable indicators. Thus, our conclusions are limited solely to the 
indicators analyzed. Also, the presented country cases cannot be taken as a representative of 
the whole of Europe, even though we select countries that represent each group distinguished 
in our study. Overall, our study relies on secondary data and we might miss some relevant 
facts. Nevertheless, we do not aim to present the whole context of the policy making in a 
given country but to shed some light on this process. 
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The results show that there is a great diversity in the formal-informal payment mix in 
European countries. In most countries, formal cost-sharing is broadly applied i.e. for both 
commodities and health care services, though the policy on patient payments often lacks 
consistency. The broad scope of formal cost-sharing does not always result in high total out-
of-pocket expenditure, due to the relatively small magnitude of these payments or the 
presence of complementary private insurance. In some countries, along with formal 
payments, some (not widespread) informal payments are present. These are CEE countries 
which succeeded to limit the spread of informal payments, but also Western European 
countries where the emergence of informal patient payments calls for policy and research 
attention. However, the most alarming situation is observed in a few CEE countries (Albania, 
Latvia, Bulgaria), where formal cost-sharing (for commodities and services) co-exists with 
still widespread informal payments. This results in a high burden of out-of-pocket 
expenditures for patients and in barriers to health care use as confirmed by empirical 
evidence (Atanasova et al., 2013; Tomini et al., 2013). Relatively high out-of-pocket 
spending can be also observed in countries where formal cost-sharing is not applied for 
services, but patients bear high costs of pharmaceuticals, or meet other payment obligations 
(informal payments and quasi-formal charges, payments for services in a private sector) 
(Bazylevych, 2009; Gaál et al., 2010). In these countries, the room for the extension of formal 
cost-sharing to services, is substantially limited.  
Our analyses indicate that a different set of factors contributes to total out-of-pocket 
expenditures, the spread of informal patient payments and the scope of formal cost-sharing in 
European countries.  
The total level of out-of-pocket expenditure (as % of GDP) is not found to be related to 
governance and cultural factors. However, it should be noted that this indicator embraces 
different types of patient payments that can result from either explicit rationing (exclusion 
services from statutory benefit package, formal cost-sharing) or implicit rationing (e.g. 
payments due to long waiting lists). These different rationing mechanisms might have 
dissimilar determinants. Nevertheless, our results imply that the level of out-of-pocket 
payment is related to the economic indicator (the share of public expenditures in total health 
expenditures). Thus, it can be concluded that, a limited contribution of public resources in 
covering the health care costs entails a greater burden of out-of-pocket expenditure on the 
population, though the types of out-of-pocket payments might differ. The observed relation is 
due to, on the one hand, the convergence in total health care spending across Europe, and on 
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the other, the still negligible scale of private insurance in most European countries to cover 
the cost of care in case of low public funding (Leiter & Theurl, 2012; Thomson & Mossialos, 
2009).  
Our results confirm the multi-dimensional nature of the informal payments phenomenon at 
the European level (influenced by economic, social-cultural and governance factors) (Gaal & 
McKee, 2005). Improving system governance and public funding (to increase quality of care 
and medical personnel remuneration) might be crucial to reduce informal patient payments. A 
suitable supplementary strategy in dealing with informal payments could be a public 
campaign that can help to create social opposition to informal payments. However, the 
importance of economic, governance, and cultural factors in the presence of informal 
payments may still differ across countries and thus, the elimination of these payments 
requires a country specific mix of measures.  
The comparative quantitative analyses reveal no association between the scope of formal 
cost-sharing and the share of public resources in total health care financing. However, the 
presented country experiences indicate that situational economic factors (the economic 
recession and high public deficits) are the underlying reason for the implementation or 
increase in cost-sharing. Apparently, policy makers see the potential of patient payments to 
relieve the government of some of the responsibility for health care financing. Nevertheless, 
this mechanism should be applied with caution due to the inequity which occurs as a result of 
shifting costs to patients, but also due to a poorly evidenced effectiveness of patient payments 
in reducing unnecessary health care use (Lostao et al., 2007; Newhouse, 1993; Sepehri & 
Chernomas, 2001; Shakarishvili, 2006). Policy makers should thus, also consider using 
supply side measure to improve efficiency in health care (Mladovsky et al., 2012; Thomson 
et al., 2009). 
We do not find an association between the scope of formal payments and the cultural 
indicator included in our analysis (the perception of responsibility for satisfying basic needs). 
Although this finding does not allow us to conclude on the role of social values in patient 
payment policies in European countries, the Danish case, analyzed in thus study, indicates 
that the perception of equity as a fundamental value driving the system might sometimes 
restrain policy makers from applying obligatory service cost-sharing.  
Both qualitative and quantitative results highlight the importance of the governance factors in 
the prevalence of formal cost-sharing. We find that obligatory charges for services in the 
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statutory benefit package are more present in countries with a higher government 
effectiveness, which reflects among others the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). We also observe that a more extensive government system of checks 
and balances (higher political constraint index (Henisz, 2002)) contributes to the presence of 
cost-sharing. Although it could be argued that less veto power increases the ability to 
implement unpopular reforms, a more extensive system of checks and balances forces to seek 
commonly acceptable solutions which further leads to more stable policy outcomes (Hurst, 
2010; Tsebelis, 2002). This is in good agreement with the results of our qualitative analysis. 
The experience of European countries prove that in countries where the system compels more 
consensus-oriented policy making (e.g. Netherlands), though it requires a long period of 
negotiation to align the interests of different stakeholders groups, patient payment policies 
seem more sustainable. Additionally, the country cases show that the process of cost-sharing 
policy making might be supported by the institutions (e.g. group of experts and 
representatives of stakeholders) which provide information and evidence for the reform and 
facilitate public debate and stakeholders’ engagement. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analyze the prevalence of formal and informal patient payments in Europe, 
from the perspective of economic, governance and cultural differences between countries. 
We find that formal patient payments are applied in European countries regardless of the 
level of public resources devoted to health care, although a driving force for their 
implementation is the economic need. Their successful implementation can be attributed to 
governance factors. A consensus-based policy making, supported by evidence and 
stakeholders’ engagement, might contribute to a more sustainable patient payment policy in 
European countries.  
The results show that in many European countries the room for the extension of patient cost-
sharing is limited due to the high out-of-pocket expenditures, which are driven by a low share 
of public funding. Thus, in these countries, the introduction of obligatory charges for health 
care services in the statutory benefit package should be accompanied by a reduction in other 
patient payment obligations. This includes eradication of informal payments, since the co-
existence of these payments result in a high financial burden for households. As indicated by 
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the results, the elimination of informal payments requires governance measures, in addition to 
economic and social-cultural ones. Given the adverse equity effects and also the questionable 
effectiveness of patient payments, policy attention should also focus on other measures than 
patient payments to increase health care resources and their efficient use. Further research on 
the determinants of formal and informal patient payments in European countries e.g. 
involving a bigger sample (more countries or an analysis at regional level) as well as different 
indicators, should be undertaken to provide more evidence and to explore the robustness of 
our results. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Towards a stakeholders’ consensus on patient payment 
policy: the views of health care consumers, providers, 
insurers and policy makers in six Central and Eastern 
European countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter draws upon: 
Tambor, M., Pavlova, M., Golinowska, S., Sowada, C., & Groot, W. (2012). Towards a 
stakeholders' consensus on patient payment policy: the views of health-care consumers, 
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Abstract  
 
Background: Cost-sharing policies in CEE countries meet with little public and political 
support which impedes the introduction of obligatory patient charges for health care services 
or leads to their withdrawal. The evidence indicates that a consensus among the main 
stakeholders might facilitate successful implementation of cost-sharing. 
Objective: To study the acceptability of formal patient charges for health care services in the 
statutory benefit package, among different health care system stakeholders in six CEE 
countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine).  
Methods: Qualitative data were collected in 2009 via focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews with health care consumers, providers, policy makers and insurers. The same 
participants were asked to fill in a self-administrative questionnaire. Qualitative and 
quantitative data are analyzed separately to outline similarities and differences in the opinions 
between the stakeholder groups and across countries. 
Results: There is a weak consensus on patient cost-sharing policies in the countries. Health 
care policy makers and insurers strongly advocate patient charges. Health care providers 
overall support charges but their financial profit from the system strongly affects their 
approval. Consumers are against paying for services, mostly due to poor quality and access to 
health care services and inability to pay. 
Conclusions: In order to build a consensus on patient charges, the payment policy should be 
responsive to consumers’ needs with regards to quality and equity. Transparency and 
accountability in the health care system should be improved to enhance public trust and 
acceptance of patient payments. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Although patient charges in CEE countries are broadly applied to pharmaceuticals, their 
implementation for other services in the statutory benefit package (visits to GPs and 
specialists, hospitalization) was successful only in few countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Latvia) (see Chapter 2 and 3). Elsewhere, the lack of public and political support has impeded 
policy attempts to introduce such charges (e.g. Poland) or has led to their abolition, e.g. in 
Hungary or in Slovakia (the experience of Slovakia is described in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation) (Baji et al., 2011; Sowada, 2004; Zajac et al., 2004). The opposition to cost-
sharing may be driven by the fact that patient payments impose a financial barrier to the use 
of health care services and thus, they may have an adverse effect on both patients’ health and 
patients’ wealth (Sepehri & Chernomas, 2001). The reason for the non-acceptance of patient 
charges by the public can also be the perception of free-of-charge health care as a basic right 
for all citizens, inherited from the Semashko system (Włodarczyk & Mierzewski, 1991a). 
This could be questioned however, since patients in CEE, even if not obliged by law to co-
pay for health care services, are accustomed to payments (informal or quasi-formal for better 
quality or quicker access) (Lewis, 2002; Stepurko et al., 2010). 
The results of the analysis presented in Chapter 3, indicates that building a consensus among 
the health care system stakeholders (incl. health care consumers) on the presence and role of 
cost-sharing might be crucial for the presence of patient payments in a country. Data on 
stakeholders’ opinions and factors underlying these opinions could facilitate the development 
and implementation of an adequate patient payment policy acceptable to all stakeholder 
groups.  
In this chapter, our aim is to explore the acceptability of patient charges across CEE countries 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine) and across stakeholder groups 
(health care consumers, providers, insurers and policy makers). We focus on formal and 
obligatory patient charges for health care services included in the statutory benefit package as 
they present a highly sensitive policy issue. We specifically include the group of health care 
consumers and compare their opinions to that of other stakeholder groups since consumers 
directly bear the consequence of patient charges, also the negative ones, e.g. impoverishment 
and health deterioration. We use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to 
examine differences in opinion on formal patient charges between the stakeholder groups and 
across countries. 
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4.2. Background  
The six countries included in the study, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
and Ukraine, share a common communist past (with Lithuania and Ukraine being post-soviet 
states). During the communist period, all countries adopted the Semashko health care model, 
though transition towards the tax-based system was slower in countries where insurance-
based health care system had been better developed prior the soviet regime, i.e. in Poland and 
Hungary (Davis, 2010). As it was described in the introductory chapter, the Semashko health 
care systems, suffered from various problems, such as chronic shortages in specialized 
personnel and equipment, inefficiencies and consequently poor quality of care offered to 
patients (Golinowska et al., 2006). Thus, although the systems were based on the principle of 
free-of-charge universal health care provision, informal (mostly in-kind) patient payments 
were a common way to obtain a better quality of care in all six countries (Lewis, 2002; 
Stepurko et al., 2010).  
After the collapse of communism, the countries experienced a sharp economic decline, which 
further limited the available health care resources, e.g. in Bulgaria, health expenditure 
dropped from 5.4% of GDP in 1991 to 3.8% of GDP in 1998 (Atanasova, 2014). Difficult 
economic situation and disillusionment with the soviet system provoked health care system 
reforms (Kutzin et al., 2010; Mossialos & Dixon, 2002; Włodarczyk & Mierzewski, 1991b). 
Among the six countries, only in Ukraine the health care system has not undergone major 
changes (Danyliv et al., 2012; Lekhan et al., 2010). In the other five countries, an insurance-
based system with market-oriented elements started to develop (Rechel & McKee, 2009). The 
changes included: decentralization, expansion of private providers, introduction of the new 
output-based provider payment methods and the increased role of out-of-pocket payments.  
Despite the commonalities in reforming the system, the transition period brought divergence 
in health care systems and their funding among the six countries. Presently, the level of 
health expenditure and their composition differ greatly (data on health expenditure in all six 
countries are presented in Chapter 1). In Hungary and Poland (two most economically 
developed countries), per capita spending on health is 1.7 and 1.4 thousand international 
dollars respectively, while in Ukraine it is only 0.5 thousand, though this accounts for a 
relatively high share of GDP of Ukraine (7.3%). In Ukraine and Bulgaria, the burden of 
health care cost is borne largely by patients, i.e. out-of-pocket expenditure is more that 40% 
of total health expenditure. The available data indicate that the lowest proportion of out-of-
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pocket expenditure is in Romania (19%), though this number should be interpreted with 
caution as patient payments might be significantly underestimated in this country (Vlădescu 
et al., 2008). Available estimations indicate that most households’ health expenditure is for 
pharmaceuticals, e.g. in Lithuania more than 70% (Murauskiene et al., 2013), in Poland 60%, 
in Hungary 50% (OECD, 2013). Patient payments for services in the countries are, however, 
also common and they take different forms.  
Formal and obligatory cost-sharing for health care services in the statutory benefit package 
(out-patient visit to GP or specialist and hospitalization) was implemented only in Bulgaria in 
2000 along with the implementation of a social health insurance system (Pavlova et al., 
2000). The fee size is equal to 1% of the minimum wage of the country for each visit to a GP 
and out-patient medical specialist after a referral from a GP, and 2% of the minimum wage 
for the first 10 days of the first hospitalization in a year (in 2009 about 1 and 2 euro 
respectively). The charges are collected and used by the service provider. There is a wide 
range of exemptions and fee reductions for certain population groups. 
In other countries, constitutional, political and above all social obstacles impeded the 
implementation of obligatory patient charges. In Hungary, co-payments for basic health care 
services (approximately 1 euro for each visit to GP and medical specialist after a referral and 
for each day of hospitalization) were introduced in 2007 with the objective to decrease 
unnecessary use of health care services and to eliminate informal patient payments (Baji et 
al., 2011). These fees were collected and retained by the health care institutions. The 
payments system was also accompanied by various exemptions and fee reductions. 
Nevertheless, in April 2008, fees were abolished as the result of a public referendum initiated 
by the government’s opposition. Similarly, in Ukraine, the government made some attempts 
in 1996 to introduce official charges for health care services. However, constitutional 
provisions proclaiming free-of-charge medical care in state and community health facilities, 
prohibited the introduction of the fee (Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010). In Poland, Lithuania and 
Romania, uniform obligatory charges for services included in the statutory benefit package 
have been under policy discussion but at the time of the study were not (yet) implemented 
(see Chapter 2). 
Notwithstanding the absence of obligatory charges for health care services in the benefit 
package, poor quality and access to public health care often force patients in CEE countries to 
seek care in the private sector. Moreover, in the face of the underfunding of services under 
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the public health care system, implicit rationing regulated by providers and outside the 
control of the government, takes place and results in quasi-formal charges for health care 
services in the statutory benefit package (Bazylevych, 2009; Gaál et al., 2010; Gotsadze & 
Gaál, 2010; Murauskiene et al., 2010). This refers to payments for health care services with 
higher hospitality standards (better room in the hospital e.g. in Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Lithuania, Ukraine), more diagnostic tests (e.g. Ukraine, Lithuania), services with quicker 
access (bypassing waiting list, visits to a specialist without referral e.g. Lithuania, Romania), 
and free choice of a physician (surgeon or obstetrician e.g. Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary). 
Patients are also asked to purchase pharmaceuticals and/or surgical materials for their 
hospitalizations (e.g. Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria). Additionally, in Ukraine, there 
are also voluntary charitable donations for public hospitals, which in practice are almost 
compulsory (Gryga et al., 2010). 
In all countries included in the study, informal (under-the-table) patient payments to 
personnel continue to exist to a greater or lesser extent (Atanasova et al., 2011; Cockcroft et 
al., 2008; Gaál et al., 2010; Stepurko et al., 2010). Recent studies suggest that these payments 
are widespread in Ukraine and Romania, followed by Lithuania and Hungary while they are 
least widespread in Bulgaria and Poland (Stepurko et al., 2011). Some of these payments are 
considered as gratitude payments, yet patients often pay to get better service quality, more 
attention from medical staff or quicker access. 
 
4.3. Methods 
Qualitative and quantitative data were collected in 2009 in six CEE countries: Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine, Hungary and Poland among the following stakeholders groups: 
health care policy makers and health insurance representatives, health care providers and 
health care consumers. Qualitative data were obtained through focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews. Due to the different characteristics of the groups (e.g. size, diversity), 
policy makers and insurers were approached via face-to-face semi-structured interviews, 
while health care providers and consumers were approached via focus group discussions. 
After a discussion or interview, participants were asked to fill in a self-administrative 
questionnaire to collect quantitative data (see Appendix B for further details about the 
participants’ groups).  
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The objective was to study acceptability of patient charges for health care services in the 
statutory benefit package and the opinion about the adequate role and design of these charges. 
A list with key questions was developed based on a preliminary literature review. The key 
questions were used to develop guides (including questions) for focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews as well as a questionnaire (covering the same questions) to collect 
quantitative data. The guides and questionnaire were standardized (i.e. the questions and 
explanations were the same for all countries). They were developed in English and then 
translated into national languages by professional translators or bilingual experts in the field 
of the research. The accuracy of translation was verified by 1-2 other bilingual experts. The 
guide for focus group discussions and interviews, as well as the questionnaire, were discussed 
with researchers from the six countries to assure that the country specificities were well 
reflected. The data collection instruments were also pre-tested after translation to assure that 
the translation is understandable for the potential respondents.  
The qualitative data from the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were tape-
recorded, then transcribed and translated in English by professional translators or bilingual 
experts and then verified by other experts. The transcripts in the original languages were also 
available for the researchers, and if necessary the translation was again verified during the 
process of analysis.  
Data analysis focused on respondents’ opinions on whether patient charges for health care 
services in the statutory benefit package should exist in their country. An inductive approach 
to develop a set of codes was applied. Transcripts were reviewed and codes were assigned to 
emerging concepts. Ultimately, data were classified into three main categories (respondents’ 
arguments in support of patient fees, condition for patient fees existence, arguments against 
patient fees) and specific subcategories related to the main objectives of health care financing 
systems defined by the WHO, i.e. equity and financial protection, efficiency, quality, 
transparency and accountability (Kutzin, 2008). 
Quantitative data analysis was targeted on the general acceptability of patient fees and policy 
objective of their introduction. Respondents’ opinions on selected elements of patient cos-
sharing design were also analyzed (charges for emergency services, fee beneficiaries, 
exemption or reduction mechanisms) (see Appendix B for the wording of questions). All 
original data were re-coded into binary variables and Pearson chi-square test or Fisher’s exact 
test (if more than once cell has expected number of observations fewer than five) was 
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performed (software: SPSS 19) to determine whether the above mentioned issues got equal 
support in all countries and among all stakeholders groups.  
 
4.4. Results  
This section separately presents the results of the qualitative and quantitative data analysis. 
The conformity of the results from the two types of analysis is also indicated. 
 
4.4.1. Qualitative results  
The results of the qualitative data analysis are summarized in Table 4.1. Below, the main 
findings are presented. Relevant quotes from the transcripts are included in boxes.  
Arguments in support of patient payments (Box 1) 
In all countries, two arguments supporting patient charges, namely improving efficiency and 
generating additional resources, prevail among those in favor of charges i.e. policy makers 
and insurers and majority of health care providers. According to these respondents, patient 
charges could reduce unhealthy behavior as well as unnecessary use of health care services, 
which improves the efficiency of health care provision. With regards to the fiscal argument, 
respondents from all countries more often refer to patient payments as a necessary measure to 
fill the gap between an inadequate reimbursement from insurance/state funds and the actual 
cost of services (in Bulgaria also a lack of cost reimbursement for services provided to the 
uninsured), and less often to incentives for quality-improving competition. 
 
Box 1. Statements that advocate patient payments 
 “Patients would take the health care service more seriously, take our advices more carefully, and also feel that it has its price. 
Because although they pay the health insurance that is distracted from the salary, then everyone use the services as they were for 
free. And if something is free-of-charge, it doesn’t have value.” (GP, city, Hungary)  
 “Patient payments should exist. And why? This is a universal problem, but I think that such goods financed with public resources, if 
they are available in an unlimited manner, free-of-charge, then naturally they will be abused.” (Policy maker, regional level, Poland) 
 “One more reason why official patient payments should exist in hospitals is that current state funding is not enough to provide high 
quality and sufficient services (…) It should be clearly declared what is covered by the state and what – by a patient.” (Physician, 
district hospital, Lithuania) 
 “Our healthcare institutions have to raise additional funds and earn money in a civilized way.” (Policy maker, regional level, 
Ukraine) 
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In Lithuania and Ukraine where informal and quasi-formal payments are common, the 
legalization of these fees and improving transparency are perceived as an important issue 
among all stakeholders groups, including also health care consumers. In the opinion of the 
respondents, the presence of formal patient charges in other European countries is also an 
argument in favor of fees introduction.  
Conditions for patient payments implementation (Box 2) 
Service exemption is commonly viewed as a complementing condition for patient payments 
implementation. Respondents in all countries agree that payments could be applied but only 
for selected services (services which are not essential/lifesaving). In Lithuania, Romania and 
Ukraine, there is a common opinion (expressed also by policy makers/insurers and health 
care providers) that a statutory benefit package financed from public resources should be 
clearly defined and mandatory patient payments should not be applied to these services. 
Nevertheless, physicians in Poland express negative attitudes towards service exemption, 
arguing that the unfavorable situation of all health care providers justifies applying universal 
fees. 
 
Box 2. Statements that specify conditions for patient payments 
 “I think that general rules should apply, i.e. the patient should have a sense of security and this sense of security should come from 
the guarantee of free access to those services that save lives, which is related to emergency situations.” (Policy maker, national level, 
Poland)  
 “In order to be able to provide medical care of good quality there should be co-payment, but a guaranteed level of health care should 
be defined on the state level (...) It should be “a sacred law” and within this level the healthcare should be provided free-of-charge.” 
(Policy maker, national level, Ukraine) 
 “The system operates as a whole, all services are elements of the health care system. If there are patient payments, they should apply 
to every area.” (Physician, city hospital Poland) 
 “I’m not against paying, if we will be able to afford paying the price.” (Consumer, disabled, Ukraine) 
 “There should be no exceptions! If a person cannot afford to pay, belongs to some kind of special social group, his expenses for 
health care services should be covered by some social institution. Health care specialist should not care about it!” (Physician, 
district hospital, Lithuania) 
 “It is not my problem if people cannot pay; it is the problem of those who brought them into this status.” (GP, city, Romania) 
 “If there are fees, greater attention should be paid to the patients, proper examinations should be made and not only writing a 
prescription.” (Consumer, pensioner, Bulgaria) 
 “I am in favor of those patient payments – optional or compulsory, but in exchange for this we must get something!” (Consumer, 
rural area, Poland) 
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Respondents, who do not oppose patient charges, also make the fees’ implementation 
conditional upon setting payments at an affordable level and protecting vulnerable population 
groups. However, this opinion is less common among providers (physicians but not nurses) in 
different countries, who often are against any exemptions or fee reductions. They argue that 
the protection of vulnerable individuals is not the role of the health care system and such 
mechanisms result in additional administrative work. Consumers, who do not express firm 
opposition towards patient payments, would accept fees if quality and access to health care 
services were better. In Bulgaria and Hungary, the opinion on a general improvement in 
quality is more common, while in other countries patients would also agree to pay voluntarily 
to get higher quality, higher standard of services or extra services.  
Arguments against patient payments (Box 3) 
Opponents of patient payments express concern about patients’ inability to pay and the 
financial barrier to use health care services (especially for the poor and chronically sick). This 
argument is often used by consumers but also by providers, especially in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Ukraine. Respondents in these countries underline that public health care services are 
often used by the poorest while those who can afford to pay use the private system. Another 
argument commonly discussed by consumers in all countries who object to patient fees, is 
poor access and quality of health care services. This is contrasted with the high health 
insurance contributions paid by health care consumers. Consumers question whether the 
funds accumulated through these contributions are used appropriately. They also do not trust 
that the additional resources generated through patient charges are used to improve quality, 
but they see them as a double payment. The same opinion among Bulgarian and Hungarian 
consumers is based on their experiences with patient charges in their own country.  
 
Box 3. Statements that oppose patient payments 
  “Those fees stop many people from visiting the doctor because of the sum.” (Consumer, working individual, city, Bulgaria) 
 “If I have nothing to pay, am I supposed to die?”(Consumer, pensioner, Ukraine ) 
 “A lot of money was collected as patient payment, but we, patients didn’t see any change.” (Consumer, pensioner, Hungary) 
 “We should not be paying extra because we pay insurance contributions. We don’t know what happens to them. The worst thing is 
that, in general, we don’t take advantage of our contributions.” (Consumer, family with children, city, Poland) 
 “The only thing we could see was that there was lots of administration with patient fees, consulting was much slower and I don’t 
know where that money has gone.” (Physician, out-patient specialist, city, Hungary) 
 “It is much easier for me to negotiate personally and to pay not at the desk but straight to a doctor.” (Consumer, student, Ukraine) 
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As stated by respondents, charges have not resulted in access or quality improvements and 
the system lacks transparency and control over the revenue collected (e.g. patients do not get a 
receipt). Most consumers also believe that formal patient payments cannot eliminate paying 
informally. Health care providers who have experienced charges (i.e. Hungary, Bulgaria) but have not 
been direct beneficiaries of the revenues (i.e. physicians who do not work in individual practices), are 
against them due to the administrative burden of collecting charges. 
 
Table 4.1. Summary of qualitative results  
 
Arguments supporting patient 
charges 
Conditions for patient charges Arguments against patient 
charges 
Equity and  
financial 
protection 
  If no obligatory payments for 
basic services/ lifesaving 
services (service exemptions): 
H (1,2), LT (1,2,3), PL (1), 
RO (1,2,3), UA (1,2,3) 
 If payments are adequate to 
ability to pay (population 
exemptions):  
BG (1), H (1,3), PL (2,3),   
UA (1,2,3) 
 Inability to pay for health care 
services:  
BG (1,2,3), H (1,2), LT (1), 
PL (1), RO (1,2), UA (1,2) 
 Social health issuance 
contribution/taxes paid by 
working individuals:  
BG (1,2,3), H (1,2), LT (1,2), 
PL (1), RO (1,2), UA (1) 
    
Efficiency  Reducing moral hazard ex 
ante (increase people 
responsibility for own health 
and compliance with 
physicians recommendations): 
BG (2,3), H (2,3), LT (2,3), 
RO (2,3), UA (2,3) 
 Reducing moral hazard ex 
post (increase cost 
consciousness, reduce 
unnecessary consumption): 
BG (2,3), H (1,2,3), LT (2,3), 
PL (2,3), RO (2,3) 
 If payments system is 
administratively efficient/ 
resources are not wasted:  
BG (1), H (2) 
 If payments system does not 
result in extra administrative 
work for physicians:  
H (2), LT (2), RO (2) 
 Inefficiency in health care 
system (in using public 
money): LT (1), PL (1) 
 
    
Quality  Generating additional 
resources by institutions (for 
investment), increasing 
competitions:  
H (1,2,3),  PL (2,3) 
 Filling the gap between 
service cost and inadequate 
reimbursement:  
BG (2), H (3), LT (2,3), PL 
(2,3), RO (1,2,3), UA (1,2,3) 
 If overall quality (access) is 
improved/physician attention/ 
better equipment:  
BG (1), H (1,2), LT (1),  
PL (1), RO (1), UA (1) 
 If payments are for better 
quality/standard of services 
(at patient choice):  
LT (1,2,3), PL (1), RO (1,2,3), 
UA (1,2,3)  
 Poor quality and access to 
health care services:  
BG (1), H (1,2), LT (1),  
PL (1), UA (1) 
 Lack of benefits for 
physicians and administrative 
burden:  
BG (2), H (2), LT (2) 
 
    
Transparency 
and 
accountability 
 Legalization and 
formalization of existing 
patient payments (quasi-
formal, informal):  
LT (2,3), UA (1,2,3) 
 Increasing the accountability 
of physicians: UA (1,2,3)  
 If payment system is 
transparent (price list, 
exemptions, use of generated 
resources): BG (1), UA (1) 
 If patients do not have to pay 
informally: RO (1), UA (1) 
 Lack of transparency and 
control over patient payments: 
BG (1,2), H (1,2) 
 Existence of informal patient 
payments: LT (1), UA (1) 
    
Other  Presence of patient charges in 
other European countries:  
BG (2,3), H (3), LT (3),  
PL (2,3), UA (2,3) 
 Presence of payments for 
other services (e.g. public 
transport): UA (1,2) 
  Legislative 
obstacles/constitutional 
provision: UA (1) 
BG - Bulgaria, H - Hungary, LT - Lithuania, PL - Poland, RO – Romania, UA - Ukraine; 1 - Health care consumers, 2 - Health care 
providers, 3 - Policy makers & insurers 
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4.4.2. Quantitative results 
In order to statistically test the differences in the opinion on patient charges between 
stakeholder groups as well as between countries, quantitative analysis of data collected 
through the standardized questionnaire was performed. The results presented in Table 4.2 
indicate that there are significant differences in the acceptability of formal patient charges 
among stakeholder groups included in the study. The lowest support for patient payments is 
among health care consumers (mostly disapproval) while the majority of policy makers, 
insurers and health care providers advocate formal patient fees. There are no significant 
differences across countries in the consumers’ approval of fees. Yet, Lithuanian and Polish 
health care consumers in our study are least in favor of fees. Similarly, the groups of policy 
makers and insurers present a rather homogeneous attitude towards fees. However, health 
care providers are less uniform in their opinion. In particular, Hungarian health care providers 
express considerably less approval for patient fees than providers in other countries. These 
results are in line with our findings from the qualitative data, which shows that health care 
providers who have not been direct beneficiaries of fees, are against their reintroduction.  
The views on the main policy objective of patient fees, differ across stakeholders groups as 
well as across countries (see Table 4.3). Overall, the efficiency improvement’s goal gets the 
greatest support among policy makers and insurers, while the majority of health care 
consumers and health care providers support the generation of resources as the main 
objective. The elimination of informal patient payments as a main policy objective of patient 
fees gets marginal support. Nevertheless, significant differences in stakeholders’ views can 
be observed between countries. The results indicate that efficiency improvement is more 
important for respondents in Hungary, Poland and especially in Bulgaria where this objective 
finds substantial approval also among health care consumers. Respondents in Lithuania, 
Romania and Ukraine perceive patient fees rather as an additional source of funding than a 
measure to improve efficiency. Noteworthy, Ukrainian health care consumers express 
relatively strong support for efficiency improvement (stronger than Ukrainian health care 
providers). 
Table 4.4 presents the respondents’ views on three main elements of the patient fee design i.e. 
services which are the subject of fees (emergency services is given as an example), the 
beneficiary of patient fees (approval for health care providers being the beneficiary) and the 
need of a protection policy (approval for reduction or exemption mechanisms). 
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Table 4.2. Approval of patient charges 
 
Bulgaria 
N= 102 
 
Hungary 
N= 46 
 
Lithuania 
N= 104 
 
Poland 
N= 92 
 
Romania 
N= 99 
 
Ukraine 
N= 103 
 
Total 
N= 546 
 
P-value  
(between-
country 
comparison)a 
 n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N % 
 
Health care consumers 
N= 266 
21/44 48  14/26 54  16/54 30  17/47 36  18/43 42  26/52 50  112/266 42  .19 
Health care providers 
N= 227 
41/48 85  7/15 47  33/40 83  35/36 97  41/47 87  28/41 68  185/227 81  <.001 
Policy makers & insurers 
N= 53 
8/10 80  5/5 100  9/10 90  8/9 89  8/9 89  8/10 80  46/53 87  .97  
Total 
N= 546 
70/102 69  26/46 57  58/104 56  60/92 65  67/99 68  62/103 60  343/546 63  .31 
P-value (between-
stakeholders comparison)a 
<.001  .12  <.001  <.001  <.001  .08  <.001   
a P-value based on Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test (used when more than one cell has expected count less than five) applied for binary outcome - agree that official patient payments should exist (strongly 
agree or agree) vs. do not agree (neutral or disagree or strongly disagree).  
 
Table 4.3. Approval of efficiency improvement as the primary policy objective of patient charges 
 
Bulgaria 
N= 102 
 
Hungary 
N= 46 
 
Lithuania 
N= 104 
 
Poland 
N= 92 
 
Romania 
N= 99 
 
Ukraine 
N= 103 
 
Total 
N= 546 
 
P-value  
(between-
country 
comparison)a 
 n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N % 
 
Health care consumers 
N= 266 
18/44 41  5/26 19  5/54 9  7/47 15  8/43 19  14/52 27  57/266 21  .004 
Health care providers 
N= 227 
26/48 54  9/15 60  14/40 35  20/36 56  15/47 32  6/41 15  90/227 40  <.001 
Policy makers & insurers 
N= 53 
10/10 100  5/5 100  3/10 30  5/9 56  4/9 44  3/10 30  30/53 57  .001  
Total 
N= 546 
54/102 53  19/46 41  22/104 21  32/92 35  27/99 27  23/103 22  177/546 32  <.001 
P-value (between-
stakeholders comparison)a 
.003  .001  .008  <.001  .18  .31  <.001   
a P-value based on Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test (used when more than one cell has expected count less than five) applied for binary outcome - approve of efficiency goal (discouraging unnecessary use 
of health care services or controlling the overall health expenditure) vs. disapprove of efficiency goal (approving other goals i.e. generation of resources or elimination of informal patient payments).  
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Table 4.4. Opinion on the main elements of patient charges design 
 
 
Bulgaria 
N= 102 
 
Hungary 
N= 46 
 
Lithuania 
N= 104 
 
Poland 
N= 92 
 
Romania 
N= 99 
 
Ukraine 
N= 103 
 
Total 
N= 546 
 
P-value  
(between-country 
comparison)a ,b, c    n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  n/N %  
A
p
p
ro
v
al
 o
f 
fe
es
 f
o
r 
em
er
g
en
cy
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
Health care consumers 
N= 266 
5/44 11  3/26 12  14/54 26  6/47 13  11/43 26  10/52 19  49/266 18  .24 
Health care providers 
N= 227 
10/48 21  3/15 20  14/40 35  30/36 83  13/47 28  7/41 17  77/227 34  <.001 
Policy makers & insurers  
N= 53 
0/10 0  0/5 0  2/10 20  1/9 11  3/9 33  1/10 10  7/53 13  .34 
Total  
N= 546 
15/102 15  6/46 13  30/104 29  37/92 40  27/99 27  18/103 17  133/546 24  <.001 
P-value (between-
stakeholders comparison)a  
.17  .69  .51   <.001  .89  .78   <.001   
A
p
p
ro
v
al
 o
f 
b
en
ef
ic
ia
ry
 –
 
h
ea
lt
h
 c
ar
e 
p
ro
v
id
er
s 
Health care consumers 
N= 266 
20/44 45  24/26 92  43/54 80  28/47 60  26/43 60  23/52 44  164/266 62  <.001 
Health care providers 
N= 227 
46/48 96  14/15 93  37/40 93  33/36 92  42/47 89  31/41 76  203/227 89  .08  
Policy makers & insurers 
N= 53 
9/10 90  5/5 100  8/10 80  7/9 78  8/9 89  9/10 90  46/53 87  .91  
Total 
N= 546 
75/102 74  43/46 93  88/104 85  68/92 74  76/99 77  63/103 61  413/546 76  <.001 
P-value (between- 
stakeholders comparison)b 
<.001  1.00  .21  .004  .003  .001  <.001    
A
p
p
ro
v
al
 o
f 
ex
em
p
ti
o
n
/ 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 
Health care consumers 
N= 266 
43/44 98  21/26 81  53/54 98  45/47 96  41/43 95  49/52 94  252/266 95  .07 
Health care providers 
N= 227 
28/48 58  12/15 80  31/40 78  24/36 67  28/47 60  38/41 93  161/227 71  .003 
Policy makers & insurers 
N= 53 
10/10 100  3/5 60  8/10 80  8/9 89  9/9 100  10/10 100  48/53 91  .05  
Total 
N= 546 
81/102 79  36/46 78  92/104 88  77/92 84  78/99 79  97/103 94  461/546 84  .013 
P-value (between-
stakeholders comparison)c 
<.001   .60   .003   .002  <.001  1.00  <.001   
a P-value based on Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test (used when more than one cell has expected count less than five) applied for binary outcome - approve of fees for emergency services vs. disapprove of 
fees for emergency services. 
b P-value based on Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test (used when more than one cell has expected count less than five) applied for binary outcome - approve health care providers (institution or physician) 
for beneficiary of fee revenues vs. disapprove health care providers for beneficiary (approving health insurance fund or state or municipality for beneficiary). 
c P-value based on Pearson’s chi-square test or Fisher’s exact test (used when more than one cell has expected count less than five) applied for binary outcome - approve of exemption/reduction mechanism vs. 
disapprove of exemption/reduction mechanisms.  
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We observe that the majority of respondents are against fees for emergency services. It is 
especially noticeable among policy makers/insurers and among health care consumers, 
though to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, in total, more than 30% of health care providers (with 
significant differences across countries) are of the opinion that fees should be also applied to 
emergency services. This support is particularly high among Polish health care providers, 
which is in line with findings from the focus groups discussions.  
Significant differences in opinions on patient payments’ beneficiary are observed among 
stakeholder groups. Policy makers/insurers and health care providers commonly agree that 
the beneficiary of patient payments revenue should be the health care providers. However, 
this opinion is less common among health care consumers who often opt for other 
beneficiaries (health insurance fund/state/municipality). The opinion of health care 
consumers across countries differs significantly. Approximately 45% of Ukrainian and 
Bulgarian respondents support health care providers as a beneficiary while this percentage is 
much higher in Hungary and Lithuania. 
Overall, respondents have a positive attitude towards protection mechanisms for vulnerable 
population groups. Yet, health care providers express the least support for this, which 
confirms our finding from the qualitative data analysis. Significant variation between 
countries is found. In Bulgaria and Romania, approximately 60% of health care providers 
approve fee reductions or exemption policy while in Ukraine, this share is more than 90%. 
 
4.5. Discussion  
This chapter presents the results of a study on the acceptability of patient payments by health 
care stakeholders in six CEE countries. Although we combine two types of analysis 
(qualitative and quantitative) in order to strengthen validity and reliability (we have found no 
conflicting results), the limitations of the study should be acknowledged. Most importantly, 
the study groups are small and the degree of their representativeness of the wider population 
is unknown. However, the primary research objective was to collect in-depth information on 
the views of different stakeholders rather than achieving representatives for a country. 
Furthermore, the quality of our qualitative data is highly influenced by the knowledge and 
skills of the moderator or interviewer. We mitigated this limitation by choosing experienced 
moderators and interviewers and by applying a standardized guide to assist them during the 
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data collection process. Also, our findings can be subject of biases arising from the 
translation of the research tools and of the transcripts (the qualitative data). By involving 
professional translators and research experts in the translation process, we diminished such 
biases to a certain extent. Notwithstanding the study limitations, our results suggest some 
patterns that apply to all six countries, which will be the focus of our discussion. 
Patient charges are strongly advocated by policy makers and insures’ representatives in our 
study. This finding is not surprising given previous research (see Chapter 2) as well as the 
fiscal pressure in the CEE health care systems (Healy et al., 2010). Both fiscal goals 
(generation of additional resources) and efficiency goals (reduction of moral hazard) of 
patient charges implementation are acknowledged by policy makers and insurers in all 
countries included in the study. Yet, their importance differs in accordance with the 
expectation that in health care system with relatively better funding, efficiency goals gain in 
relevance (Saltman & Figueras, 1997). The exemption is Bulgaria where although public 
health care spending is relatively low, patient charges are perceived as a means to improve 
efficient use of health care resources. This can result from the fact that reducing unnecessary 
use was the initial goal of patient payments when they were implemented along with the 
health insurance system in 2000 (Atanasova et al., 2011). Moreover, the long experience with 
patient payments has proved that these charges hardly increase resources or improve quality 
of services, as is stated by Bulgarian respondents. 
Health care providers, though they overall support payments, are the least homogeneous 
group in our study and their opinion differs depending on the country. In Bulgaria and 
especially in Hungary, health care providers, who have experienced formal patient payments 
but have not been direct beneficiaries of fees revenues, express negative attitudes toward 
patient charges, perceiving them mostly as an administrative burden. By the same token, 
some health care providers oppose excluding services or population groups from payments 
obligations. Thus, it can be concluded that acceptability of patient payments by health care 
providers to a large extent depends on the financial benefit from these payments. 
The majority of health care consumers in our study (irrespective of the country) are against 
obligatory charges for services in the statutory benefit package. Our results indicate that the 
low acceptability of fees among consumers follows from poor quality and access to health 
care services offered in the public health care system in these countries, combined with the 
low transparency and accountability e.g. in patients’ entitlements. Although patients in CEE 
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countries are entitled to a broad range of services, the quality and accessibility of these 
services are rarely specified (Kutzin et al., 2010). Consequently, due to the shortage of public 
resources, patients are often denied free-of-charge high-quality and timely health care. This 
contributes to the common characteristic in CEE countries: lack of trust in public institutions 
and in the adequate use of health care resources (Horne, 2010). As our results indicate, this 
attitude also finds an explanation in the failure of patient payment policies, i.e. lack of quality 
improvement, poor transparency, co-existence of informal payments. The low effectiveness 
of patient payment policy might result from the fact that health policy making in CEE 
countries is rarely rooted in evidence (Ensor, 2004). The reforms are usually ad hoc measures 
implemented when a political window of opportunity opens.  
Despite the opposition against obligatory fees, some consumers in our study agree to 
voluntary payments for additional value i.e. in exchange for additional service, better quality, 
standard or better access (except for life saving/essential services). The relatively high 
acceptability of such fees (especially in Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine) may be explained 
by widespread informal and quasi-formal charges in these countries, which serve the same 
goals (Gaál et al., 2010; Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010; Lewis, 2000, 2002; Murauskiene et al., 
2010). Yet, it should be noted that payments for additional value (e.g. payments for quicker 
access) may raise equity concerns or even efficiency concerns (e.g. co-payments for 
additional tests without medical indication). 
Our results indicate that consumer attitudes towards obligatory charges are also a reflection 
of their concern about the inability to pay for health care services. Financial barriers to health 
care are a common problem in CEE countries due to already high out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (including payments for pharmaceuticals) and lack or failure of protection 
mechanisms for vulnerable population groups (Balabanova et al., 2004; Shakarishvili, 2006; 
Szende & Culyer, 2006; Xu et al., 2003). The development of an effective exemption 
mechanism which accompany patient payments is a challenging task due to considerable 
informational, administrative, resource and socio-political constraints (Gilson et al., 1995; 
Russell & Gilson, 1997). The broad exemption policies, often applied by governments due to 
the pressure of different social groups, do not effectively target the most vulnerable but 
increase administration of the system and reduce its fiscal efficiency. 
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4.6. Conclusions 
Our study shows that there is a rather weak consensus among the main stakeholder groups on 
the presence and role of patient charges in CEE. Health care policy makers and insurers 
strongly advocate patient charges, in countries with better funding, mostly as a measure to 
improve efficiency in health care utilization. Health care providers acknowledge the 
importance of reducing unnecessary use of health care services, but their approval of charges 
is driven by the perspective of financial profit from the payment system and a low 
administrative burden. However, the majority of health care consumers are against charges. 
This is largely due to distrust that the implementation of obligatory formal patient payments 
would benefit patients, i.e. improve the poor access and quality of health care services, and 
thus, reduce other payment obligations. Although in CEE countries with relatively poor 
public funding, all stakeholders groups see the implementation of universal formal patient 
charges as the way to regulate the quasi-formal payments, patient inability to pay for health 
care services and inequity are major concerns in these countries.  
Our findings indicate that enhancing public trust and acceptance of patient payments in CEE 
countries require improving transparency and accountability in the health care system, e.g. a 
clear formulation of a feasible (considering limited resources) benefit package, well-defined 
quality and access standards, eradication of informal payments. The introduction of 
obligatory patient payments should be accompanied by investments to assure high-quality 
health care services, through reinvesting the fee revenues in health care facilities. Further, 
decision makers should protect the most vulnerable groups against adverse equity effects e.g. 
applying transparent exemption or reduction mechanisms. Administrative costs and fiscal 
efficiency should be closely considered when developing a patient payment system. Relying 
on evidence (e.g. preliminary analyses of the impacts of patient charges) should facilitate 
building an effective and more equitable patient payment policy in CEE countries. 
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Abstract 
 
Background: Out-of-pocket payments are a major source of health care financing in CEE 
countries. Different payments might constitute a barrier to the use of services for vulnerable 
population groups. Individuals who are unable to pay, employ different coping strategies (e.g. 
borrowing money, delaying or foregoing service utilization), which can have negative 
consequences on their health and social welfare.  
Objective: To study financial barriers to the use of health care services in CEE countries: 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. 
Methods: The analysis is based on quantitative data collected in 2010 in nationally 
representative surveys. Two indicators of inability to pay for out-patient and hospital services 
were considered: the need to borrow money or sell assets and foregoing service utilization. 
Statistical analyses were applied to investigate associations between the indicators of inability 
to pay and individual characteristics of respondents. 
Results: Patient payments are most common in Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania 
and often include informal payments. Romanian and particularly Ukrainian patients most 
often face difficulties to pay for health care services with approximately 40% of Ukrainian 
payers borrowing money or selling assets to cover hospital payments and approximately 60% 
of respondents who need care foregoing services. Inability to pay mainly affects those with 
poor health and low income.  
Conclusions: Widespread patient payments constitute a major financial barrier to health care 
service use in CEE, particularly in less wealthy countries. There is a need to formalize them 
where they are informal and to take measures to protect health care consumers, especially 
those with limited possibilities to deal with payment difficulties.  
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5.1. Introduction 
The transition period in CEE countries has brought significant changes to their health care 
systems, including health care financing (Kutzin et al., 2010; Mossialos & Dixon, 2002). As 
we presented in Chapter 1, the severe economic downturn in the 1990s, coupled in many 
countries with rising unemployment, inflation, low salaries, tax evasion and a large informal 
sector, led to specific challenges, such as substantial deficits in the public financing of health 
care systems. Countries struggled to retain the coverage levels of the communist period, 
which had given universal access to a broad range of (admittedly, poor quality) health care 
services (Golinowska et al., 2006; Rechel & McKee, 2009). Many opted to ration publicly 
funded health care services, such as through limiting the scope of statutory benefit packages 
or introducing patient cost-sharing (though not all planned reforms were implemented, and 
some were reversed)(Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010; Robinson, 2002; Teutsch & Rechel, 2012). 
Furthermore, implicit rationing had already become a common feature of CEE health care 
systems. This included informal (under-the-table) patient payments, quasi-formal payments 
(introduced by health care providers to compensate for insufficient funding) and long waiting 
lists, which compelled patients to seek health care in the private sector (Gaál et al., 2010; 
Gotsadze & Gaál, 2010; Lewis, 2002; Stepurko et al., 2010). 
As a result, patients in CEE countries are now confronted with various payment obligations 
when using health care services, and out-of-pocket payments constitute a major source of 
health care financing, (for data on health expenditure see Chapter 1). This imposes a 
particular financial burden on vulnerable groups in the population, such as those with low 
income or chronic conditions (Balabanova et al., 2004; Shakarishvili, 2006; Xu et al., 2003). 
Patients who are unable to pay, employ different coping strategies, either to meet health care 
costs (e.g. by limiting other expenses, borrowing money or selling assets) or to avoid 
payments (e.g. by foregoing or delaying health care utilization) (Chuma et al., 2007; 
McIntyre et al., 2006; Russel, 2004; Sauerborn et al., 1996). Both types of strategy are likely 
to have negative consequences for health and social welfare at the individual and population 
level. Although this issue has major policy implications, empirical evidence on the inability 
to pay in CEE countries is sparse. This is surprising, as it is likely that this problem will grow 
in the future. The rise of public health care deficits increasingly prompts policy makers in 
CEE countries to focus their attention on private sources of health care financing (Blažek & 
Netrdová, 2012; De Beer, 2012; Holt, 2010). 
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This chapter explores the inability to pay for health care services in six CEE countries: 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. We focus on two key indicators 
of inability to pay: the need to borrow money and/or sell assets (representing strategies aimed 
at meeting health care costs) and foregoing health care utilization (a strategy to avoid costs).  
 
5.2. Methods 
The data analyzed in this chapter were collected in surveys among nationally representative 
samples of the adult population in each of the six CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine). In order to ensure comparability of data across 
countries, the questionnaire was identical for all six countries (it was developed in English 
and then translated into national languages). The data collection process took place 
simultaneously in all six countries in July-August 2010. The samples were selected using a 
multi-stage random probability design. The surveys were conducted by trained interviewers 
using face-to-face interviews. The data collection resulted in approximately 1000 effective 
interviews per country. The description of data collection process and characteristics of the 
samples are included in Appendix C.  
The objective of the survey was to provide quantitative data on the respondents’ willingness 
and ability to pay for health care services. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix D. The 
survey questions of interest in this chapter refer to the use of physician and hospital services 
during the preceding 12 months, payments for these services and inability to pay. We 
specifically focused on two indicators of inability to pay, i.e. the need to borrow money 
and/or sell assets to cover payments and foregoing health care services due to inability to pay.  
We applied statistical analyses to investigate associations between indicators of inability to 
pay and individual characteristics, using the software package Stata 11. To analyze the first 
indicator of inability to pay (the need to borrow money and/or sell assets), a sequential logit 
model was used (Buis, 2013). It allowed us to examine the relation between respondents’ 
socio-demographic characteristics and the need of borrowing/selling assets, while accounting 
for the use of health care services and paying for services. The association between the 
second indicator of inability to pay (foregoing health care services) and respondents’ 
characteristics was studied by means of multinomial logistic regression. Differences were 
analyzed for four groups of respondents: users who did not forego services due to payments 
Inability to pay for health care services in CEE countries 
91 
(reference category), users who forewent services due to payments, non-users who forewent 
services due to payments, and non-users who did not forego services due to payments.  
The explanatory variables used in the models are described in Appendix E. They include: 
age, gender, place of residence, education, equivalized household income (using the OECD 
equivalence scale (Hagenaars et al., 1994)), health insurance status, self-perceived health 
status, presence of a diagnosed chronic illness. Due to the high number of missing data on 
income (average for all countries: 7.75%), the missing values were replaced using data on the 
perception of income, obtained in the same survey (see Appendix E for more details). A 
dummy variable (income proxy: 1- proxied income, 0 – reported income) was included in the 
model to indicate the replaced missing values.  
The analyses were done separately for each country, as well as jointly for all countries. 
Because the analyses per country showed similar patterns, this chapter presents only the 
results for the aggregated sample of six countries. The models include country indicators, 
except for Lithuania, which is taken as the reference country, as our initial analysis found that 
this country usually ranked in the middle in cross-country comparisons. 
 
5.3. Results 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the descriptive statistics related to out-of-pocket payments for 
health care services and the two coping strategies in response to inability to pay (i.e. 
borrowing money or selling assets, and foregoing utilization). The statistics show that out-of-
pocket payments for health care services are very common in Bulgaria (reported by more 
than 70% of out-patient service users and more than 60% of hospital care users). However, 
most of these payments are formal and comparatively small. Patients also very often pay for 
health care services in Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania (with up to 70% of users paying for 
hospital services in Ukraine). In contrast to Bulgaria, payments in these countries are often 
also informal and relatively high. The percentage of users who report paying for health care 
services is lowest in Poland (where approximately 80% of users did not pay for services at 
all) and Hungary. Yet, in Hungary payments for hospitalizations are reported by 46% of 
users, and the vast majority of payments are informal.  
Overall, payments related to hospitalizations are more common and more often include 
informal payments than payments for out-patient care. The median amount of money paid in 
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a year is also higher for hospital services than for out-patient services. Thus, the burden of 
hospital payments for individuals is substantial. The highest median share of hospital 
payments in annual equivalized household income is reported in Ukraine (7.8%) and 
Romania (4.7 %). For 43.5% and 23.9% of payers in these two countries respectively, these 
payments account for at least 10% of household income per equivalent adult.  
 
Table 5.1. Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for out-patient and in-patient services - descriptive 
statistics 
   Bulgaria  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Ukraine  Total 
Number of respondents  1003 1037 1012 1000 1000 1000 6052 
         
Number and percentage of 
respondents who use 
services 
P 738 (73.6) 828 (79.8) 739 (73.0) 735 (73.5) 651 (65.1) 573 (57.3) 4264 (70.5) 
H 171 (17.0) 219 (21.1) 165 (16.3) 159 (15.9) 192 (19.2) 184 (18.4) 1090 (18.0) 
          
Number 
and 
percentage 
of users 
who pay 
for 
services a 
Formal and/or 
informal 
payments 
P 543 (73.6) 225 (27.2) 315 (42.6) 172 (23.4) 345 (53.0) 323 (56.4) 1923 (45.1) 
H 106 (62.0) 101 (46.1) 99 (60.0) 34 (21.4) 116 (60.4) 130 (70.7) 586 (53.8) 
 Only 
formal 
payments 
P 472 (64.0) 51 (6.2) 169 (22.9) 123 (16.7) 158 (24.3) 115 (20.1) 1088 (25.5) 
 H 72 (42.1) 4 (1.8) 17 (10.3) 8 (5.0) 21 (10.9) 41 (22.3) 163 (15.0) 
 Only 
informal 
payments 
P 18 (2.4) 119 (14.4) 81 (11.0) 28 (3.8) 64 (9.8) 80 (14.0) 390 (9.1) 
 H 5 (2.9) 78 (35.6) 46 (27.9) 21 (13.2) 33 (17.2) 27 (14.7) 210 (19.3) 
 
 Formal 
and 
informal 
payments 
P 53 (7.2) 55 (6.6) 65 (8.8) 21 (2.9) 123 (18.9) 128 (22.3) 445 (10.4) 
 
 H 29 (17.0) 19 (8.7) 36 (21.8) 5 (3.1) 62 (32.3) 62 (33.7) 213 (19.5) 
          
Amount 
paid per 
year (€): 
median 
value in 
payers’ 
sample 
Formal and/or 
informal 
payments 
P 6.0 35.1 28.6 48.8 46.5 20.6 24.4 
H 25.0 87.7 85.7 48.8 93.0 103.1 73.2 
Formal 
payments 
P 5.5 35.1 28.6 48.4 34.9 20.6 17.5 
 H 24.0 35.1 57.1 48.8 58.1 103.1 48.8 
Informal 
payments 
P 15.0 35.1 28.6 24.3 23.3 10.3 23.3 
 H 10.0 105.3 85.7 48.8 46.5 41.2 57.1 
Total amount paid as % of 
equivalized annual income b : 
median in payers’ sample 
P .3% .9% .9% 1.1% 1.8% 1.7% .9% 
H 1.4% 2.3% 2.2% 1.0% 4.7% 7.8% 3.1% 
Percentage of payers with a 
total amount paid ≥ 10% of 
equivalized annual income 
P 3.0% 2.3% 6.2% 3.2% 13.2% 11.4% 6.7% 
H 13.4% 8.2% 16.2% 3.1% 23.9% 43.5% 21.1% 
P - out-patient physician services; H – in-patient hospital services 
a Missing values of payments (number and percentage of users): Bulgaria – P: 28 (3.8%) H: 12 (7.0%), Hungary – P: 11 (1.3%) H: 4 (1.8%), 
Lithuania – P: 10 (1.4%) H: 1 (.6%), Poland – P: 12 (1.6%) H: 3 (1.9%), Romania – P: 36 (5.5%) H: 14 (7.3%), Ukraine – P: 5 (.9%) H: 6 
(3.3%);  
b Household income was equivalized using the OECD-modified scale which assigns the weight 1 to the first adult, .5 to each additional adult 
and .3 to each child aged below 14 years (in our study a person under the age of 18). 
  
Inability to pay for health care services in CEE countries 
93 
The differences in out-of-pocket payments for out-patient and in-patient services have 
implications for the coping strategies to deal with the inability to pay. The strategy of 
borrowing money or selling assets to cover payments is reported more frequently for in-
patient than for out-patient services. The median amount of money borrowed is also higher 
for in-patient than for out-patient services, which seems to be related to the higher payments 
for in-patient care. The money borrowed is often equal to the entire payment, with the median 
amount of money borrowed as a percentage of total payment being 70%. Ukrainian and 
Romanian patients most often report borrowing money or selling assets, while in Hungary 
this strategy is least commonly reported. 
Table 5.2. Indicators of inability to pay - descriptive statistics 
   Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine Total 
          
B
o
rr
o
w
in
g
 m
o
n
ey
/ 
se
ll
in
g
 a
ss
et
s 
Number and percentage of 
payers who borrow/sell 
P 33 (5.6) 13 (5.5) 35 (10.7) 24 (13.0) 83 (21.7) 60 (18.3) 248 (12.1) 
H 22 (18.5) 12 (11.4) 23 (23.0) 9 (24.3) 45 (34.4) 58 (42.6) 169 (26.9) 
Amount borrowed per year 
(€): median value in 
borrowers’ sample 
P 50.0 17.5 57.1 109.8 69.8 51.5 57.1 
H 140.0 87.7 142.9 122.0 93.0 128.9 116.3 
Amount borrowed as % of 
amount paid: median in 
borrowers’ sample 
P 93.2% 50.0% 100.0% 63.3% 62.5% 50.0% 66.7% 
H 100.0% 63.3% 66.7% 71.4% 75.0% 66.7% 70.7% 
Amount borrowed as % of 
equivalized income a: median 
in borrowers’ sample 
P 2.8% .6% 2.6% 2.5% 3.3% 3.8% 3.1% 
H 8.5% 2.7% 4.3% 3.7% 4.7% 10.3% 6.3% 
 
         
F
o
re
g
o
in
g
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
Number and percentage of 
users (actual and potential)b 
who forewent services  
P 307 (40.4) 257 (29.7) 214 (28.0) 215 (28.5) 284 (42.0) 465 (64.6) 1742 (38.4) 
H 60 (29.1) 27 (11.6) 32 (17.8) 23 (13.2) 94 (39.5) 165 (60.4) 401 (30.8) 
Number of foregone services 
per year: mean and standard 
deviation in sample of those 
who forewent c 
P 2.7 (2.2) 2.5 (2.0) 2.3 (2.1) 2.5 (2.0) 3.3 (4.8) 2.7 (2.2) 2.7 (2.8) 
H 1.6 (1.3) 1.3 (.8) 1.4 (.9) 1.3 (.7) 1.8 (1.3) 2.0 (1.6) 1.7 (1.4) 
P – out-patient physician services; H – in-patient hospital services  
a  Household income was equivalized using the OECD-modified scale which assigns the weight 1 to the first adult, .5 to each additional adult 
and .3 to each child aged < 14 (in our study a person under the age of 18); 
b The sample users (actual and potential) included 1) respondents who used health care services in the last 12 months and did not forego any 
services 2) respondents who did not use services but forewent services due to inability to pay;  
c  In all countries the median number of foregone services equals 2 for out-patient physician services and 1 for hospitalization. 
 
In contrast, the second strategy (i.e. foregoing health care utilization) is more often applied 
for out-patient care than for hospital services. Not visiting a physician at least once or not 
being hospitalized due to inability to pay is most commonly reported in Ukraine (by 
approximately 60% of those in need). In all countries, the median number of foregone 
services in a year is two for out-patient visits and one for hospitalizations. The average 
Chapter 5 
94 
number of foregone services is highest in Romania (3.3 visits to physicians and 1.8 
hospitalizations) and lowest in Poland and Hungary.  
The results of the sequential logit model (Table 5.3) indicate that paying for health care 
services is more common among younger respondents, women (for out-patient services only), 
those living in rural areas, individuals with higher income, and also among those with worse 
health status or a chronic condition. The results also confirm that paying for services is 
significantly more prevalent in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, whereas respondents in 
Hungary and Poland less often pay for health care services, compared with Lithuania.  
After controlling for the use of health care services and for paying for services, the 
probability of borrowing money or selling assets increases with a lower health status and a 
lower income. For individuals with a poor health status the odds of borrowing money/selling 
assets to pay for out-patient services and hospital services are respectively 5.2 and 3.8 times 
higher than the odds for individuals in good health. Also, the presence of a chronic illness is 
significantly associated with this coping strategy (for out-patient services). On the other hand, 
for a one unit increase in log-transformed income (a 2.72-fold increase), we see an 
approximately 50% decrease in the odds of borrowing money/selling assets for both types of 
services. We also observe that borrowing/selling assets is more likely among younger 
respondents and among those with a university education (for hospital services, p≤ 0.1). 
Furthermore, this coping strategy is significantly more often applied in Romania, but less 
often in Bulgaria and Hungary, compared with Lithuania.  
The association of the second type of coping strategies (i.e. foregoing services) with the 
selected characteristics of respondents was studied by means of a multinomial logistic 
regression (Table 5.4).  
Users and non-users who forewent services due to the inability to pay were compared to users 
who did not face this problem. The results indicate that a higher income result in a lower 
probability of foregoing services, irrespective of the group (users and non-users). In addition, 
users are more likely to forego in-patient and out-patient services if their health status is poor. 
For individuals with poor health relative to individuals with good health, the relative risk 
ratio (RRR) of foregoing services is 1.7 and 3.1 for out-patient care and hospital care 
respectively. Foregoing out-patient care is also significantly more likely among women and 
young people. Compared with Lithuania, foregoing out-patient and hospital care is 
significantly more common in Ukraine and Romania. 
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Table 5.3. Borrowing money/selling assets to pay for health care services – sequential logit model 
  Out-patient physician services   In-patient hospital services  
  Using services Paying for services Borrowing/selling  Using services Paying for services Borrowing/selling  
  Coeff. (SE) OR Coeff. (SE) OR Coeff. (SE) OR  Coeff. (SE) OR Coeff. (SE) OR Coeff. (SE) OR 
Age (10-years)  -.043* (.022) .958 -.120*** (.023) .887 -.274*** (.053) .760  -.061*** (.024)  .941 -.097** (.044) .908 -.119* (.070) .888 
Gender (male → female)  .497*** (.064) 1.643 .212*** (.070) 1.237 .032 (.159)  1.032   -.064 (.073) .938 .168 (.133) 1.183 -.017 (.208) .984 
Residence place (rural → urban)  -.036 (.071) .964 -.164** (.075) .848 .028 (.155)  1.029  -.047 (.078) .954 -.233* (.144) .792 -.078 (.215) .925 
University education a (no →yes)  .244*** (.088) 1.276 .130 (.094) 1.139 -.098 (.214) .906  .019 (.103) 1.019 .113 (.195)  1.119 .457* (.280) 1.580 
Perceived health: poor  1.272*** (.152) 3.568 .320*** (.121) 1.377 1.652*** (.255) 5.216  1.249*** (.120) 3.486 .057 (.212) 1.058 1.323*** (.343) 3.754 
Perceived health: fair  .692*** (.086) 1.997 .211** (.090) 1.235 .693*** (.216)  2.000  .394*** (.098) 1.482 -.013 (.183) .988 .688** (.315) 1.990 
Chronic condition (no → yes)  1.371*** (.087) 3.940 .376*** (.087) 1.457 .447** (.204) 1.563  1.050*** (.094) 2.858 .554*** (.179) 1.740 .319 (.306) 1.376 
Public health insurance (no 
→yes) 
 .582*** (.105) 1.789 -.032 (.120) .969  .058 (.232)   1.060  .473*** (.128) 1.605 .199 (.232) 1.221 -.021 (.346) .979 
Monthly income per adult 
equivalent b (€) 
 .338*** (.058) 1.402 .271*** (.068) 1.311 -.708*** (.141) .493  .021 (.069) 1.021 .388*** (.132) 1.475 -.659*** (.211) .517 
Income proxy (no →yes)  -.089 (.132) .915 .166 (.156) 1.180 .422 (.293) 1.525  -.197 (.173) .821 -.670** (.337) .512 .116 (.625) 1.123 
Bulgaria  .371*** (.117) 1.449 1.685*** (.124) 5.392 -.895*** (.277) .409  .067 (.131) 1.069 .392* (.243) 1.480 -.565* (.375) .569 
Hungary  .457*** (.115) 1.580 -.715*** (.111) .489 -.659* (.353) .518  .352*** (.122) 1.422 -.568*** (.218) .567 -.520 (.411) .595 
Poland  .182* (.116) 1.200 -.907*** (.120) .404 .402 (.304)  1.494  -.010 (.134) .990 -1.626*** (.261) .197 .253 (.483) 1.288 
Romania  -.222** (.111) .801 .635*** (.116) 1.888 .720*** (.238) 2.054  .264** (.127) 1.302 .243 (.232) 1.275 .560* (.340) 1.750 
Ukraine  -.417*** (.141) .659 .664*** (.159) 1.942 -.256 (.325) .774  .336** (.168) 1.399 .938*** (.315) 2.554 .266 (.445) 1.304 
Constant  -2.304*** (.339)  -1.575*** (.404)  2.070*** (.825)   -2.764*** (.410)  -1.813** (.777)  2.038* (1.233)  
               
Observations  5809       5929      
Pseudo R-square  .157       .116      
LR chi2   2007.4       773.1      
Prob.> chi2  .000       .000      
OR – odds ratio; *** p≤ .01, ** p≤ .05, * p≤ .1;  
a The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was applied University education = ISCED 5-6;  
b The natural log transformation was employed. 
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Table 5.4. Foregoing health care services due to inability to pay – multinomial logistic regression 
  Foregoing out-patient physician services a  Foregoing in-patient hospital services 
a 
  users  
forewent  
non-users  
forewent  
non-users  
did not forego  
 users 
forewent  
non-users 
forewent  
non-users  
did not forego  
  Coeff. (SE) RRR  Coeff. (SE) RRR  Coeff. (SE) RRR   Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff. (SE) RRR 
Age (10-years)  -.054** (.024) .948 .050 (.037) 1.052 .011 (.026) 1.011  -.003 (.062) .997 .052 (.051) 1.053 .061** (.026) 1.063 
Gender (male → female)  .167** (.073) 1.182 -.371*** (.109) .690 -.455*** (.075) .635  .084 (.191) 1.088 .254* (.157) 1.289 .071 (.079) 1.074 
Residence place (rural → urban)  -.110 (.077) .896 -.077 (.117) .926 .054 (.083) 1.056  -.231 (.190) .794 .124 (.162) 1.132 .0003 (.085) 1.000 
University education b (no →yes)  -.221** (.102) .802 -.137 (.149) .872 -.379*** (.102) .684  -.400 (.300) .670 -.156 (.220) .856 -.045 (.110) .956 
Perceived health: poor  .553*** (.122) 1.739 -.345* (.223) .709 -1.586*** (.220) .205  1.120*** (.334) 3.066 .051 (.258) 1.052 -1.190*** (.130) .304 
Perceived health: fair  .246*** (.094) 1.279 -.118 (.138) .889 -.763*** (.103) .466  .234 (.315) 1.263 .143 (.216) 1.154 -.420*** (.103) .657 
Chronic condition (no → yes)  .051 (.090) 1.052 -1.157*** (.144) .315 -1.452*** (.107) .234  .212 (.284) 1.236 -.089 (.201) .915 -1.062*** (.100) .346 
Public health insurance (no 
→yes) 
 -.054 (.121) .948 -1.003*** (.163) .367 -.391*** (.127) .676  .353 (.310) 1.424 -.611*** (.239) .543 -.430*** (.140) .651 
Monthly income per adult 
equivalent c (€) 
 -.333*** (.069) .717 -.697*** (.096) .498 -.351*** (.069) .704  -.417** (.176) .659 -.494*** (.141) .610 -.032 (.075) .968 
Income proxy (no →yes)  .449*** (.156) 1.567 .294 (.232) 1.342 .253* (.155) 1.288  .425 (.440) 1.530 .497* (.334) 1.644 .172 (.188) 1.187 
Bulgaria  .458*** (.125) 1.581 -.056 (.216) .946 -.276* (.134) .759  .305 (.392) 1.357 .364 (.312) 1.439 -.049 (.138) .952 
Hungary  .221* (.123) 1.248 -.098 (.222) .907 -.484*** (.129) .616  -.165 (.416) .848 -.702* (.384) .496 -.341*** (.126) .711 
Poland  -.019 (.135) .981 .072 (.229) 1.075 -.218* (.129) .804  -.881* (.553) .414 .102 (.358) 1.107 -.025 (.138) .976 
Romania  .401*** (.128) 1.493 .328* (.205) 1.389 .360*** (.126) 1.434  .925*** (.361) 2.522 .750*** (.295) 2.117 -.193 (.137) .825 
Ukraine  .923*** (.164) 2.517 .957*** (.227) 2.605 .609*** (.173) 1.839  1.745*** (.439) 5.724 1.110*** (.345) 3.034 -.144 (.188) .866 
Constant  .725* (.402)  2.855*** (.542)  2.382*** (.399)   -1.033 (1.051)  .712 (.819)  2.849*** (.445)  
               
Observations  5667       5762      
Pseudo R-square  .115       .125      
LR chi2   1576.9       1025.2      
Prob.> chi2  .000       .000      
RRR – relative risk ratio; *** p≤ .01, ** p≤ .05, * p≤ .1;  
a Multinominal logistic regression, reference group - users who did not forego any services;  
b The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was applied University education = ISCED 5-6;  
c The natural log transformation was used 
Inability to pay for health care services in CEE countries 
97 
5.4. Discussion  
In this chapter, we analyze patients’ inability to pay for health care services in six CEE 
countries. The analysis is limited to out-of pocket payments for health care services incurred 
by individuals, not considering other direct costs of illness (e.g. for pharmaceuticals) and 
indirect costs (e.g. loss of income due to illness) for individuals, and also other household 
members. This is a potential limitation of our study, since we do not capture the total burden 
of illness for households. We might also miss some interrelations, as the inability to pay for 
services can, for example, be a result of high costs for pharmaceuticals. Another drawback of 
our study is that we investigate only two types of behavior (i.e. borrowing money/selling 
assets and foregoing health care utilization), whereas households might also employ other 
strategies to deal with payment difficulties, such as cutting other expenses or using savings. 
However, in our analysis we do not aim to depict the full spectrum of coping behaviors, but 
only examine the two main types of strategies (i.e. strategies aimed at meeting the costs and 
strategies aimed at avoiding the costs) which have in various studies, been found to be the 
most commonly used (Chuma et al., 2007; Kabir et al., 2000; McIntyre et al., 2006; Russel, 
2004; Sauerborn et al., 1996). 
Our study provides important insights into the prevalence of patient payments for health care 
services in CEE countries and the burden that these payments constitute. The results confirm 
that paying for health care services is common, but also that there are major differences 
across countries. Reasons for the different patterns and frequency of payments are likely to 
include the level of public resources devoted to health care, as well as differences in attitudes 
and health care system governance.  
In Poland and Hungary, countries with a relatively high public health expenditure per capita 
(WHO, 2012), patient payments occur least frequently. In both countries, the use of publicly 
financed health care services does generally not require formal patient co-payments (Chapter 
2). Instead, payments occur in the private sector (due to poor access to publicly financed care, 
mostly in the out-patient sector), or are requested by public health care providers (quasi-
formal payments, mostly for hospital care) (Golinowska & Tambor, 2012). The latter 
practice, which is of questionable legality, is being restricted in Poland. There are also some 
indications that the spread of informal payments in Poland was reduced as a result of 
anticorruption measures undertaken in the past years (Golinowska, 2010; Sagan et al., 2011). 
This might explain why Polish respondents relatively rarely report paying for services. In 
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contrast, in Hungary, there is a high frequency of informal payments (especially for hospital 
services), which might be due to a more positive attitude towards these payments among 
health care consumers and policy makers than in some other countries of the region (Stepurko 
et al., 2011). 
In the other countries, i.e. Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria, paying for health care 
services is common. Amongst them, Bulgaria is the only country with a universal system of 
formal co-payments for publicly financed health care services (Atanasova et al., 2011). This 
could explain why Bulgarian consumers most often report small formal payments. In 
Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, informal as well as quasi-formal payments (frequently 
requested by providers to compensate for insufficient public funding) are widespread, often 
imposing a double financial burden on patients (Danyliv et al., 2012; Murauskiene et al., 
2012). These payments are largely outside the control of governments and thus not supported 
by measures to secure equity. The high frequency of patient payments, combined with 
relatively high poverty rates, especially in Ukraine and Romania (Eurostat, 2010; Libanova et 
al., 2009), has catastrophic consequences for patients and their households. Our results 
indicate that Ukrainian and Romanian patients face the greatest burden of payments and 
difficulties in paying for health care services. As mentioned earlier, the financial burden 
could be even greater, if other costs of illness are considered, such as the costs for 
pharmaceuticals, which are particularly high in CEE countries (WHO, 2012).  
Based on the results of our analysis it can be concluded that patient payments are determined 
by health care needs on one hand (i.e. paying is more frequent among those with poor self-
perceived health status and with chronic condition), and the ability to pay for better quality 
and access to services, on the other hand (i.e. higher income individuals pay more 
frequently). As indicated by our results, individuals who have greater needs but a low ability 
to pay for services (i.e. those with low income) often forego using health care services and 
more often borrow money and sell assets to cover payments, compared to healthier and 
wealthier groups.  
The choice of a strategy in response to payment difficulties might be affected by the ability of 
households to mobilize financial resources (resource portfolio), as well as the type of health 
problems and related costs (Chuma et al., 2007; McIntyre et al., 2006; Russel, 2004). 
Individuals with more resources (material, human and social) have also greater ability to 
borrow money or sell assets (Kabir et al., 2000; Russel, 2004; Sauerborn et al., 1996; Wilkes 
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et al., 1997). In our study, we observe that younger respondents and those with a university 
education are more likely to apply this strategy. Households might also try to mobilize 
resources if the health problem is severe or care is not initiated by the patient (Chuma et al., 
2007; Russel, 2004). In case of inability to pay for hospital care respondents in our study 
more often apply strategy to meet the cost (borrowing money/selling assets) than to avoid the 
cost (foregoing care), while the opposite is true for out-patient services.  
Strategies in response to cost pressure, may have adverse consequences for individuals, 
households and society as a whole. Not seeking health care when needed, as commonly 
reported by the respondents in our study, might worsen one’s health status, ultimately 
increasing the cost of illness, and might lead to a deterioration of one’s health, economic and 
social status. Borrowing money, if it leads to accumulated debt, might bring similar negative 
results in the long run (Chuma et al., 2007; Russel, 2004). 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
Our study shows that policies are required to reduce out-of-pocket payments and to ensure 
more equitable access to health care services, particularly in less wealthy CEE countries and 
among the vulnerable population groups. Replacing informal or quasi-formal payments with 
a universal system of formal charges might help to protect individuals with low income or 
poor health, by exempting them from payments or applying fees limits. However, the 
potential of such policies to enhance equity is limited. Firstly, it is challenging to develop and 
apply exemption mechanisms that effectively target vulnerable population groups (Gilson et 
al., 1995; Russell & Gilson, 1997). Secondly, formal fees rarely substitute for informal 
payments, unless the reasons for their presence are eliminated (Baji et al., 2012b; Belli et al., 
2004; Gaál et al., 2010). Therefore, public investments in CEE health care systems to 
enhance the quality and accessibility of health care services, as well as improved system 
governance, are crucial to improve equity of health care financing and utilization in this part 
of Europe. 
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Willingness to pay for publicly financed health care 
services in Central and Eastern Europe: evidence from six 
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Abstract 
 
Background: Evidence indicates that health care consumers in CEE countries might be 
willing to pay for publicly financed services, provided these services are easily accessible and 
of good quality. Data on consumers’ willingness to pay and its determinants might facilitate 
development of patient payment systems that better contribute to sustainable health care 
financing.  
Objective: To study the consumer’s willingness to pay for publicly financed health care 
services in CEE countries using a stated willingness-to-pay technique. 
Methods: Contingent valuation method was applied to investigate consumer’s willingness 
and ability to pay a fee for two types of publicly financed health care services: consultation 
with medical specialists and hospitalization. Data were collected in nationally representative 
population-based surveys conducted in 2010 in six CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine) using an identical survey methodology.  
Results: The majority of health care consumers in the six CEE countries are willing to pay an 
official fee for publicly financed health care services that are of good quality and quick 
access. The consumers’ willingness to pay is limited by the lack of financial ability to pay for 
services, and to a lesser extent by objection to pay. Significant differences across the six 
countries are observed, though.  
Conclusions: The contingent valuation method can provide decision-makers with a broad 
range of information to facilitate cost-sharing policies. Nevertheless, the intrinsic limitations 
of the method (i.e. its hypothetical nature) and the context of CEE countries call for caution 
when applying its results for policy analysis.  
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6.1. Introduction 
The increased interest in patient cost-sharing as a measure for sustainable health care 
financing calls for research tools to provide reliable evidence to support the development of 
effective patient payment policies. In the last decades, willingness-to-pay techniques have 
increasingly been applied to inform policy decisions in health care (Bala et al., 1999; De 
Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Diener et al., 1998; Olsen & Smith, 2001; Russell et al., 1995). 
These techniques are based on either observed actual consumer behavior (revealed 
willingness-to-pay approach) or hypothetical consumer behavior expressed in a survey (stated 
willingness-to-pay approach) (Breidert et al., 2006). None of these two approaches is without 
drawbacks and both can be fraught with errors. As most health care services are provided 
outside of “free” markets, the stated willingness-to-pay approach has certain advantages. 
Asking individuals about the amount they are willing to pay for a given good or service on a 
hypothetical market has been mostly used to place a monetary value on health care benefits 
for the purpose of cost-benefit analyses (De Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Diener et al., 1998; 
Klose, 1999; Olsen & Smith, 2001). In recent years, the usefulness of this approach for the 
development of cost-sharing policies has been put forward (Delcheva et al., 1997; Mataria et 
al., 2007; Pavlova et al., 2004a, b).  
The technique allows eliciting information on how different population groups would 
respond to a given service price. This can facilitate the design of patient payment systems that 
reduce excess demand without preventing those in need from using necessary health care 
services. Yet, this research area is rather new and underdeveloped. More work is needed to 
elucidate the usefulness of the stated willingness-to-pay approach for cost-sharing policies 
and to strengthen its validity and reliability.  
The aim of this chapter is to present an application of a stated willingness-to-pay technique, 
namely the contingent valuation method (Carson et al., 2001; Venkatachalam, 2004), to 
investigate consumers’ willingness and ability to pay a fee for two types of publicly financed 
health care services: consultation with medical specialists and hospitalization. Data were 
collected in six CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. 
As we presented in the preceding chapters, in these countries patient payments have met with 
little public support. However, our results (Chapter 4) indicate that health care consumers 
might be willing to pay towards publicly financed services, provided they are easily 
accessible and of good quality (Lewis, 2002; Stepurko et al., 2010). The differences in health 
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care systems and in the experiences with cost-sharing between the six countries analyzed in 
this study (for more details see Background section in Chapter 4), allow to draw some 
conclusions on how health care system context affects consumers’ willingness to pay for 
services.  
 
6.2. Methods 
Just as in Chapter 5, the analysis presented in this chapter, draws on quantitative data from 
nationally representative population-based surveys among the adult population (aged 18 and 
more) in six CEE countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. 
The surveys were conducted between July and August 2010, and were based on an identical 
survey methodology (see Appendix C for details on the data collection process and 
characteristics of the samples in the six countries). 
To investigate the respondents’ willingness and ability to pay for health care services, a 
contingent valuation method was applied. The design of the study (scenario, questions, 
definitions) was developed based on the results of a qualitative study (focus group 
discussions with health care consumers) conducted prior to the survey in the same six 
countries (see Chapter 4), and following the contingent valuation methodology (Russell et al., 
1995; Wedgwood & Sansom, 2003). The exact wording of the contingent valuation task in 
the questionnaire is given in Appendix D.  
Respondents were confronted with a scenario of obtaining publicly financed health care 
services (funded from social health insurance contributions or taxes) of good quality and 
quick access if they pay an official fee to the health care facility (e.g. polyclinic, clinic or 
hospital). During the pre-test, payments through the health care facility appeared to be the 
most acceptable formal payment channel, as opposed to fees paid to the state or a health 
insurer. Two types of services were specified in the contingent valuation task: 1) a 
consultation and examination by a medical specialist in case of experiencing a major health 
problem (unfamiliar symptoms that make the respondent concerned); 2) a 5-day 
hospitalization due to a planned surgery (but no life-threatening illness). These two types of 
services were chosen due to their relevance for policy making, as the most commonly applied 
patient cost-sharing schemes in European countries involve flat-rate fees per out-patient visit 
and per hospitalization day (see Chapter 2).  
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Definitions of good quality and quick access were provided to the respondents using a 
visualization card, accompanied with an explanation by the interviewer when necessary. 
They included: 1) for good quality: modern medical equipment, renovated health care 
facilities, and polite staff with good reputation and skills; 2) for quick access: max. 30 
minutes travel time to the health care facility, max. 10 minutes waiting time in the out-patient 
facility, max. 1 month waiting time for planned surgeries. The selection of the above 
attributes of good quality and quick access was based on the preceding focus-group 
discussions in the six countries. These attributes were identified as the most relevant when 
consumers take decisions on the use of health care services. The choice of attributes was also 
influenced by the results of the pre-tests of the questionnaire which verified whether 
attributes are meaningful to the respondents and mimic a real-life situation. For this reason, 
technical quality was not included among the criteria for good quality; some respondents 
could not understand indicators for technical quality, such as treatment success, since these 
indicators were not readily available to them in real-life situations. 
In order to elicit the respondents’ willingness and ability to pay, a combination of closed and 
open-ended questions were used to minimize biases which can arise when using only one 
type of questions (Klose, 1999). The respondents were first asked whether they were willing 
to pay for a given service (with the options to accept or reject). Those who stated that they 
were willing to pay, where asked to choose a payment interval presented on a visualization 
card. Finally, an open-ended question was used to elicit the exact amount within the chosen 
interval that the respondent was willing and able to pay. We asked about willingness and 
ability to pay instead of inquiring only about willingness to pay, since these two terms are not 
necessarily equivalent. In particular, studies show that some patients who are unable to pay a 
fee, might decide to borrow money or sell assets to pay for health care (see Chapter 5). The 
payment intervals on the visualization card had the same values in Euros for all six countries, 
but they were presented to the respondents in their local currency, using the official 
conversion rates at the start of the survey. Respondents also stated their amounts in the local 
currency, which were then converted into Euros using the same conversion rates, as well as 
into international dollars using the World Bank’s GDP Purchasing Power Parity conversion 
factor. 
The respondents, who stated that they would not be willing to pay, were asked to give the 
reason for their unwillingness to pay, with the following answer options: unable to pay, 
object to pay, and both unable and object to pay. Inability and objection to pay were the focus 
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of our attention, since they are commonly regarded as the two main potential reasons of 
unwillingness to pay for publicly financed health care services of good quality and quick 
access (Danyliv et al., 2013) (see also Chapter 4). Data on past experiences (during the 
preceding 12 months) with the use of health care services and payments (formal and 
informal) for these services were also collected. 
We applied a two-step method with selection-bias correction based on the multinomial logit 
model (selmlog Stata command, software: Stata 9) (Bourguignon et al., 2007) to study 
associations between willingness to pay and socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents. In the first step, a multinomial logit model was used to compare the three groups 
of those unwilling to pay (unable to pay, object to pay, and both unable and object to pay) 
with the group of respondents who were willing to pay (reference category). In the second 
step, a linear regression model (level willing to pay in PPP Int.$) was estimated on a subset of 
observations (only those who were willing to pay) with a selectivity correction (using Lee’s 
correction method) (Lee, 1983). The variables used in the models are given in Appendix E. 
The list of explanatory variables included: age, gender, place of residence, level of education, 
self-perceived health status, presence of a diagnosed chronic illness, equivalized household 
income using the modified OECD equivalence scale (Hagenaars et al., 1994)) and recent use 
of health care services (out-patient visit or hospitalization in the last 12 months). We did not 
include past payment experiences in the regression model because of a potential reverse 
causality between past payments and willingness to pay. Instead, we ran stratified regression 
analysis (by group, i.e. non-users, users who did not pay, and users who paid formally and/or 
informally). However, we did not observe any relevant differences across these groups. The 
link between respondents’ experiences with payments and their willingness to pay was 
examined by means of comparative quantitative analyses. 
 
6.3. Results 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics on the stated willingness to pay for health care 
services in the six countries. In Table 6.2, we present information on the past payments for 
health care services reported by the same respondents. 
The majority of respondents in the six countries are willing to pay for services of good 
quality and quick access. Respondents in all countries except Ukraine are more often willing 
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to pay for out-patient services than for in-patient care. This is in contrast to the pattern of past 
payments, which are more common for hospital treatment than for out-patient services. We 
observe significant differences between the countries in terms of willingness to pay. The 
lowest shares of respondents willing to pay are in Hungary and Poland (see Table 6.1). In the 
other four countries, a higher percentage of respondents express willingness to pay, reaching 
approximately 80% for visits to medical specialists in Romania and Lithuania and 
approximately 75% for hospitalizations in Ukraine and Romania. When looking at the past 
experiences with payments (Table 6.2), we observe a similar trend. Polish and Hungarian 
health care users report to pay less often than health care users in the other four countries. In 
Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine informal payments are reported to be common, while in 
Bulgaria formal payments prevail.  
Among the respondents willing to pay for consulting medical specialists, the median amount, 
after correction for purchasing power parity, is the lowest in Ukraine (14 dollars) and the 
highest in Poland (27 dollars). However, when comparing the indicated amounts to 
respondents’ income, respondents in Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria are willing to spend the 
highest share of their income. We also observe significant differences across the countries in 
the amount respondents are willing and able to pay for hospitalization. The median willing-
to-pay fee for hospitalization range from 192 dollars in Lithuania to 303 dollars in Bulgaria. 
The median share of household monthly equalized income respondents are willing to pay for 
hospitalizations is the highest, however, in Ukraine, 58%, while in Poland and Hungary it 
amount to approximately 24%. Comparing the median amounts respondents are willing to 
pay for a given service to the median of average past payments for the same type of service, 
we see that willingness-to-pay amounts often exceed the corresponding amounts paid. Yet, in 
Ukraine and Romania, past payments for out-patient services are higher than the willingness-
to-pay amounts.  
The most frequent reason for the unwillingness to pay among the respondents from the six 
countries is inability to pay, while objection to pay is less often declared (Table 6.1). 
However, there are significant differences across the countries. The lowest objection to pay 
for services is observed in Bulgaria, where the vast majority of those unwilling to pay (more 
than 70%) state solely an inability to pay. The objection towards paying is also relatively low 
in Romania, where it is declared as the only reason for the unwillingness to pay for out-
patient services by 14% and for in-patient services by 17% of those unwilling to pay for these 
services. Hungarian respondents significantly more often object to pay (for out-patient
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Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics – willingness to pay 
 
  Bulgaria  
N= 1003 
Hungary  
N= 1037 
Lithuania  
N= 1012 
Poland  
N= 1000 
Romania  
N= 1000 
Ukraine  
N= 1000 
Total  
N= 6052 
P-value 
 
  
       
 
O
u
t-
p
at
ie
n
t 
se
rv
ic
es
 (
v
is
it
 t
o
 s
p
ec
ia
li
st
) 
Willing to pay n (% N) 752 (75.0) 688 (66.3) 813 (80.3) 726 (72.6) 807 (80.7) 731 (73.1) 4517 (74.6) <.001 a  
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
visit in Euro d 
M (SD) 
Median  
8.8 (6.9) 
7.5 
13.9 (21.1) 
10.0 
11.9 (14.0) 
8.6 
15.1 (14.4) 
12.2 
11.2 (13.5) 
7.4 
6.8 (7.6) 
5.2 
11.2 (13.9) 
7.6 
 
<.001 b 
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
visit in PPP Int.$ d 
M (SD) 
Median  
26.6 (20.9) 
22.7 
30.7 (46.6) 
22.1 
26.8 (31.4) 
19.2 
33.5 (32.0) 
27.0 
30.2 (36.5) 
20.1 
18.4 (20.7) 
14.0 
27.7 (32.6) 
22.1 
 
<.001 b 
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
visit, as % of monthly income 
per adult equivalent d 
Median %  4.0% 2.8% 3.3% 3.2% 4.1% 4.0% 3.5% <.001 b 
Unwilling to pay  n (% N) 238 (23.7)  346 (33.4) 192 (19.0) 269 (26.9) 184 (18.4) 263 (26.3) 1492 (24.7)  
 Unable to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 188 (79.0) 116 (33.5) 99 (51.6) 79 (29.4) 114 (62.0) 106 (40.3) 702 (47.1) <.001 
c 
 Object to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 23 (9.7) 131 (37.9) 46 (24.0) 75 (27.9) 25 (13.6) 81 (30.8) 381 (25.5) 
 Unable and object to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 25 (10.5) 99 (28.6) 39 (20.3) 115 (42.8) 36 (19.6) 76 (28.9) 390 (26.1) 
 No reason stated  n (% unwilling to pay) 2 (.8)  0 (.0) 8 (4.2) 0 (.0) 9 (4.9) 0 (.0) 19 (1.3) 
Missing  n (% N) 13 (1.3) 3 (.3) 7 (.7) 5 (.5) 9 (.9) 6 (.6) 43 (.7)  
           
H
o
sp
it
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
 (
5
-d
ay
 h
o
sp
it
al
iz
at
io
n
) 
Willing to pay n (% N) 654 (65.2) 581 (56.0) 693 (68.5) 497 (49.7) 748 (74.8) 757 (75.7) 3930 (64.9) <.001 a 
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
hospitalization in Euro d 
M (SD) 
Median  
111.7 (66.5) 
100.0 
100.9 (64.7) 
100.0 
101.6 (62.0) 
85.7 
115.8 (85.4) 
97.6 
109.0 (119.4) 
95.3 
94.8 (65.9) 
81.4 
105.0 (80.6) 
97.7 
 
<.001 b 
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
hospitalization in PPP Int. $ d 
M (SD) 
Median  
338.5 (201.6) 
303.0 
223.0 (142.9) 
220.9 
227.9 (139.0) 
192.3 
256.7 (189.3) 
216.2 
294.7 (322.8) 
257.9 
258.3 (179.6) 
221.9 
267.6 (211.8) 
222.7 
 
<.001 b 
 Amount respondents were 
willing and able to pay per 
hospitalization, as % of 
monthly income per adult 
equivalent d 
Median % 47.4% 24.8% 31.2% 23.4% 45.1% 57.8% 37.7% <.001 b 
Unwilling to pay n (% N) 338 (33.7) 450 (43.4) 303 (29.9) 496 (49.6) 235 (23.5) 240 (24.0) 2062 (34.1)  
 Unable to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 247 (73.1) 164 (36.4) 140 (46.2) 144 (29.0) 151 (64.3) 115 (47.9) 961 (46.6) <.001 
c  
 Object to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 46 (13.6) 151 (33.6) 91 (30.0) 144 (29.0) 39 (16.6) 55 (22.9) 526 (25.5) 
 Unable and object to pay n (% unwilling to pay) 43 (12.7) 131 (29.1) 67 (22.1) 205 (41.3) 44 (18.7) 69 (28.8) 559 (27.1) 
 No reason stated n (% unwilling to pay) 2 (.6) 4 (.9) 5 (1.7) 3 (.6) 1 (.4) 1 (.4) 16 (.8) 
Missing n (% N) 11 (1.1) 6 (.6) 16 (1.6) 7 (.7) 17 (1.7) 3 (.3) 60 (1.0)  
a Pearson’s Chi-square test was applied for dichotomous nominal outcome, i.e. willing to pay; not willing to pay; b Kruskal-Wallis test was applied; 
c Pearson’s Chi-square test was applied for nominal outcome, i.e. unable to pay; object to pay; unable and object to pay;  
d Values in the sample of respondents willing to pay for health care services. 
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Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics – past payments (during the last 12 months) 
 
 
  Bulgaria 
N= 1003 
Hungary 
N= 1037 
Lithuania 
N= 1012 
Poland 
N= 1000 
Romania 
N= 1000 
Ukraine 
N= 1000 
Total 
N= 6052 
P-value 
           
O
u
t-
p
at
ie
n
t 
se
rv
ic
es
 
Use of health care services  n (% N) 738 (73.6) 828 (79.8) 739 (73.0) 735 (73.5) 651 (65.1) 573 (57.3) 4264 (70.5)  
 Not paying n (% users) 167 (22.6) 592 (71.5) 414 (56.0) 551 (75.0) 270 (41.5) 245 (42.8) 2239 (52.5) <.001 a 
 Paying only formally n (% users) 472 (64.0) 51 (6.2) 169 (22.9) 123 (16.7) 158 (24.3) 115 (20.1) 1088 (25.5)  
 Paying only informally n (% users) 18 (2.4) 119 (14.4) 81 (11.0) 28 (3.8) 64 (9.8) 80 (14.0) 390 (9.1)  
 Paying formally and informally n (% users) 53 (7.2) 55 (6.6) 65 (8.8) 21 (2.9) 123 (18.9) 128 (22.3) 445 (10.4)  
 Missing n (% users) 28 (3.8) 11 (1.3) 10 (1.4) 12 (1.6) 36 (5.5) 5 (.9) 102 (2.4)  
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number 
of visits in a year in Euro c 
M (SD) 
Median  
6.7 (19.4)  
1.3 
11.1 (12.5) 
7.0 
20.0 (30.5) 
8.6 
15.5 (17.2) 
12.2 
29.7 (54.8) 
11.6 
20.9 (42.2) 
8.6 
16.7 (34.7) 
6.0 
 
<.001 b 
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number 
of visits in a year in PPP Int.$ c 
M (SD) 
Median  
20.2 (58.7) 
3.8 
24.5 (27.6) 
15.5 
44.9 (68.5) 
19.2 
34.4 (38.2) 
27.0 
80.4 (148.1) 
31.4 
56.8 (114.9) 
23.4 
43.0 (92.5) 
15.5 
 
<.001 b 
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number 
of visits in a year, as % of monthly 
income per adult equivalent c 
Median %  .8% 1.9% 3.3% 2.7% 6.2% 8.2% 2.6% <.001 b 
           
H
o
sp
it
al
 s
er
v
ic
es
 
Use of health care services n (% N) 171 (17.0) 219 (21.1) 165 (16.3) 159 (15.9) 192 (19.2) 184 (18.4) 1090 (18.0)  
 Not paying n (% users) 53 (31.0) 114 (52.1) 65 (39.4) 122 (76.7) 62 (32.3) 48 (26.1) 464 (42.6) <.001 a 
 Paying only formally n (% users) 72 (42.1) 4 (1.8) 17 (10.3) 8 (5.0) 21 (10.9) 41 (22.3) 163 (15.0)  
 Paying only informally n (% users) 5 (2.9) 78 (35.6) 46 (27.9) 21 (13.2) 33 (17.2) 27 (14.7) 210 (19.3)  
 Paying formally and informally n (% users) 29 (17.0) 19 (8.7) 36 (21.8) 5 (3.1) 62 (32.3) 62 (33.7) 213 (19.5)  
 Missing n (% users) 12 (7.0) 4 (1.8) 1 (.6) 3 (1.9) 14 (7.3) 6 (3.3) 40 (3.7)  
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number 
of hospitalizations in a year in Euro c 
M (SD) 
Median  
62.4 (108.5) 
20.0 
85.4 (72.0) 
70.2 
99.8 (103.6) 
85.7 
62.2 (64.6) 
43.9 
109.4 (130.4) 
58.1 
150.8 (191.2) 
82.5 
101.6 (131.9) 
52.6 
 
<.001 b 
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number of 
hospitalizations in a year in PPP Int.$ c 
M (SD) 
Median  
189.1 (328.9) 
60.6 
188.8 (159.0) 
155.0 
224.0 (232.4) 
192.3 
137.9 (143.1) 
97.3 
295.9 (352.6) 
157.2 
411.0 (520.9) 
224.7 
262.2 (355.5) 
140.4 
 
<.001 b 
           
 Total amount paid in a year ÷ number 
of hospitalizations in a year, as % of 
monthly income per adult equivalent c 
Median %  14.2% 18.8% 23.4% 10.7% 34.3% 67.4% 26.7% <.001 b 
a Pearson’s Chi-square test was applied for dichotomous nominal outcome in a group of users, i.e. paying ; not paying;  
b  Kruskal-Wallis test was applied; c Values in the sample of health care users who paid for services. 
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services, 38% of those unwilling to pay). The opposition towards paying is also considerable 
in Poland. However, the highest share (more than 40%) of Polish respondents who are not 
willing to pay for services state both objection and inability to pay. 
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics and comparative analyses of willingness to pay across 
three groups of respondents: non-users (those who did not use services in the last 12 months), 
users who did not pay, and users who paid for services. We observe significant differences 
across the groups in the acceptability of payments (stating a positive willingness to pay) and 
less often in the amounts respondents are willing to pay. The highest percentage of 
respondents willing to pay is among users who paid for services. Those who paid for services 
indicate also a higher median willing-to-pay amounts than users who did not pay for services. 
Yet, in Bulgaria, where the reported past payments are mostly obligatory user charges, the 
three groups of respondents do not differ significantly.  
Table 6.4 presents the results of the statistical analysis using the two-step method to 
investigate the association of willingness to pay with the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents. Since the results of the analyses for each country separately followed the same 
pattern, only the results for the aggregated sample of six countries are presented. Country 
dummy variables are included in the models, except for Bulgaria which is taken as the 
reference category since it is the only country in the study where official co-payments for 
publicly funded services existed at the time of the survey. 
 
The results of the first step indicate that, in the case of out-patient services, declaring inability 
to pay is related to lower income (for a one unit increase in log-transformed income, i.e. a 
2.72-fold increase, the relative risk for being unable to pay relative to being willing to pay 
decreases by a factor of 0.40), and also to higher age, urban residence, no university 
education and worse health status. However, recent users (individuals who used out-patient 
services in the last 12 months) are less likely to declare inability to pay for services. The 
analysis for the in-patient services revealed the same socio-demographic characteristics 
differentiating the group of those unable to pay from the group willing to pay (with a similar 
strength of association), with the exemption of two variables (place of residence and recent 
use of hospital services) being not significant in the model for in-patient services.  
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Table 6.3. Willingness to pay among groups of non-users, non-paying users and paying users 
(during the last 12 months) 
 
  
   Out-patient services 
(visit to specialist) 
 In-patient services  
(5-day hospitalization) 
   
N
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n
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N
o
n
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P
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P
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Bulgaria  Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
180/230 
(78.3%) 
128/162 
(79.0%) 
409/514 
(79.6%) 
.920  543/779 
(69.7%) 
31/50 
(62.0%) 
71/99 
(71.7%) 
.456 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M 
(SD)  
Median 
26.1  
(9.7) 
30.3 
28.0  
(17.7) 
28.0 
27.0  
(25.2) 
22.7 
.097  337.4 
(195.5) 
303.0 
373.9 
(229.7) 
303.0 
333.6 
(234.1) 
303.0 
.559 
            
Hungary Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
120/202 
(59.4%) 
372/588 
(63.3%) 
188/221 
(85.1%) 
<.001  458/805 
(56.9%) 
42/115 
(36.5%) 
79/101 
(78.2%) 
<.001 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M 
(SD) 
Median 
31.5  
(35.6) 
22.1 
28.9  
(48.7) 
16.6 
34.4 
(49.4) 
23.3 
.024  218.3 
(143.9) 
220.9 
202.0 
(128.0) 
155.0 
262.7 
(141.7) 
232.6 
.007 
            
Lithuania Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
215/268 
(80.2%) 
331/407 
(81.3%) 
260/308 
(84.4%) 
.384  587/818 
(71.8%) 
34/65 
(52.3%) 
72/99 
(72.7%) 
.004 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M 
(SD) 
Median 
26.7  
(37.8) 
19.2 
24.2  
(20.9) 
19.2 
30.3  
(36.4) 
22.4 
.031  228.0 
(137.4) 
192.3 
224.8 
(156.7) 
192.3 
228.6 
(146.1) 
192.3 
.830 
            
Poland Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
178/257 
(69.3%) 
382/547 
(69.8%) 
155/170 
(91.2%) 
<.001  427/828 
(51.6%) 
48/120 
(40.0%) 
21/34 
(61.8%) 
.025 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M  
(SD) 
Median 
35.7 
(33.8) 
27.0 
29.5  
(23.8) 
27.0 
41.3 
(44.3) 
28.1 
<.001  261.7 
(195.5) 
216.2 
207.8 
(121.7) 
162.2 
269.2 
(181.8) 
162.2  
.226 
            
Romania Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
279/343 
(81.3%) 
208/260 
(80.0%) 
291/337 
(86.4%) 
.086  617/780 
(79.1%) 
38/58 
(65.5%) 
79/109 
(72.5%) 
.023 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M  
(SD) 
Median 
33.5  
(45.0) 
22.0 
26.1 
(20.9) 
20.1 
29.6 
(36.8) 
20.1 
.302  291.9 
(236.1) 
269.8 
241.7 
(159.4) 
188.7 
344.8 
(724.2) 
235.8 
.193 
            
Ukraine Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
313/417 
(75.1%) 
160/242 
(66.1%) 
254/317 
(80.1%) 
.001  621/799 
(77.7%) 
29/47 
(61.7%) 
103/127 
(81.1%) 
.022 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M 
(SD) 
Median 
17.9  
(14.5) 
14.0 
19.5  
(26.9) 
14.0 
18.4  
(22.5) 
14.0 
.394  264.1 
(182.9) 
224.7 
204.8 
(151.3) 
140.4 
242.4 
(164.5) 
140.4 
.088 
            
Total  Willing to pay n/N  
(%) 
1285/1717 
(74.8%) 
1581/2206 
(71.7%) 
1557/1867 
(83.4%) 
<.001  3253/4809 
(67.6%) 
222/455 
(48.8%) 
425/569 
(74.7%) 
<.001 
 Amount respondents 
were willing and able 
to pay, PPP Int.$ 
M  
(SD) 
Median 
27.5 
(32.3) 
21.3 
26.7 
(30.6) 
21.6 
28.9  
(35.2) 
22.7 
.095  268.1 
(189.8) 
224.7 
237.2 
(164.5) 
175.4 
279.3 
(350.0) 
220.1 
.012 
a P-value based on: 1) Pearson’s Chi-square test applied for dichotomous nominal outcome, i.e. willing to pay; not willing to pay,  
2) Kruskal-Wallis test applied for the amounts willing to pay; comparisons between groups of non-users, non-paying users, paying users; 
only non-missing values included. 
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On the other hand, objection to pay for out-patient services (declaring only objection to pay 
rather than willingness to pay) is significantly (at p≤ 0.05) more likely among older 
individuals (for a 10-year increase in age, the relative risk ratio (RRR) is 1.12), men (for 
females relative to males, RRR= 0.70), residents of urban areas (for urban relative to rural 
residence, RRR= 1.63). Similarly, men and those living in urban areas are more likely to 
object to pay for in-patient services. Objection to pay for hospitalization is additionally 
associated with better health status. 
The group of respondents who declare both inability and objection to pay is significantly 
different (p≤ 0.05) from the group of respondents willing to pay in terms of age and income, 
i.e. older respondents and those with lower income are more likely to declare inability and 
objection to pay for both out-patient and in-patient services. However, the recent use of out-
patient services increases the probability of being willing to pay for this type of service.  
The results of the second step, i.e. the linear regression model with selectivity correction, 
show that the amount respondents are willing and able to pay for physician services is 
significantly higher for those with a higher income (a 2.72-fold increase in income increases 
the amounts respondents are willing to pay by approximately 13%). Individuals with a worse 
self-perceived health status and recent users of physician services who are willing to pay 
indicate significantly lower amounts. However, the presence of a chronic condition increases 
the level of willingness to pay. Similar to physician services, the amount respondents are 
willing to pay for hospitalization increases with respondents’ income (the strength of the 
association is greater than in the case of out-patient services), better health status and the 
presence of a chronic condition (significant only at p≤ 0.1). Additionally, younger 
respondents and those with university education are willing to pay significantly higher fees 
for in-patient services.  
The coefficients of the country indicators (dummy variables) included in the models confirm 
the presence of significant differences in the willingness to pay across countries (see Table 
6.4).  
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Table 6.4. Willingness to pay for services – results of the two-step method with selection-bias correction based on the multinomial logit model 
  Out-patient services (visit to specialist)  In-patient services (5-day hospitalization) 
  Multinomial logit model a  Linear 
regression 
 Multinomial logit model a Linear 
regression 
  Unable to pay Object to pay Unable and object to pay Amount WTP 
(PPP Int. $) b 
 Unable to pay Object to pay Unable and object to pay Amount WTP 
(PPP Int. $) b 
  Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff. (SE)) RRR Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff.(SE) c  Coeff. (SE)  RRR Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff. (SE) RRR Coeff. (SE)  c 
Age (10-years)  .223*** (.030) 1.250 .111*** (.038) 1.117 .141*** (.037) 1.152 -.019* (.012)  .195*** (.027) 1.216 .045 (.034) 1.046  .124*** (.032) 1.132 -.045*** (.012) 
Gender (male→ 
female) 
 -.093 (.090) .911 -.361*** (.115) .697 -.181* (.111) .834 -.016 (.024)  .104 (.080) 1.109 -.405*** (.100) .667 -.196** (.096) .822 -.010 (.024) 
Place of residence (rural 
→ urban) 
 .201** (.094) 1.222 .489*** (.136) 1.631 .149 (.118) 1.161 .015 (.028)  .109 (.083) 1.116 .403*** (.116) 1.497 .161* (.104) 1.175 .032 (.028) 
University education d 
(no →yes) 
 -.573*** (.159) .564 -.245* (.157) .783 -.301* (.175) .740  -.006 (.031)  -.663*** (.141) .515 -.123 (.135) .884 -.196 (.144) .822 .125*** (.033) 
Self-perceived health: 
poor 
 .854*** (.151) 2.348 -.121 (.225) .886 .182 (.201) 1.199 -.029 (.056)  .765*** (.137) 2.149  -.441** (.217) .644 .163 (.180) 1.178 -.153*** (.053) 
Self-perceived health: 
fair 
 .346*** (.121) 1.413 -.270* (.151) .764 -.046 (.146) .955 -.053** (.027)  .382*** (.105) 1.465 -.198* (.133) .820 -.048 (.127) .953 -.052* (.033) 
Chronic condition (no 
→ yes) 
 .148 (.119) 1.159 -.070 (.150) .932 .075 (.146) 1.078 .065** (.028)  -.013 (.102) .987 -.089 (.129) .915 -.054 (.125) .947 .054* (.029) 
Monthly income per 
adult equivalent (€) b 
 -.929*** (.080) .395 .092 (.117) 1.096 -.587*** (.103) .556 .118*** (.035)  -.996*** (.072) .369 -.163* (.097) .850 -.555*** (.092) .574   .236*** (.045) 
Income proxy e (no 
→yes) 
 .067 (.215) 1.070 .368* (.218) 1.445 .036 (.247) 1.037 -.052 (.044)  .064 (.184) 1.066 .195 (.197) 1.216 -.059 (.212) .943  -.055 (.053) 
Recent user (no →yes)  -.294*** (.110) .746 -.237* (.131) .789 -.346*** (.130) .708 -.056** (.029)  -.024 (.100) .976 .145 (.136) 1.155 -.026 (.130) .974 -.010 (.032) 
Hungary  .348** (.151) 1.416 1.877*** (.258) 6.534 2.001*** (.259) 7.394  -.086 (.071)  .463*** (.136) 1.588 1.421*** (.194) 4.141 1.677*** (.205) 5.348 -.628*** (.079) 
Lithuania  -.271* (.148) .763 .712*** (.281) 2.038 .750*** (.281) 2.117 -.151*** (.036)  -.145 (.133) .865  .774*** (.200) 2.169  .742*** (.216) 2.100 -.493*** (.041) 
Poland  .008 (.170) 1.008 1.093*** (.280) 2.982 2.196*** (.261) 8.989  .086* (.056)  .604*** (.146) 1.829 1.371*** (.206) 3.941  2.374*** (.205) 10.738 -.565*** (.099) 
Romania  -.570*** (.142) .565 .155 (.306) 1.167 .412* (.282) 1.509 -.019 (.038)  -.599*** (.128) .549 -.172 (.229) .842 .016 (.230) 1.016 -.178*** (.042) 
Ukraine  -.912*** (.150) .402  1.466*** (.266) 4.331 1.062*** (.261) 2.891 -.400*** (.039)  -1.283*** (.140) .277 .110 (.221) 1.116  .242 (.217) 1.273 -.185*** (.055) 
Constant  1.664*** (.415)  -4.983*** (.685)  -1.173** (.579)  2.693*** (.201)  2.522*** (.379)  -2.464*** (.552)  -.712 (.509)  4.401*** (.282) 
Selection correction term      .233 (.213)        -.340* (.214) 
Observations  5783        5796       
Pseudo R-square  .089        .090       
LR chi2   832.55        1,037.67       
Prob.> chi2  .000        .000       
Sigma2        .446*** (.016)         .438*** (.019) 
Rho        .349 (.326)        -.514* (.314) 
RRR – relative risk ratio; WTP – willing to pay *** p≤.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤.1;  
a Reference group – respondents who were willing to pay; b The natural log transformation was employed; c Bootstrapped standard errors (1 000 replications); d The International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED) was applied. University education = ISCED 5-6; e This variable indicates the replaced missing values in the income variable (1- proxied income, 0 – reported income) (see Appendix E for more information). 
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6.3. Discussion  
This chapter presents the results of a study on consumers’ willingness and ability to pay for 
publicly financed health care services in six CEE countries using the contingent valuation 
method. The results indicate that the majority of health care consumers in the six countries 
are willing to pay an official fee for publicly financed health care services that are of good 
quality and quick access. This in is line with previous research (Baji et al., 2011) (Chapter 4) 
that concluded that the acceptability of formal patient payments in CEE countries can be 
increased by assuring the quality and accessibility of health care services.  
Nevertheless, our results show that the willingness to pay for services with good quality and 
quick access differs significantly across the countries. In countries with lower levels of health 
care funding, i.e. Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania (WHO, 2012), the willingness to 
pay is more commonly expressed and consumers are willing to devote a higher share of their 
income to fees. In these countries, although they lack a formal system of cost-sharing (except 
for Bulgaria), patients are already confronted with various payments (informal and quasi-
formal) to enhance the quality and accessibility of services. The willingness to pay formal 
fees might thus be driven by the perceived need to improve existing services. Indeed, the 
regression results indicate that those who have recent experiences with out-patient health care 
(users in the last 12 months) are more likely to express willingness to pay for these services 
rather than inability or objection to pay, and those with a worse health status are less likely to 
object to pay for hospitalization. Furthermore, the observed differences in the acceptability of 
payments between rural and urban populations might be due to the greater need for quality 
and access improvements in rural areas (Shakarishvili, 2006). The results of the comparative 
quantitative analyses also show that in most countries those who paid for services in the last 
12 months more often express a willingness to pay than non-payers. However, it remains 
unclear how past experiences with payments might affect respondents’ willingness to pay, as 
reverse causality is possible (i.e. reported payments might result from consumers’ willingness 
to pay for improvements in quality and access).  
Although the majority of respondents is willing to pay for better and more accessible health 
care services, willingness to pay is limited by financial ability. Stated inability to pay is the 
most frequent reason for unwillingness to pay in our survey, most often in Ukraine, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Lithuania. Previous research findings presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation 
also indicate that in these countries patients often meet financial barriers in the use of health 
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care services (with the need to borrow money or sell assets to cover payments and some 
foregoing services altogether). Inability to pay affects particularly those with lower income, 
no university education, worse health status or older age. These groups are more likely to be 
unwilling to pay due to their inability to pay or are willing and able to pay significantly lower 
amounts. 
Our results also indicate a certain level of objection towards co-paying for publicly funded 
health care services, which is a frequent reason for stated unwillingness to pay, particularly in 
Hungary and Poland. A greater objection in these countries might result from a lesser need to 
improve quality and access of services. It is also possible that the results reflect consumers’ 
distrust that formal cost-sharing will guarantee better quality and easier access. Although 
respondents in our study are asked about their willingness to pay in a hypothetical market 
where quality and access are already improved, respondents are likely to reflect on their 
experiences and opinions on formal cost-sharing policy which are particularly negative in 
Hungary and Poland, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
Applying our results for the purpose of cost-sharing policy making should be done with 
caution. The results of the contingent valuation method can be subject to various forms of 
bias (Carson et al., 2001; Klose, 1999; Venkatachalam, 2004). It should be borne in mind that 
the study is based on hypothetical statements that are sensitive to the information provided to 
the respondents (e.g. quality and access attributes of services, payment beneficiary). Thus, 
from a methodological point of view, the willingness-to-pay results should not be interpreted 
as indicative of the level of fees a given country could or should introduce, but rather in terms 
of the general acceptability of fees conditional on the service provision specified in the 
scenario. Given the opposition towards cost-sharing policies in the analyzed countries, our 
results can also be subject to a strategic bias. Concerns about the introduction of fees might 
prompt some respondents to misrepresent (understate) their true willingness to pay, despite 
the fact that respondents are provided with information on the purpose of the survey 
(academic study).  
 
6.4. Conclusions 
The use of willingness-to-pay data to set up fee levels for efficiency and equity maximization 
is a challenging task (Russell et al., 1995). As demonstrated by our results, the willingness to 
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pay for health care services is affected by socio-demographic characteristics of consumers 
and can also be influenced by the type of service or health problem. Thus, fees uniform 
across individuals and services (e.g. at the level of average willingness and ability to pay), 
might lead to foregoing the use of health care by those with a lower willingness and ability to 
pay for a given service. This might be risky if health care consumers assign a low value to 
services which are in fact highly beneficial for them (e.g. due to insufficient information). For 
this reason, some researchers advocate a cost-sharing system which is linked to the clinical 
value of services, i.e. introducing fees for services with a low ratio of benefits to costs, while 
applying lower or no fees to high-value services in order to encourage their use (Braithwaite 
& Rosen, 2007; Chernew et al., 2007; Fendrick & Chernew, 2006). However, the lack of data 
and the high cost of implementation are important barriers for the application of value-based 
payment systems.  
In CEE countries that are characterized by low administrative capacity, a low-complex 
patient payment system is often the most rational solution. Nevertheless, given the need to 
enhance equity in health care, a cost-sharing system should be accompanied by well-designed 
and transparent protection mechanisms, e.g. exemptions or reductions for the poor, and 
payment limits to protect those who need to use health care frequently. Furthermore, service 
exemptions should be applied to encourage the use of services highly beneficial for patients 
and society. This, however, does not diminish the importance of the evaluation of the 
potential and actual effects of the patient payment policy, in terms of both the costs 
(operating cost of patient payment system) and the benefits (e.g. savings due to reduced 
demand among non-vulnerable population groups and collected additional revenues) which is 
the basis for pursuing effective cost-sharing policy.  
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7.1. Introduction 
This dissertation has been devoted to the topic of patient payments in Europe with the main 
focus on patient cost-sharing for health care services, i.e. patient payments for health care 
services that are included in the statutory benefit package. As outlined in Chapter 1, the 
motivation behind addressing this topic is the growing interest of policy makers in patient 
cost-sharing as a measure to create more sustainability in health care financing, and the need 
for more evidence to support policy actions. 
To respond to the research needs, two research aims have been specified. First, we aim to 
review the existing patient payment mix in European countries and identify its determinants. 
Along with the formal payments arrangements, we study informal patient payments, as their 
presence has important implications for the introduction of formal cost-sharing and for equity 
in health care. We consider a broad range of factors as potential determinants of patient 
payments (incl. economic, governance, social-cultural). To meet this aim, we rely on the 
analysis of available macro (country) level data for high number of European countries of 
different economic development. Second, the dissertation aim to provide evidence on the 
potential of formal cost-sharing for health care services in CEE countries. Given the existing 
barriers for cost-sharing policy in CEE countries, we focus our attention on the acceptability 
of cost-sharing for services, patients’ financial barriers to the use of health care services, and 
consumers’ willingness to pay for services. The study includes the analysis of micro level 
data (qualitative and quantitative) collected in six CEE countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine.  
While our analyses are not without limitations (see the discussion sections in Chapter 2-6) 
and there is a need for further research to explore cost-sharing in European countries, the 
broad range of evidence which we provide in this dissertation contributes to our knowledge 
on patient payments in European countries. In this chapter, the key findings are presented in 
the form of statements and are discussed from the perspective of policy and research. 
Conclusions on how to strengthen cost-sharing policy and to improve European health care 
systems’ performance, complete the chapter. 
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7.2. Main findings 
Cost-sharing arrangements in European countries have only limited potential to 
improve efficiency and resources generation. 
The analysis of cost-sharing policies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
shows that patient cost-sharing for health care services is commonly applied in Europe. In the 
past two decades, various European countries have implemented or increased obligatory 
payments for out-patient physicians’ and hospital services (details on the changes in patient 
cost-sharing in European countries are presented in Table 2.3, Chapter 2). Efficiency 
improvement and resource generation are the two objectives commonly assigned to cost-
sharing policies. As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the ability of 
cost-sharing to meet its policy objectives depends to a large extent on the design of the cost-
sharing system. The review of patient payment arrangements in European countries, which 
we present in this dissertation (Chapter 2), leads us to conclude that cost-sharing policies in 
European countries have limited potential to meet their objectives.  
In the poorly financed health care systems of CEE countries, patient payments are often seen 
as a source of additional revenues, which is expected to generate resources for health care 
improvements. However, in these countries, the level of fees is rather low so that they are 
affordable for a majority of the population. The review of cost-sharing arrangements for 
2008-2009 (Table 2.1, Chapter 2) show that co-payments for out-patient visit range from 
approximately 1 Euro (Bulgaria, Czech Republic) to approximately 3 Euro (Latvia Estonia 
for a visit to specialist). For example, in Bulgaria this fee accounts for approximately 15 -
20% of reimbursement price for a visit by a third-party payer (Danyliv et al., 2014a). The 
revenues from cost-sharing might be substantially restricted due to exemptions or 
compensations for selected population groups and payment limits, which we observe to be 
common in European countries. For example, in Latvia due to exemptions (approximately 
one third of the population is exempted) and payments caps, the revenues from cost-sharing 
are reduced by half (Mitenbergs et al., 2012). Further, the administrative cost of collecting 
payments from patients diminishes the net revenue. Reliable and accurate data on the 
resources generated from cost-sharing payments in European countries are scarce. Yet, 
available estimates (for both CEE and Western European countries) are in good agreement 
with our conclusions, e.g. in Latvia in 2010 collected fees accounted for 7% of total 
providers’ revenues (other 7% was the reimbursement from the public insurer for exempted 
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patients) (Mitenbergs et al., 2012), in Hungary patient payments revenues accounted for 4-
5% of public health expenditure (Baji, 2012), while in Germany a 10 Euro charges per first 
patient visit to the medical doctor in each calendar quarter, which existed till 2013, generated 
a net revenues of nearly 2 billion Euro a year (approximately 1% of public health insurance 
expenditure) (Stafford, 2012). This indicates that the fiscal efficiency of cost-sharing systems 
should be measured and should constitute important evaluation criteria of cost-sharing policy, 
particularly in countries which aim to generate additional resources for health care through patient 
payments.  
In well-funded health care systems of Western European countries, patient cost-sharing is 
often implemented as a measure to increase patient responsibility and thus, for a more 
efficient use of health care resources. Efficiency improvement was also a declared policy 
objective of cost-sharing introduction in some CEE countries, though with little approval by 
health care system stakeholders (e.g. in Slovakia and Hungary as described in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4). For a cost-sharing system to be able to enhance efficiency, it should give price 
signals to help consumers to discriminate between low- and high-value services (see Chapter 
1). However, in European countries, the amounts of patient payments are generally not 
aligned with the values of the services for patients. In Chapter 2, we show that most countries 
apply uniform co-payments for broad categories of services (visit to a GP/specialists, 
hospitalization day) and few countries base the payment amounts on the actual service cost 
(co-insurance, deductibles). Such “one size fits all” cost-sharing does not adequately 
moderate the utilization of services and is likely to reduce both essential and nonessential 
services, particularly among the vulnerable population groups, limiting the efficiency gain 
(Fendrick et al., 2010). The evidence on the effects of cost-sharing policy in few European 
countries where such analyses have been performed, confirms the adverse equity effects of 
cost-sharing (Huber et al., 2012; Lostao et al., 2007; Mielck et al., 2009; Rückert et al., 
2008).  
Our results indicate that cost-sharing arrangements in European countries should be 
reconsidered to contribute better to the sustainability of the health care systems. The need to 
amend cost-sharing policies has been already put forward in health care debates. A new 
approach to cost-sharing called value-based cost-sharing (value-based insurance design) has 
been proposed (Drummond & Towse, 2012). In this system, fees for health care services are 
differentiated based on their cost-effectiveness or on the health benefits they provide; health 
care services or goods which are proven to be cost-effective are provided with no charges, 
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particularly for patients who can benefit the most from their consumption (Chernew et al., 
2007; Fendrick & Chernew, 2006). Value-based cost-sharing has been increasingly applied 
for medications. In the area of health care services, it has been less common. Only some 
attempts to relate the level of fees to the value of services can be observed in European 
countries. For example, we observe that in many European countries, preventive services are 
excluded from the cost-sharing obligation, pregnant women are entitled to free-of-charge 
maternity care, chronically ill are compensated or exempted, in some countries patients meet 
lower payment obligation when they use preferred providers or have to pay more when 
visiting specialist without a referral (Chapter 2 and 3 include country details). The main 
barriers in the implementation of value-based cost-sharing is the lack of data on the health 
benefits or cost-effectiveness of health care interventions and the high administrative costs of 
such system. Nevertheless, European countries should consider a broader use of value-based 
cost-sharing in the future. This system could complement supply-side measures to improve 
quality and efficiency in health care such as paying-for-performance and paying-for-
coordination (Doran et al., 2006; Tsiachristas et al., 2013)  
Suggestions for further research:  
Our conclusions on the potential of cost-sharing to enhance efficiency and resources 
generation are largely based on the review of cost-sharing arrangements applied in European 
countries. More research on the actual effects of cost-sharing policy in European countries is 
needed to be able to thoroughly evaluate cost-sharing policies and amend payment 
arrangements for an optimal cost-sharing design. Particularly, it is worthwhile to study the 
effects of cost-sharing on the use of different types of services (essential vs. non-essential, 
preventive vs. curative) and on the cost of treatment, e.g. to test if the reduction in the number 
of visits is not offset by an increase in the intensity of services provided during the visit or the 
use of other provider’ services. Given the crucial role of health care providers in shaping 
demand for health care services, more research should be targeted on how to align demand- 
and supply-side measures for better performances of the health care systems.  
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Cost-sharing policies in European countries have not been effective in eliminating 
informal patient payments as the causes of informal patient payments are rarely taken 
away by the formal charges. 
In some CEE European countries, policy makers see the introduction of formal payments as 
an opportunity to “formalize” existing informal patient payments in these countries. This was 
one of the objectives stated by the Hungarian government when obligatory fees were 
implemented in 2007, as well as in Slovakia in 2003 (Chapter 3 and 4) or more recently in 
Romania (Holt, 2010). However, there is no convincing evidence that the introduction of 
formal cost-sharing leads to a significant reduction of informal patient payments. For 
example, a study on Hungary by Baji et al (2012b) indicates a decrease in informal patient 
payments only among low-income patients who might have needed to compensate for the 
increased burden of formal payments (Baji et al., 2012b). Also the results of our review of the 
formal-informal patient payment mix in European countries (Chapter 3) show that the two 
types of payment, i.e. formal and informal, might co-exist. Informal payments remain 
common in Albania, Bulgaria and Latvia despite the presence of formal cost-sharing for 
services. Although, in a few CEE countries, namely the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia and 
Slovenia where patients pay formally for services, informal payments are not reported to be 
widespread, the reduction of informal payments cannot be attributed solely to the 
introduction of formal fee. Researchers see this as a result of various health care reforms and 
overall improvements in the health care systems (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Lewis, 2000).  
The failure of cost-sharing policies to eliminate informal patient payments can be due to the 
fact that the cost-sharing policy does not address the reasons for informal patient payments. 
Evidence shows that although certain differences across countries (e.g. in the pattern of 
informal payments and their perception by the public), better attention and better services are 
the main reasons to pay informally in CEE countries (Stepurko, 2013). Health care 
professionals who receive additional income (informal payment) increase their attention and 
care for the patient or use their professional power to improve other aspects of quality at the 
expense of the public payer (and undoubtedly other patients). The motivation of health care 
providers to accept informal payment (or sometimes even initiate informal transaction) might 
be greater if they are dissatisfied with their salary. This indicates that formalization of 
informal patient payments could be achieved if patients could gain better quality by paying 
formally. Alternatively, cost-sharing could contribute to the reduction of informal payments 
if generated resources are successfully invested to enhance quality of care for all patients and 
General discussion 
123 
working condition for medical professionals (more discussion on this will follow). However, 
as indicated by the qualitative results presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, in CEE 
countries where obligatory formal fees were implemented, health care consumers did not 
observe improvements in quality of care and health care providers’ needs for better income 
were not always satisfied.  
Moreover, it should not be expected that fiscal measures will be sufficient for the eradication 
of informal patient payments in CEE countries. The results of the analysis presented in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation indicate that informal patient payments are a multi-caused 
phenomenon influenced not only by economic factors but also by social-cultural and 
governance factors. This finding is in line with the discussions by other researchers who 
argue that a single measure targeting only one aspect is often ineffective in the eradication of 
informal payments (Gaál et al., 2010; Stepurko, 2013a). In many CEE countries, there is still 
much room for improvement in the area of public perception of informal payments or 
transparency and accountability in the health care system. For example, a study by Stepurko 
et al. (2013) shows that only approximately 50% of Hungarian respondents perceive informal 
cash payments as similar to corruption. This number is not much higher for Ukraine and 
Romania. Health care consumers also often do not possess information on where to complain 
if asked to pay informally (Stepurko et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the actions of CEE country 
governments against informal patient payments are rare and there is often an “unspoken 
permission” for informal payments which are considered as undesirable but necessary, in the 
view of shortage of public resources, to satisfy consumers and providers’ needs. One of the 
few examples of the government commitment to fight informal patient payments is 
Corruption Control Program - Anti-corruption Strategy adopted by the Polish government. It 
included various legislation, organization and education projects. The actions of a new 
agency established in 2006 within the program - the Central Anticorruption Bureau, were 
largely targeted at fighting against the corruption in the health care system and resulted in 
spectacular (with media involvement) arrests of medical doctors suspected of taking informal 
payments from patients (Sagan et al., 2011). 
Suggestions for further research: 
There is a need for more empirical evidence on the link between formal and informal patient 
payments. Very few studies have addressed the question on how the implementation of cost-
sharing affects the frequency and level of informal patient payments (the example for Europe 
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is the earlier work of Baji et al. mentioned before). More research should also focus on other 
strategies to eliminate informal patient payments. Although there are some indicators that the 
government anticorruption measures implemented in Poland might have led to the reduction 
of informal payments, this has not been thoroughly studied.  
Our cross-country study on the potential determinants of informal patient payments relies on 
selected country-level indicators which might be of limited accuracy. We recognize that to 
build an effective strategy for the elimination of informal patient payments, more studies on 
the presence of these payments in a country, are required. Along with health care consumers, 
such studies could target also other stakeholders groups, namely health care providers and 
policy makers.  
 
A consensus-based policy supported by evidence might contribute to more sustainable 
patient payment systems in European countries. 
Despite the high prevalence of patient cost-sharing in Europe, not all European countries rely 
on obligatory cost-sharing for services. As suggested by our analysis in Chapter 3, the 
countries where patients do not meet formal payment obligations when using health care 
services are CEE countries, where high opposition towards these payments refrains policy 
makers from their implementation, but also some Western European counties, e.g. UK, Spain, 
Denmark, fall in this category.  
As outlined in Chapter 3, various factors might affect the cost-sharing policy. The decision to 
implement or abolish formal cost-sharing for health care services is often motivated by the 
economic needs in the health care system. The analysis of selected countries’ experience 
presented in Chapter 3, indicates that situational economic factors such as a high public 
deficits and economic recession were a driving force for extending cost-sharing in France, 
Latvia, Slovakia or in the Netherlands, while the surplus in public health care system 
prompted to withdraw fees in Germany in 2013 (Stafford, 2012). Yet, our quantitative 
analysis does not show that the level of public health expenditure is associated with the 
presence of cost-sharing for services. The countries’ experience indicates that the tradition 
and values which govern the health care system might also play a role in shaping cost-sharing 
policy. However, the lack of cost-sharing for health care services in some CEE countries 
should not be associated with communism tradition of free-of-charge health care provision. 
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Our results presented in Chapter 5 and 6 show that the social belief that all services should be 
provided free-of-charge is not as common as expected and its importance in creating 
opposition towards formal cost-sharing in these countries has been overvalued. Finally, we 
observe that the presence of cost-sharing is related to governance factors. The comparative 
quantitative analysis (Chapter 3) shows that countries with cost-sharing for services are those 
with a greater capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies, and countries with more extensive system of check and balance. Also, the 
experience of European countries, indicates that quality of governance matters and 
governments which are not able to develop effective policy that responds to the problems in 
the health care system, and that reflects expectations of health care system stakeholders, fail 
to implement cost-sharing or sustain it.  
The process of developing effective cost-sharing policy can be facilitated by evidence. For 
example, the analysis of the problems in the health care system allows to select and build an 
adequate mechanism that has potential to eliminate existing problems. Further, the evidence 
on the actual effect of the cost-sharing can be used to evaluate whether policy meets its 
objectives and align the reform if necessary. Although we observe that cost-sharing policy in 
European countries is rather ideological (driven by political changes), few countries analyzed 
in this dissertation (Denmark and the Netherlands, Chapter 3) used evidence (provided by an 
appointed committee or groups of experts) for cost-sharing policy making.  
Another important element in cost-sharing policy making highlighted by this dissertation, is 
building a broad consensus and receiving stakeholders’ approval for the reform. Policies 
which do not take into account the interests of different stakeholders groups might create 
opposition and even if the government, taking advantage of political window of opportunity, 
implements the reform, the policy is more exposed to government rotation. This was the case 
of Slovakia, where cost-sharing was abolished by a newly elected government three years 
after its implementation (the Slovakian experience is presented in Chapter 3). Similarly, in 
Hungary the fee implementation was reversed within a year as a result of a public referendum 
initiated by the opposition party (see Chapter 4). Communication and engagements of the 
stakeholders groups, might help to create a wide ownership of the reform and prevent 
stakeholders from blocking or reversing the reform (Hurst, 2010).  
In the context of cost-sharing, two stakeholders groups are particularly important and their 
expectations should be considered in cost-sharing policy. The first group includes health care 
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consumers who become payers and bear the consequences of cost-sharing policy, also the 
negative ones. This group most often opposes obligatory cost-sharing. The lack of 
consumers’ support for the reform might have important political implications. The 
experience of various countries shows that cost-sharing is often used as a tool in the fight for 
voters and might contribute to the loss of ruling party for the benefit of those who are against 
cost-sharing (De Gooijer, 2007; Robinson, 2002). The second group, which is directly 
affected by the cost-sharing policy, includes the health care providers. Cost-sharing might be 
beneficial for medical professionals if it reduces unnecessary patient visits or increases their 
income. However, implementing charges might change the patient-doctor relation, burden 
medical personnel with additional administrative work. Receiving medical professionals’ 
support for the change is very important as though it is a smaller group than consumers’ 
group, it is more consolidated and characterized by high sovereignty and greater patients’ 
trust as oppose to policy makers (Hurst, 2010). A good demonstration of the impact of 
medical professionals on cost-sharing policy, is the repeal of obligatory fees in Germany in 
2013, as a results of health care professional initiative (Stafford, 2012).  
Suggestions for further research:  
Further research on the factors affecting the presence of cost-sharing should be undertaken to 
provide more evidence and explore the robustness of our results. The quantitative analysis 
could be extended by including more countries as well as other indicators of governance, 
economic and social-cultural factors to allow for more robustness checks. We recognize that 
the situational factors might play a crucial role in the cost-sharing policy. Hence, the study 
based on primary data (e.g. in-depth interviews with country experts or policy makers 
involved in cost-sharing policy making) might provide more insight in the context and 
process of cost-sharing policy making.  
 
Patients and health care providers in Central and Eastern European countries generally 
expect cost-sharing policies to improve quality of health care services and working 
conditions.  
The results of the qualitative study (focus groups discussions and in-depth interviews) 
conducted in six CEE countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Ukraine 
(Chapter 4), indicate that health care consumers’ acceptance of cost-sharing depends on the 
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quality improvements in the health care system. This finding is confirmed in the quantitative 
study on the hypothetical health care consumer behavior (stated willingness to pay study 
presented in Chapter 6) which shows that majority of respondents in the six countries are 
willing to pay some price for publicly financed services, if these services are of good quality 
and access. The willingness to pay is particularly high in poorly financed countries where 
payments to improve services (informal and quasi-formal) are common. Nevertheless, health 
care consumers do not trust that cost-sharing policies might contribute to service 
improvements. As our qualitative results show, this prompts them to oppose the 
implementation of patient payments in their countries. 
The expectations of health care providers about cost-sharing, identified in our qualitative 
study, are related to broadly-defined working conditions. Medical professionals believe that 
cost-sharing might reduce unnecessary visits and increase their income. The possibility of 
additional financial resources for their own use, i.e. as a source of additional income, is an 
important factor for health care providers’ acceptability of cost-sharing. We observe that in 
countries where cost-sharing has been introduced, the support for cost-sharing is smaller 
among those health care providers who did not financially benefit from the payment system. 
Health care providers also expect that the payment system will not burden them extensively 
with administrative tasks, i.e. in their opinion, the collection of fees should be simple.  
Our results indicate that cost-sharing in CEE countries is seen primarily as a source of 
additional resources for the improvements in health care. Policy makers are faced with the 
challenge how to design a cost-sharing system in order to ensure quality and access 
improvements for patients and better working condition for medical professionals. The 
experience of CEE countries, which have already introduced cost-sharing (e.g. Hungary and 
Bulgaria discussed in Chapter 4), indicates that this task is difficult. The possible barriers are  
insufficient revenues generated from cost-sharing payments, which do not allow for 
significant improvements, and the lack of strategies on how to use the generated resources for 
the benefits of patients. Many CEE countries, which implemented cost-sharing for services, 
left the decision on the resource use to health care institutions. Although this ensured 
providers’ support for cost-sharing policy, there is scarce information on how much resources 
was generated and what quality investments were made. 
Hence, there is a need for strategies how to use resources generated from cost-sharing for 
quality and access improvement. The studies on the preferences of health care consumers in 
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CEE countries where selected attributed of quality and access have been analyzed (Baji et al., 
2012a; Danyliv et al., 2014b), show that health care characteristics important to health care 
consumers are the skills of health care professionals and their attitude. Consumers also attach 
a high value to timely access to care (waiting time for the appointment). These results 
indicate the areas for the investments in order to meet consumers’ expectations from cost-
sharing policy in CEE countries. The investment plans should be worked out taking into 
consideration also the interests of health care professionals to ensure their acceptability of 
cost-sharing and compensate for the increase in bureaucracy related to fees collection. 
Another strategy to enhance health care through patient charges is to allow patients to pay an 
additional amount to gain quality and access. The practice of paying to obtain a better 
standard or quality of care is common in CEE countries. These are however, not regulated 
payments, i.e. as discussed earlier informal patient payments to health care professionals and 
so-called quasi-formal payments to health care institutions. In some health care systems of 
Western European countries (e.g. French system presented in Chapter 3), so-called extra-
billing is allowed. Patients cover the difference between the reimbursement rate from public 
insurance and price of health care service charged by health care provider. However, in order 
to prevent equity within publicly financed health care when extra fees for higher quality of 
care are allowed, transparent regulations and control mechanisms are necessary. Most of all, 
the charges should be allowed only for quality and access above the level guaranteed by 
public resources. The quality, to which patients are entitled within the publicly financed 
health care services, should be provided to patient regardless their ability to pay, if equity 
principle is to be preserved. Moreover, the improvement in access and quality for patients 
who pay an additional fee should remain without a negative impact on the care provided to 
those patients who did not pay. The above conditions are also specified by respondents in our 
qualitative study on consumers’ acceptability of patient payments in CEE countries (Chapter 
4).  
Applying any strategy to improve health care through patient payments requires more 
transparency and accountability in health care systems of CEE countries. A clearly defined 
statutory benefit package, which specifies not only the scope of services to which patients are 
entitled but also their quality and access, is a necessary first step. Further, countries need to 
develop a comprehensive system for measuring and reporting the quality of care. Despite the 
various efforts undertaken and some progress in this area, CEE countries still suffer from a 
lack of reliable data on quality in health care system.  
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Suggestions for further research: 
Given the scarcity of data on health care quality in CEE countries, there is a need for more 
research to facilitate building a system for measuring and improving quality of care in these 
countries. Further research on the expectations of health care consumers and health care 
providers could facilitate the investment strategies in the health care systems of CEE 
countries.  
 
High out-of-pocket expenditures and consumers’ inability to pay significantly limit the 
potential for cost-sharing in many Central and Eastern European countries. 
Despite the general willingness to pay for good quality and accessible health care services 
among health care consumers in CEE countries, the existing patient payments and 
consumers’ inability to pay are important obstacles for the extension of patient cost-sharing. 
The results presented in Chapter 3 confirm that in many countries of this region, even if 
formal cost-sharing for services is absent, out-of-pocket payments compensate for the low 
public resources devoted to health care and are a significant source of health care funding. 
Patients in CEE countries are extensively burdened with payments for pharmaceuticals (e.g. 
in Poland 60% of total expenditure of pharmaceuticals is paid by households out of pocket 
(OECD, 2013)) and various types of payment for services.  
The evidence on six CEE countries presented in Chapter 5 indicate that payments for services 
are very frequent in Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine (mostly informal and quasi-formal 
payments), and Bulgaria (mostly formal co-payments). The results also show that payments 
for services constitute a great burden for households and a barrier to the use of health care 
services, particularly in Ukraine and Romania. Patients are forced to borrow money or sell 
assets to cover payments (particularly fees for hospital services) or forego the use of health 
care services (commonly applied strategy in case of inability to pay for out-patient visits). 
The results on the stated willingness to pay for health care services presented in Chapter 6 
also highlight the problem of consumers’ inability to pay. The lack of financial resources is 
the main reason for the unwillingness to pay for high-quality and accessible services among 
all respondents from the six countries, though most frequently reported in Bulgaria and 
Romania. Both analyses, i.e. revealed inability to pay (i.e. past experienced difficulties in 
paying for services) and stated inability to pay (stated in the willingness to pay survey), 
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indicate that the groups particularly affected by the inability to pay are those with low income 
and poor health status.  
Health care consumers’ inability to pay presents a significant problem in the health care 
systems of CEE countries. The adverse effects on households wealth (catastrophic and 
impoverishing households health expenditure) have been reported in various countries, also 
those not analyzed in this dissertation (Arsenijevic et al., 2013; Bredenkamp et al., 2011; 
Tomini et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2003). The scale of this problem varies and less wealthy 
countries with a greater reliance on out-of-pocket expenditure are affected the most (Xu et al., 
2003). Although certain improvement in the number of patients affected by the inability to 
pay has been observed in some countries, the increasing gap in the burden of out-of-pocket 
payments between the poorest and the richest raises concerns (Tomini et al., 2013).  
It is evident that the introduction of formal cost-sharing for health care services in CEE 
countries must entail the reduction of other payment obligations for patients (including 
informal patient payments which have been earlier discussed). Moreover, policy makers face 
the challenge how to design effective mechanisms which need to accompany the cost-sharing 
obligations to protect equity in health care. As discussed in Chapter 1, the more the fees are 
aligned with consumer ability to pay and health care needs, the less likely are the adverse 
equity effects. Yet, a sophisticated design of cost-sharing system requires a large range of 
data (e.g. on income, utilization and payments by patients) and is more feasible in health care 
systems of high administrative capacity. High complexity of the system might also negatively 
influence its transparency and thus, diminish effectiveness in protecting vulnerable 
population groups. In this dissertation, we provide evidence to facilitate development of 
adequate protection mechanisms.  
The review of cost-sharing systems presented in Chapter 2, shows that protection policies in 
European countries mostly include exemption or reduction for selected population groups 
(e.g. individuals with the lowest income) and payment limits (annual ceiling or limits in 
number of services to which fees apply). The exemption/reduction mechanisms are however, 
not always well-targeted on those who need protection, i.e. the criteria for the 
exemption/reduction is the age or the occupation (e.g. medical professionals or war veterans 
are entitled). 
In addition to the inadequate design of protection measures, we observe that their 
implementation sometimes fails in practice, e.g. although the poor are entitled to the 
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exemption or reduction in majority of European countries, not all individuals with low 
income can be identified. Patients might not exercise their right for exemption due to low 
transparency in the system, e.g. complexity of the French patient payment system (described 
in Chapter 3) is seen as one of the reasons for its inequitable nature. 
In pursuing an effective protection policy, the role of health care providers is also crucial. 
The results of our qualitative study among health care providers (Chapter 4) show that this 
group is against a broad exemption policy as exemptions or reductions limit revenues from 
fees and increase bureaucracy. Hence, there is a risk that health care providers might be 
unwilling to grand exemptions or might treat patients who do not provide them with revenues 
unequally (e.g. one of the examples is an adverse patient selection in France, Chapter 3). For 
this reason, protection mechanisms should rather remain without the adverse impact of health 
care professionals financial benefits from cost-sharing system, e.g. providers could be 
compensated for lower revenues, like in the mentioned earlier Latvian system.  
Suggestions for further research: 
To present a comprehensive picture of health care consumers’ ability to pay for health care, 
our study on past payments could be extended by including other costs of illness (e.g. cost of 
pharmaceutical) as well as other strategies which households might employ to deal with 
payment difficulties (e.g. use of savings). A relevant issue which also requires attention is the 
effectiveness of different mechanisms (exemptions, limits) in protecting equity in health care 
when cost-sharing is implemented. For example, the reasons for the failure of mechanism or 
the examples of good practices could help to design better protection system.  
 
7.3. Final words and valorization 
Most European countries have well developed social institutions for pooling the financial 
risks associated with sickness and rely predominantly on solidarity-based public funding. The 
growth in a countries’ wealth brings an increase of government resources for health care. 
Thus, more prosperous countries in Europe tend to rely more strongly on public financing. 
However, demographic changes and increasing health care cost challenge health care systems 
and solidarity within societies. Countries reach the point when a further extension of welfare 
state is difficult or even undesirable. In the face of “growth to limits” (Flora, 1986) of 
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people’s willingness to share their wealth and the government capacity to spend on health, 
the individual responsibility for financing health care increases.  
In this dissertation, we outline that in the course of the last few decades, the vast majority of 
Western European countries has applied cost-sharing for health care commodities and 
services. Despite the policy expectations for enhancing the sustainability of health care 
financing, there is scarce evidence on the positive effects of cost-sharing policy in European 
countries. The analyses presented in this dissertation indicate that the cost-sharing solutions 
applied by European countries have limited potential for efficiency improvements or resource 
generation. The benefits from the cost-sharing implementation might be outweighed by the 
negative consequences for equity and consumers’ financial protection. Hence, European 
countries need to revise their cost-sharing systems and move towards payments schemes 
well-targeted based on the values of services and consumers’ ability to pay.  
A significant part of this dissertation was devoted to CEE countries. The topic of cost-sharing 
is equally relevant for these countries, although the context of cost-sharing policy is different 
than in wealthier countries of Europe. The relatively low expenditure on health, significant 
problems with quality and accessibility of care or shortcomings in governance, make to see 
cost-sharing in a different light and assign different role to these payments. Thus, although 
CEE countries can learn from the experiences of Western European countries, applying other 
countries’ solutions cannot be seen as a straightforward process. Also, within the CEE 
countries, we observe a certain diversity, though some common features, which should find 
reflection in cost-sharing policy. Acknowledging these differences, we draw some 
conclusions from our results for cost-sharing policy in CEE countries.  
A relevant conclusion which follows from this dissertation is that the implementation of 
patient cost-sharing for health care services, which has been considered in many CEE 
countries, should not be seen as the goal itself but only as a widely acceptable response to 
health care problem and an adequate tool for dealing with the problem. Policy makers in CEE 
countries too often focus their actions on the instrument rather than on the problem, letting 
ideology drive their decisions. So it was with the introduction of social health insurance 
model in these countries, which was to emulate the German health care system and believed 
to be superior over a tax-based system. Such approach to policy making, makes the countries 
likely to fall into a “trap of unfulfilled hopes” (Sowada, 2013) increasing citizens’ distrust in 
public policy and institutions. Cost-sharing should be thus, considered in the context of 
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challenges and problems in the health care systems of CEE countries and the ability to 
implement the system, which could allow for the improvements.  
Having this in mind, one might consider the introduction of cost-sharing to deal with the 
inefficiencies in the health care systems of CEE countries, which have not experienced 
significant improvements though various reforms undertaken since the collapse of 
communism. However, as we discussed in this dissertation, for a cost-sharing policy to be 
able to enhance efficiency without deteriorating equity, highly targeted payment mechanisms 
are required. While such systems should be increasingly applied, it is unlikely that CEE 
countries have the technical capacity for designing and implementing sophisticated cost-
sharing systems. Moreover, when looking closer at the problem of excess demand in health 
care in CEE countries, the greatest losses are likely to be due to too high utilization of 
hospital care. The use of in-patient care is largely induced by health care providers and might 
result from inappropriate provider payment mechanisms, underdevelopment of primary care 
or poor resource planning. Thus, CEE countries should increase their efforts to implement 
effective supply-side measures to encourage provision of high-value services and increase the 
coordination of care.  
A more plausible role for cost-sharing in CEE countries is enhancing quality and access of 
health care services. The results presented in this dissertation show that if cost-sharing leads 
to better care for patients might get greater acceptability. Health care consumers in CEE 
countries are overall willing to pay for high quality and accessible services. While there is a 
fair consensus on the role of cost-sharing in CEE countries, the question on how to design an 
adequate cost-sharing system which will contribute to services’ improvement, remains partly 
unanswered. The experiences of CEE countries indicate that not only sufficient resources 
need to be generated, but there is also a need for strategies to ensure improvement in quality 
of services. The use of resources from cost-sharing should follow the investment plans 
worked out taking into consideration the expectations of health care consumers for better 
quality and access as well as the interest of health care providers. To be successful, the 
strategy needs to be supported by a system of quality control to monitor and maintain quality 
levels. Poorly specified and unregulated quality standards and lack of monitoring system, 
constitute significant obstacles for enhancing health care in CEE countries.  
When implementing cost-sharing for health care services, policy makers in CEE countries 
need to take account of the presence of different forms of patient payments (formal for 
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pharmaceuticals, informal and quasi-formal for services) which limit consumers’ ability to 
spend more on health care. The problem of households’ inability to pay for health care is 
particularly evident in less wealthy CEE countries (Ukraine, Romania). Although better 
quality of care and improved working conditions for health care professionals could 
contribute to the elimination of some patient payments, there is a need for a greater 
governments’ commitment to fight unregulated payments and to improve transparency and 
accountability in health care system. Further, the implementation of cost-sharing for health 
care services requires protection mechanisms which should be well-targeted on those with 
low income and greater health care needs. The mechanisms should be however, possible for 
administration in a given health care system and transparent for patients and health care 
providers. 
The debate on generating more resources for quality and access improvements in health care 
systems of CEE countries, cannot be limited to the discussion on the implementation of cost-
sharing, but other sources of health care funding should be considered as well. There is an 
increasing interest of policy makers in some CEE countries (Hungary, Poland) in extending 
the space for the development of voluntary private health insurance. With the exemption of 
Slovenia, its role in funding health care in CEE countries is marginal (Thomson & Mossialos, 
2009). There are various factors which inhibit the development of private health insurance in 
countries of this region, among them are factors such as the lack of regulatory capacity, the 
low consumers’ ability to pay for the insurance, or the presence of informal patient payments 
which might be considered by consumers as a better way to improve care (Kutzin et al., 
2010). Policy makers should bear in mind that, although private insurance might contribute to 
better quality and access, it tends to benefit more privilege groups. Vulnerable populations 
groups often meet barriers to purchase private insurance due to their inability to pay as well 
as the insurer’s preferences to enroll low-cost individuals.  
Given the relatively low public expenditure on health in CEE countries, policy makers might 
also seek for the options to increase public institutions’ commitment to fund health care. In 
many CEE countries, there is room for improvement in social health insurance e.g. some 
populations groups are not covered or contribution is not levied on all types of income. 
Further efforts to strengthen social health insurance might have positive effects on equity and 
on the financial sustainability of health care system. Policy makers in CEE countries also 
need to make health care a priority in their decisions. The economic prosperity limits the CEE 
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governments’ fiscal capacity, thus, giving more importance to health care is crucial for the 
improvement in health care system in these countries.  
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Table A.1. List of data sources used for the review of patient cost-sharing in 27 EU countries 
(Chapter  2) 
Austria         a,b,c,d Germany    n,a,q,v,d,s Netherlands    n,z,d 
Belgium         e,f,d Greece       t,u,d      Poland         
   aa,g 
Bulgaria        g,h Hungary         g,j Portugal        n,d 
Cyprus         i Ireland           d,v Romania         g,,j 
Czech Republic  g,j Italy               n,d Slovakia        ab,g,ac  
Denmark         k,d Latvia          m,w,x,g Slovenia        ad,j,g 
Estonia         l,m,g Lithuania       m,x,g Spain            n,d,s 
Finland         n,o,p,d Luxembourg      d Sweden          d 
France          n,q,v,d,s Malta    y         United Kingdom     d,ae 
 
a Theurl E. Some aspects of the reform of the health care Systems in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Health Care Anal 1999;7:331–354. 
b Stepan A, Sommersguter-Reichmann M. Monitoring political decision-making and its impact in Austria. Health Econ 2005;14:S7–S23. 
c Reichmann G, Sommersguter-Reichmann M. Co-payments in the Austrian social health insurance system: Analysing patient behaviour and 
patients' views on the effects of co-payments. Health Policy 2004;67(1):75-91. 
d Ros CC, Groenewegen PP, Delnoij DMJ. All rights reserved, or can we just copy? Cost-sharing arrangements and characteristics of health 
care systems. Health Policy 2000;52:1-13.  
e Schokkaert E, van de Voorde C. Health care reform in Belgium. Leuven: KULeuven, 2005. 
f van de Voorde C, van Doorslaer E, Schokkaert E. Effects of cost sharing on physician utilization under favourable conditions for supplier-
induced demand. Health Econ 2001;10(5):457-471. 
g Schneider P. Evidence on cost-sharing in health care: applications to Hungary. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 
h Pavlova M, Groot W, van Merode F. Appraising the financial reform in Bulgarian public health care sector: the health insurance act of 
1998. Health Policy 2000;53(3):185-199.  
i Antoniadou M . Can Cyprus overcome its health-care challenges? Lancet 2005;365(9464):1017-1020. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1. An overview of focus-group discussions and in-depth interviews (Chapter 4) 
Types of  
focus-group discussions  
and in-depth interviews 
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Focus-group discussions - health care consumers 
 (1 Focus-group discussion per group of consumers): 
Number of participants per focus group 
Pensioners living in a city 8 5 10 7 10 8 48 
Working individuals living in a city 8 5 9 8 7 8 45 
Students living in a city 8 5 6 8 5 10 42 
Disable and chronically sick individuals 8 - 10 9 8 8 43 
Families with children living in a city 4 5 8 7 9 8 41 
Individuals living in a rural area - 5 11 8 6 10 40 
Focus-group discussions - health care providers 
(1 Focus-group discussion per group of providers): 
Number of participants per focus group 
GPs working in a city 8 5 7 5 10 11 46 
Out-patient specialists working in a city 7 5 8 7 6 7 40 
Physicians working in city hospitals 8 5 7 6 11 8 45 
Nurses working in city hospitals 8 - 6 7 8 8 37 
GPs working in a rural area 8 - 6 6 - 3 a 23 
Physicians working in district hospitals 8 - 6 5 10 3 a 32 
In-depth interviews – (health) policy makers 
(1 interview per respondent): 
Number of respondents (interviews) 
(Health) policy makers national level 2 3 3 3 2 3 16 
(Health) policy makers regional level 2 - 2 2 2 2 10 
Representative health care committee 1 - - - 1 - 2 
In-depth interviews - health insurance representative 
(1 interview per respondent): 
 
Number of respondents (interviews) 
 
Representative social health insurer national level 2 2 2 2 2 4 b 14 
Representative social health insurer regional level 2 2 2 2 4 - 12 
Representative private health insurer  1 - 1 1 - 1 4 
Total number of participants/respondents: 93 47 104 93 101 102 540 
 
a Replaced with in-depth interviews because the organization of focus groups was not possible. 
b There is no social health insurance in Ukraine. Health insurance experts were interviewed instead of social health insurance representatives. 
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Table B.2. Wording of questions used to collect quantitative data among the participants of focus-
group discussions and in-depth interviews (Chapter 4) 
 
Do you agree with the following statement? “Official patient payments should exist in <country name>. 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Neither agree nor disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree 
 
If official patient payments exist, in your opinion, what should be the primary policy objective of patient 
payments? Please, mark only one option. 
□ Discouraging unnecessary use of health care services 
□ Generating additional resources for the health care system 
□ Allowing hospitals/clinics to generate additional resources  
□ Increasing the income of individual health care providers  
□ Controlling the overall health care expenditure 
□ Dealing with informal patient payments 
□ Other, please specify: _________________________________________________ 
 
If official patient payments exist, do you think that these payments should be applied to the following services?  
primary care (GP services)    
services of out-patient specialist    
in-patient hospital services    
emergency room services     
dental services     
 
If official patient payments exist, in your opinion, who should be the beneficiary of patient payments? Please, 
mark only one option.  
□ The physician, who offers the service 
□ The health institution, where the service is offered 
□ The local authorities (the municipality)  
□ Local health insurance fund 
□ The state at a national level 
□ Social health insurance fund at a national level 
 
If official patient payments exist, do you think that some population groups should pay reduced fees or be 
exempted from patient payments?     
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Appendix C  
 
Description of quantitative data collection (Chapter 5 and 6) 
 
The analyses presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation draw upon quantitative data collected in 
six CEE countries (i.e. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine) as a part of an international 
research project. Data were collected through household survey carried out in the six countries using the same 
survey questionnaire. The survey questionnaire was developed based on the results of a preceding qualitative 
study (focus group discussions and in-depth interviews) conducted in the same six countries. The questionnaire 
was developed in English and then translated into national languages. A backward translation into English by 
independent translator was done to verify quality of translation. The questionnaire was pretested on 
approximately 30 respondents in each country.  
 
The data collection was sub-contracted to Gallup International. The sub-contractor was responsible for the 
preparation of the data collection, the data-collection and the creation of the database. The data collection 
process took place simultaneously in all six countries in a period of 20 calendar days in July-August 2010. In all 
countries, the survey was conducted based on face-to-face individual interviews at the respondents’ home. To 
diminish interviewer bias, a large number of interviewers was involved in each country (each conducting on 
average 10 interviews). All interviewers participated in a training course prior to the survey.   
 
The respondents were identified using an identical sampling methodology for all countries. The aim was to have 
1000 effective interviews per country that present samples representative for the countries. The sampling 
methodology was based on a multi-staged random probability method: 
 
Stage 1: Distribution of sampling points. The sampling points in each country were distributed proportionally to 
regional, urban/rural and ethnic characteristics of the population. Within each region, the cities and towns 
belonging to the same group were put in an alphabetical order. The cities and towns included in the survey, were 
selected at random from that list. The number of sampling points in the rural areas was calculated based on the 
ratio urban/rural population in a country. In total, there were ca. 150 sampling points per country. 
 
Stage 2: Selection of addresses/ households. The objective was to identify, 8-10 respondents per sampling point. 
To select addresses/households of potential respondents, the random route method was used. For each sampling 
point, a starting point and direction were determined. The household selected for the survey, was every forth 
address on the left-hand side of the street in urban areas, turning left at intersections and, after reaching a dead 
end, going back to the last crossing and further proceeding at random. In a block-of-flats of up to four floors, 
every fifth apartment household was selected, counting from the first apartment on the left of the ground floor. 
In cases of unsuitable household, the interviewers approached the apartment next-door and continued doing this 
until reaching a suitable household. At that point, the interviews resume the standard step of every fifth 
apartment. In a block-of-flats of 5 floors and more, the selection is every tenth apartment. In rural areas, every 
fourth inhabitable house on both sides of the interviewer’s route was selected. In compounds of several houses 
behind a common fence, the interviewer had to select the fourth one from the left (counting from the gate), or if 
there were less than four houses behind a common fence, then the interviewer went out of the common yard, 
counting the houses as if they were along the street.  
 
Stage 3: Selection of the respondent within the household selected. The selection of the respondent within the 
selected household was done using the “last birthday” principle. In this procedure, the interviewer asked to 
speak to the adult member of the household who had the last birthday. The last-birthday method is based on the 
assumption that the assignment of birthdates is a random process and also every household member has an equal 
chance of being selected. Only one individual per household was interviewed. 
 
If the respondent determined on stage 3 refused or was unavailable to take part in an interview after two call 
backs recorded in the fieldwork report, a replacing respondent was identified following stage 2-3. The response 
rates (effective interviews / total contacts) were 38% in Poland, 42% in Ukraine, 55% in Romania and 
Lithuania, 67% in Bulgaria and 76% in Hungary. The socio-demographic characteristics of the samples are 
overall comparable to the countries’ national statistics (see Table C.1) 
  
1
5
4
 
 
Table C.1. Sample characteristics and country statistics (Chapter 5 and 6) 
 
Bulgaria  Hungary  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Ukraine 
Sample 
statistics 
 
N= 1003 
Country 
statistics  
 Sample 
statistics 
 
N= 1037 
Country 
statistics 
 
 
Sample 
statistics 
 
N= 1012 
Country 
statistics 
 Sample 
statistics  
 
N= 1000 
Country 
statistics 
 Sample 
statistics  
 
N= 1000 
Country 
statistics 
 Sample 
statistics 
 
N= 1000 
Country 
statistics 
                  
Age a 18-64 
% 
77 79  81 80  84 81  88 84  78 82  78 82 
> 65 23 21  19 20  17 19  12 16  22 18  22 18 
                    
Gender b Male 
% 
47 48  46 48  43 47  47 48  42 49  42 46 
Female 53 52  54 53  57 54  53 52  58 52  59 54 
                    
Place of 
residence b 
Rural  
% 
30 27  29 31  34 33  37 39  44 47  32 31 
Urban  70 73  71 69  66 67  63 61  56 53  69 69 
                    
Level of 
education c  
Non-university 
ISCED 0-4 
% 
81 80  87 83  79 73  89 80  82 88  76 71 
University 
ISCED 5-6 
19 20  13 17  21 27  11 20  18 12  24 29 
                    
Income d Equivalized 
monthly net 
income (Euro) 
Median  170 251  317 353  263 338  350 367  181 170  101 158 
                    
Social 
health 
insurance e 
Yes  % 88 77  92 96  90 96  98 98  77 75  8 0 
a Source of data : World Bank for 2010, age structure 15-64 and >65 while the structure in the sample 18-64 and <65 
b Source of data: World Bank for 2010 
c Source of data: Eurostat for 2010, education attained by persons age 18-74, for Ukraine State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/) 
d Source of data: Eurostat for 2010, median equivalized net income using the OECD -modified scale which assigns weight 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to each additional adult and 0.3 to each child 
(person under the age of 14); Note: For calculation of sample eqivalized income the same scale was used, however persons age < 18 were considered as children. For Ukraine data refers to 
average monthly income per capita (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/). 
e Source of data: Bulgaria HiT 2011, Hungary HiT 2011, Lithuania: Health Insurance Fund of Lithuania (http://www.vlk.lt/vlk/lt/) Poland HiT 2011, Romania – HiT 2008. Note: public health 
insurance in Ukraine is not present. The insurance schemes reported by respondents in this country are insurance schemes provided by employers. 
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Appendix D  
English wording of the survey questionnaire (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) 
 
PROJECT:  ASSPRO CEE 2007  
SURVEY:   WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF PATIENTS TO PAY  
 FOR MEDICAL SERVICES 
 QUESTIONNAIRE - ROUND 1 / JUNE-JULY 2010 
 
FIELDWORK CARRIED OUT BY:  BBSS Gallup International 
FIELDWORK MANAGED BY:   BBSS Gallup International 
 
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE SHOULD BE FILLED IN ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHO ARE 18 YEARS OLD OR OLDER.  
 
FILL IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: 
 
SAMPLING POINT 
          
 
REGION 
          
 
RESPONDENT ID NUMBER  
          
 
DATE OF THE INTERVIEW    /   / 2 0 1 0 
(DD/MM/YYYY)  
 
START TIME (USE 24 HOURS CLOCK)   :        
 
INTERVIEWER ID NUMBER 
          
 
© ASSPRO CEE 2007 / project no. 217431 / funded by the European Commission under FP7 Theme 8 
SSH 
No parts of this questionnaire may be used, translated, stored, published, copied or transmitted in any 
form and by any means(electronic, mechanical, copying, recording and etc.) without the written 
permission issued by the coordinators of project ASSPRO CEE 2007 (project no. 217431). For project 
details: www.assprocee2007.com 
 
Project coordinator: Dr. Milena Pavlova; Scientific coordinators: Prof.Dr. Wim Groot and Prof.Dr.Frits 
van Merode; Department BEOZ; Faculty HMLS; Maastricht University; PO BOX 616, Maastricht 6200 
MD, The Netherlands; E-mail: M.Pavlova@BEOZ.unimaas.nl; Tel: +31-43-3881705  
 
INFORMED CONSENT PROCEDURE 
 
 
BEFORE YOU START, READ THE FOLLOWING TO THE RESPONDENT: 
 
 The aim of this survey is to collect data on citizens’ opinion about the quality, access and price of 
medical services they use.  
 The survey is not commissioned by the government or a health insurer.  
 This survey is part of an international research project funded by the European Commission.  
The same survey is carried out in several European countries.  
 The data collected during the survey will be used for research purposes, namely for statistical 
analyses and reports. 
 Your answers will not be related to your personal details (address, etc.) and will be completely 
confidential. 
Answers to all questions are highly important to the project, so we hope that you will share your 
opinions and thoughts by answering all questions in the questionnaire. 
 
  
Do you agree to participate in this survey?    1= YES 
0= NO 
  
 
CONTINUE THE INTERVIEW ONLY IF THE RESPONDENT AGREES TO PARTICIPATE. 
 
 
ASK THE QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THEIR ORDER IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
READ THE EXACT WORDING OF THE QUESTIONS, AND AFTERWARDS, IF NECESSARY, MAKE 
CLARIFICATIONS. 
 
USE LOCAL CURRENCY FOR ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS (XXX). 
 
PLEASE TRY TO AVOID “DON’T KNOW” (DK) ANSWERS AND REFUSALS. 
IF THE RESPONDENT REFUSES TO ANSWER, KEEP THE ANSWER BOX BLANK. 
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PART 1: USE AND PAYMENTS FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES USED BY THE RESPONDENT 
 
The first set of questions concerns medical services that YOU used during the last 12 months (June 2009 – 
May 2010), and the money that you paid out-of-pocket (or your family members paid on your behalf) for 
YOU receiving these services.  
 
Out-of-pocket payments include OFFICIAL payments, for which one may usually receive a receipt or 
other document, INFORMAL cash payments (such as gratitude cash payments or under-the-table cash 
payments), or gifts in kind for receiving medical services.  
 
Out-of-pocket payments EXCLUDE monthly payments for health insurance (or voluntary health 
accounts), as well as payments that the patient receives back from the state or a health insurer. 
 
Instruction: Questions Q.1A /Q.3A define next sections. Please try to avoid “Don’t know”. 
 
  
Q.1A During the last 12 months, how many times did YOU 
PERSONALLY visit a physician or a physician visited you 
personally at your home, including any physician in both the 
public and private system? (Homeopaths and traditional healers 
who are not physicians, and also dentists are excluded.)  
  TIMES 
0= None 
99= DK  
IF NONE, GO TO Q.2C 
  
  
Q.1B Considering all types of official and informal cash payments, 
and gifts in kind, how much IN TOTAL did you spend (out-of-
pocket) on these visits EXCLUDING payments for travelling, 
transportation by ambulance and pharmaceuticals? 
  XXX 
0= None 
99= DK 
IF NONE, GO TO Q.2A 
  
  
Q.1C How much of this amount approximately was for INFORMAL 
cash payments and gifts in kind? 
  XXX 
0= NONE 
99=  DK
  
  
Q.1D Was it necessary to TAKE OR BORROW cash from family, 
friends, bank, via credit card or sell assets to cover these formal 
and informal payments for PHYSICIAN services that you used? 
  1= YES 
0= NO 
99= DK 
IF NO/ DK, GO TO Q.2A 
  
  
Q.1E How much IN TOTAL was it necessary to take or borrow?   XXX 
99= DK 
 
  
  
Q.2A Are you overall satisfied with the QUALITY of physician 
services that you used during the last 12 months – yes, no, 
somewhat? 
  2= YES 
1= SOMEWHAT 
0= NO 
99= DK  
 
  
Q.2B Are you overall satisfied with the ACCESS to physician services 
that you used during the last 12 months – yes, no, somewhat? 
  2 = YES 
1 = SOMEWHAT 
0 = NO 
99= DK  
  
  
Q.2C During the last 12 months, how many times have you been ill 
but DID NOT VISIT AT ALL a physician because you could 
not afford to pay either for the visit or for the 
transportation/travel? 
  TIMES 
99= DK 
 
  
PART 2: USE AND PAYMENTS FOR HOSPITAL SERVICES USED BY THE RESPONDENT 
 
  
Q.3A During the last 12 months, how many times were YOU 
hospitalized (placed in a hospital), including day surgeries 
or day treatments?  
(Re-hospitalization, i.e. repeated hospitalization for the same 
health problem, should be counted separately as a different 
hospitalization.)   
  TIMES 
0= None 
99= DK   
IF NONE, GO TO Q.4C 
  
  
Q.3B Considering all types of official and informal cash 
payments, and gifts in kind, how much IN TOTAL did you 
spend (out-of-pocket) on these hospitalizations 
EXCLUDING payments for travelling, transportation by 
ambulance and pharmaceuticals? 
  XXX 
0=None 
99=DK 
IF NONE, GO TO Q.4A 
  
Q.3C How much of this amount approximately was for INFORMAL 
cash payments and gifts in kind? 
  XXX 
0= None 
99= DK 
  
  
Q.3D Was it necessary to TAKE OR BORROW cash from family, 
friends, bank, via credit card or sell assets to cover these 
formal and informal payments for HOSPITAL services that 
you used? 
  1= YES 
0= NO 
99= DK 
IF NO/ DK, GO TO Q.4A 
  
  
Q.3E How much IN TOTAL was it necessary to take or 
borrow? 
  XXX 
99= DK 
 
  
  
Q.4A Are you overall satisfied with the QUALITY of hospital 
services that you used during the last 12 months – yes, no, 
somewhat? 
  2 = YES 
1 = SOMEWHAT 
0 = NO 
99= DK  
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Q.4B Are you overall satisfied with the ACCESS to hospital services 
that you used during the last 12 months – yes, no, somewhat? 
  2= YES 
1= SOMEWHAT 
0= NO 
99= DK  
  
Q.4C During the last 12 months, how many times have you been 
referred to a hospital but NOT GONE AT ALL because you 
could not afford to pay either for the hospital service or for the 
transportation/travel? 
  TIMES 
99= DK 
 
 
  
Q.4D Have YOU been ever hospitalized (placed in a hospital), 
including day surgeries or day treatments? 
  1= YES 
0= NO 
99= DK 
  
PART 8: WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR MEDICAL SERVICES 
 
Next questions concern your WILLINGNESS and ABILITY to pay for medical services provided by the 
state or included in the social health insurance package. 
 
Imagine that you could obtain these services with GOOD QUALITY and QUICK ACCESS if you pay an 
OFFICIAL FEE to the health care facility (e.g. polyclinic, clinic or hospital).  
 
SHOW CARD 5.  This card presents the meaning of good quality and quick access.  
 
Good quality would mean:  
- Modern medical equipment 
- Renovated health care facility  
- Polite staff with good reputation and skills 
 
Quick access would mean: 
- Max 30 min travelling to the health care facility 
- Max 10 min waiting in front of the physician office  
- Max 1 month waiting for a planned surgery 
 
At the bottom of the card, you can also see possible fees intervals regarding physician’s and hospital 
services. Higher fee would mean better quality and quicker access. Fees are fixed prices and are not 
necessarily dependent on the service costs, since a part of the costs are covered by public funds. 
 
  
Q.15A In case you experience a MAJOR HEALTH PROBLEM 
(unfamiliar symptoms that make you concerned), will you be 
willing to pay an official fee for a consultation and 
examination by a MEDICAL SPECIALIST in order to obtain 
services with good quality and quick access as described in 
the card? 
 
 
  1= YES 
0= NO 
99= DK 
IF YES, GO TO Q.15C 
 
  
Q.15B What is the REASON for your unwillingness to pay –  
unable to pay, object to pay, or both? 
  2= BOTH 
1= OBJECT 
0= UNABLE 
99= DK  
GO TO Q.16A 
  
Q.15C Considering the fee intervals regarding physician’s services 
shown on the card, how much exactly are you WILLING and 
ABLE to pay for such visit in order to obtain services with 
good quality and quick access? 
 
IF THE RESPONDENTS STATES AN INTERVAL, ASK FOR AN EXACT 
AMOUNT. IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ABLE TO INDICATE AN 
EXACT AMOUNT, FILL IN THE MIDPOINT OF THE INTERVAL. 
 
MIDPOINTS:  
 LESS THAN 5.- EURO  (MIDPOINT 2.50 EURO) 
 FROM 5.- TO  10.- EURO  (MIDPOINT 7.50 EURO) 
 MORE THAN 10.- EURO   (MIDPOINT 12.50 EURO) 
  XXX 
99= DK 
 
 
  
Q.16A In case you have to undergo a PLANNED SURGERY (for 
example, a 5-day hospitalization and no life-threatening 
illness), will you be willing to pay an official fee for this 
HOSPITALISATION in order to obtain services with good 
quality and quick access as described in the card? 
  1= YES 
0= NO 
99= DK 
IF YES, GO TO Q.16C 
  
  
Q.16B What is the REASON for your unwillingness to pay – unable 
to pay, object to pay, or both? 
  2= BOTH 
1= OBJECT 
0= UNABLE 
99= DK  
GO TO PART 9. 
  
  
Q.16C Considering the fee intervals regarding hospital services 
shown on the card, how much exactly are you WILLING and 
ABLE to pay for such hospitalization (including all types of 
fees charged by the hospital) in order to obtain services with 
good quality and quick access? 
 
IF THE RESPONDENT STATES AN INTERVAL, ASK FOR AN EXACT 
AMOUNT. IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ABLE TO INDICATE AN 
EXACT AMOUNT, FILL IN THE MIDPOINT OF THE INTERVAL. 
 
MIDPOINTS:  
 LESS THAN 100.- EURO  (MIDPOINT 50 EURO) 
 FROM 100.- TO  200.- EURO  (MIDPOINT 150 EURO) 
 MORE THAN 200.- EURO   (MIDPOINT 250 EURO) 
  XXX 
99= DK 
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PART 9: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Next questions concern your social and demographic characteristics. The information that is required will 
not be related to your identity.  The data are only necessary in order to analyse the results of this survey in a 
statistical way. 
  
Q.17A In which YEAR were you born?    
1 9   
 
 
  
Q.17B FILL IN THE RESPONDENT’S GENDER.   1= FEMALE 
0= MALE 
 
 
  
Q.17C FILL IN THE TYPE OF RESPONDENT’S 
RESIDENCE PLACE. 
  4= THE CAPITAL  
3= CITY (MORE THAN 500,000 
INHABITANTS) 
2= CITY ( 200,000 – 500,000 
INHABITANTS) 
1= TOWN (UP TO 200,000 
INHABITANTS) 
0= VILLAGE 
 
  
Q.17D SHOW CARD 6. 
 
What is the level of your current 
EDUCATION or current study? 
 
 
 
 
  5= TERTIARY EDUCATION (ISCED 
5+6) 
4= POST-SECONDARY NON-
TERTIARY EDUCATION (ISCED 4) 
3= UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION  
(ISCED 3) 
2= LOWER SECONDARY OR SECOND 
STAGE OF BASIC EDUCATION  
(ISCED 2) 
1= PRIMARY OR FIRST STAGE OF 
BASIC EDUCATION (ISCED 1) 
0= NOT COMPLETED PRIMARY 
EDUCATION (ISCED 0) 
 
  
  
Q.17E SHOW CARD 7. 
 
What is your primary OCCUPATION 
(activities) at present?  
 
  8= STUDENT (IN EDUCATION) 
7= EMPLOYEE (IN PAID JOB) 
6= OWN/FAMILY PRIVATE BUSINESS  
(INCLUDING SELF-EMPLOYED) 
5= UNEMPLOYED (JOB-SEEKING)  
4= NOT EMPLOYED (NOT SEEKING 
FOR A JOB, INCL. HOUSEWIFE) 
3= PENSIONER (BECAUSE OF AGE) 
2= PENSIONER (BECAUSE OF 
ILLNESS) 
1= FARMER/AGRICULTURER 
0= SOLDIER 
 
  
Q.17F SHOW CARD 8. 
 
What is your MARITAL status at 
present? 
  5= NEVER MARRIED AND SINGLE 
4= LIVING WITH A PARTNER 
WITHOUT MARRIAGE 
3= MARRIED (LIVING TOGETHER) 
2= MARRIED (LIVING SEPARATELY)  
1= DIVORCED AND SINGLE AT 
PRESENT 
0= WIDOW/ER AND SINGLE AT 
PRESENT 
 
  
  
Q.18A SHOW CARD 9. 
 
How do you perceive your present 
HEALTH status?  
 
  5= PERFECT HEALTH 
4= VERY GOOD HEALTH 
3= GOOD HEALTH 
2= FAIR HEALTH  
1= BAD HEALTH 
0= VERY BAD HEALTH 
  
  
  
Q.18B During the last 12 months, did you need 
to use medical services FREQUENTLY 
due to a chronic disease or a major health 
problem?  
  1= YES 
0= NO 
 
 
  
 Have a physician told you that you have 
any of the following health PROBLEMS?  
   
  
Q.18C Diabetes (increased sugar in the blood)   1= YES 
0= NO 
  
Q.18D Chronic heart disease or high arterial 
blood pressure  
  
 
1= YES 
0= NO 
  
Q.18E Chronic lung, liver or kidney disease   1= YES 
0= NO 
  
Q.18F Stroke   1 = YES 
0 = NO 
  
Q.18G Infarct    1 = YES 
0 = NO 
  
Q.18H Other chronic or major health problems   1= Yes 
0= No 
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Q.19A Do you have COMPULSORY social 
health insurance paid either by you or 
others?  
  1= YES 
0= NO 
 
  
  
Q.19B Do you have supplementary 
VOLUNTARY health insurance (or 
voluntary health account) paid either by 
you or others?  
  1= YES 
0= NO 
 
  
Part 10: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
The last set of questions concerns your household. Household is one person or a group of persons sharing a 
flat/house and having a common budget or common expenditure.  
 
FAMILY MEMBERS LIVING TOGETHER ARE ONE HOUSEHOLD ONLY IF THEY ALSO HAVE A COMMON BUDGET 
OR COMMON EXPENDITURE. FAMILY MEMBERS WHO DO NOT LIVE TOGETHER ARE NOT ONE HOUSEHOLD. 
 
  
Q.20A How many PERSONS are there in 
your household (incl. you)? 
  PERSONS 
 
 
  
  
Q.20B How many CHILDREN under the 
age of 18 are there in your 
household? 
  CHILDREN 
 
 
  
  
Q.20C At present, how many persons in your 
household (incl. you) have a PAID 
WORK or RECEIVE money (for 
example different kinds of social 
support, money from renting 
properties, etc.)? 
  PERSONS 
 
 
 
  
Q.20D At present, how many persons in your 
household (incl. you) have 
CHRONIC DISEASES or major 
health problems? 
  PERSONS 
 
 
 
  
Q.21A SHOW CARD 10. 
 
Please take a look at this card. Could 
you tell me which of the following 
categories corresponds to the NET 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME per month (i.e. after tax 
income) – considering all household 
members and all sources - wages, 
social welfare, pensions, rents, fees, 
etc.? 
  17= R - MORE THAN 3000.- EURO  
16= Q - FROM 2001.- TO 3000.- EURO  
15= P - FROM 1501.- TO 2000.- EURO  
14= O - FROM 1001.- TO 1500.- EURO  
13= N - FROM 751.- TO 1000.- EURO  
12= M -FROM 601.- TO 750.- EURO  
11= L - FROM 501.- TO 600.- EURO  
10= K - FROM 451.- TO 500.- EURO  
9= J - FROM 401.- TO 450.- EURO  
8= I - FROM 351.- TO 400.- EURO  
 
7= H - FROM 301.- TO 350.- EURO  
6= G - FROM 251.- TO 300.- EURO  
5= F - FROM 201.- TO 250.- EURO  
4= E - FROM 151.- TO 200.- EURO  
3= D -  FROM 101.- TO 150.- EURO  
2= C - FROM 76.- TO 100.- EURO  
1= B - FROM 50.- TO 75.- EURO  
0= A - LESS THAN 50.- EURO 
 99= DK 
  
Q.21B SHOW CARD 11. 
 
Which of the following is TRUE 
regarding your current household 
income? 
  4= ALLOWS TO BUILD SAVINGS 
3= ALLOWS TO SAVE JUST A LITTLE 
2= ONLY JUST MEETS THE EXPENSES 
1= NOT SUFFICIENT / NEED TO USE 
SAVINGS  
0= NOT REALLY SUFFICIENT / NEED 
TO BORROW 
99=  DK
 
  
 
The last question concerns your PERCEPTIONS about the net monthly household income that would 
allow managing appropriately your current day-to-day household needs.  
 
Show CARD 12. Which net monthly household income (i.e. after tax income) would you in YOUR 
CIRCUMSTANCES say to be: Very good? Good? Sufficient? Insufficient? Bad? Very bad?  
 
Instruction: Please try to avoid “Don’t know”. 
  
 Fill in below the income levels stated by the 
respondent: 
  
Q.22A VERY GOOD  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
     
Q.22B GOOD  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
     
Q.22C SUFFICIENT  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
     
Q.22D INSUFFICIENT  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
     
Q.22E BAD  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
     
Q.22F VERY BAD  
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
XXX 
99= DK 
   
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your participation!  
End time  
(use 24 hours clock) 
  
: 
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Appendix E  
 
Table E.1. Characteristics of the sample used in the analyses (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) 
   Inability to pay for services - the need to 
borrow money and/or sell assets 
Inability to pay for services - foregoing 
health care services 
Willingness to pay for services 
   Sequential logit model 
 
Multinomial logistic regression 
 
Two-step method with selection-bias 
correction based on the multinomial 
logit model 
   Out-patient 
services 
N= 5809 
In-patient hospital 
services 
N= 5929 
Out-patient 
services 
N = 5667 
In-patient hospital 
services 
N = 5762 
Out-patient 
services 
N= 5783 
In-patient hospital 
services  
N= 5796 
Age (10-years)  Mean (SD) 
Min., Max. 
4.7 (1.7) 
1.8, 9.2 
4.7 (1.7) 
1.8, 9.2 
4.7 (1.7)  
1.8, 9.2 
4.7 (1.7)  
1.8, 9.2 
4.9 (1.7) 
2.0, 9.4 
4.9 (1.7) 
2.0, 9.4 
Gender 1 = female % 55.4 55.7 55.7 55.5 55.8 55.7 
Place of residence 1 = urban  % 66.0 65.9 65.8 66.1 66.0 66.0 
University education 1 = yes % 17.7 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 
Self-perceived health: poor 1 = yes % 14.4 14.6 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.5 
Self-perceived health: fair 1 = yes % 33.1 33.0 32.8 32.7 33.1 33.0 
Diagnosed chronic illness 1 = yes % 44.0 44.2 43.8 43.8 44.0 44.2 
Public health insurance 1 = yes % 75.4 75.6 75.9 76.3 - - 
Ln (monthly income per adult 
equivalent) 
 Mean (SD) 
Min., Max. 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
5.4 (0.7) 
2.1, 8.0 
Income proxy a  1 = yes % 5.8 6.0 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.9 
User of health care services 
within the past 12 months 
1 = yes % - - - - 71.1 18.1 
Bulgaria 1 = yes % 16.0 16.5 16.1 16.6 - - 
Hungary 1 = yes % 17. 5 17.4 18.0 17.8 17.7 17.5 
Lithuania 1 = yes % - - - - 17. 1 17.0 
Poland 1 = yes % 15.9 15.7 15.9 16.1 15.9 15.8 
Romania 1 = yes % 16.5 16.7 16.5 16.7 16.8 16.8 
Ukraine 1 = yes % 17.0 16.7 16.4 15.9 16.8 16.8 
a This variable indicates whether missing values in the income variables were replaced with the proxied income. We proxied income using data on the perception of household income by the respondents. The 
respondents were asked, in addition to estimating the level of their household income, whether this income is insufficient, just enough to meet expenses, or allows them to build savings. For each country separately, we 
calculated the mean equivalized household income per perceived-income category. The results show a consistent pattern, in that mean income increases with a better perception of income level. For those respondents 
who did not estimate their income level, but answered the question on the perception of income, we replaced the missing values in the income variable with the mean income for their perceived-income category 
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Patient cost-sharing for health care in Europe 
 
Summary  
This dissertation is devoted to the topic of patient cost-sharing, i.e. patient payments for 
health care services that are included in the statutory benefit package. The rising health care 
cost and resources constraints confront policy makers with the challenge to ensure the 
financial sustainability of health care systems, without jeopardizing the main health system 
objectives. Cost-sharing is one of the policy options to respond to this challenge. There is a 
twofold rationale behind cost-sharing policies. Firstly, implementing patient payments gives 
the opportunity to generate resources and thus, shift some of the health care cost from public 
budgets to patients. Secondly, making patients responsible for paying at the point of use is 
expected to change their behavior, i.e. reduce the utilization of unnecessary and low-value 
health care, so that health care resources are used more efficiently and the increase in health 
care cost is slowed down. Nevertheless, the introduction of patient cost-sharing might limit 
access to care or lead to impoverishment among the vulnerable population groups such as the 
low income individuals or chronically sick. 
Despite the ongoing debates and concerns about the adverse equity effects, cost-sharing is 
broadly applied in Europe. Western European countries, following a substantial increase in 
their health expenditure in the 1960s and 1970s, began to implement cost-sharing as a cost-
containment measure. In Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the role of cost-
sharing became more significant after the collapse of communism. During the transition 
period, cost-sharing has been broadly applied to pharmaceuticals. However, the 
implementation of obligatory patient payments for publicly financed health care services 
encountered public opposition and proved to be politically difficult in many CEE countries. 
Nevertheless, underfunding of health care systems during the post-communist period led to 
spreading of non-regulated patient payments for health care services (informal and quasi-
formal), which continue to exist to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all CEE countries. 
Demographic trends for European countries indicate that patient cost-sharing is likely to gain 
relevance in the future. The need for sustainability measures is particularly evident in CEE 
countries, which are already struggling how to balance their health care system and in future, 
are likely to experience even more severe economic difficulties. To pursue cost-sharing 
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policy which responds to the challenges in the health care systems and remains without 
negative impact on equity, empirical analyses are needed to support policy makers in their 
decisions. However empirical evidence to strengthen cost-sharing policy is rarely available 
and used by policy makers, particularly in CEE countries.  
To respond to the research needs, two research aims are specified in this dissertation. First, 
we aim to review the existing patient payment mix in European countries and identify its 
determinants. Along with formal cost-sharing arrangements, we study informal patient 
payments, as their presence has important implications for equity in health care and cost-
sharing policy. To meet this aim, we rely on the analysis of available macro (country) level 
data for high number of European countries, including both Western European countries as 
well as CEE countries. Second, the dissertation is aimed to provide evidence on the potential 
of formal cost-sharing for health care services in CEE countries. We focus our attention on 
three aspects: the acceptability of cost-sharing for services, patients’ financial barriers to the 
use of health care services, and consumers’ willingness to pay for services. The analyses to 
meet the second research aim, draw upon primary (quantitative and qualitative) data collected 
between 2009 and 2010 in six CEE countries based on identical methodology. The countries 
included in the study are Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. These 
countries share a similar communist past, however, they differ in in terms of economic 
development, health system characteristics, or experience with cost-sharing policy. In 
Bulgaria, obligatory fees have existed since 2000 when they were introduced together with 
the insurance system. In Hungary, the payments system was introduced in 2007 to be 
withdrawn only one year later as a result of a public referendum. In the other countries, 
obligatory formal charges for services included in the statutory benefit package have been 
under discussion but at the time of the study were not yet implemented.  
Following the introductory chapter, this dissertation is divided into six chapters; Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 relate to first research aim, while the analyses to meet the second research aim 
are presented in Chapter 4-6. In Chapter 7, we summarize and discuss the main findings of 
the research.  
In Chapter 2, we present the review of patients cost-sharing for health care services in 27 
European Union (EU) countries (all EU countries in 2008). The review is focused on patient 
payment arrangements in 2007-2008, as well as the changes in cost-sharing policies since 
1990. The chapter provides also evidence on the link between cost-sharing arrangements and 
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health care system characteristics (i.e. type of health care funding, provider payment 
mechanisms, presence of gate-keeping function, level of public health expenditure, presence 
of informal patient payments). Data are collected based on a review of international data 
bases, national laws and regulations, as well as scientific and policy reports. The analysis 
presents a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques.  
The results show that in a majority of EU countries, patients pay a fee for the use of public 
health care services. Patient cost-sharing arrangements are quite diverse and this diversity 
could be explained by some health care system characteristics. Countries most often, rely on 
co-payments (flat-rate fee) for broad categories of services (visit to a physician, day of 
hospitalization). To prevent adverse equity effects, a broad range of mechanisms that 
accompany patient cost-sharing is present, i.e. payments limits, exemptions/reductions for 
selected population groups. 
The results on the dynamics of patient cost-sharing for health care services indicate that the 
reliance on patient cost-sharing in the EU is increasing which is motivated by the growing 
fiscal pressure and sustainability problems within health care systems. The limitation to the 
implementation of patient cost-sharing for health care services in some EU countries, appears 
to have its ground in a strong public opposition. A lack of public acceptance of patient cost-
sharing in a country is a factor which influences cost-sharing policies and restrains policy 
makers from the introduction of patient cost-sharing or even contributes to its abolishment.  
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 is extended in Chapter 3 where we review the formal-
informal patient payment mix in 35 European countries (including non-EU countries). We 
consider three indicators of patient payment mix, i.e. the scope of formal patient payments for 
publicly financed health care, the spread of informal patient payments, and the level of total 
out-of-pocket expenditure. To explain the cross-country differences in the formal-informal 
patient payment mix, we search for economic, governance and cultural factors. The 
comparative quantitative analysis is supported by a qualitative description of selected country 
experiences with the implementation of patient cost-sharing.  
The results show that there is a great diversity in the formal-informal payment mix in 
European countries. In most countries, formal cost-sharing is broadly applied i.e. for both 
commodities and health care services. The broad scope of formal cost-sharing does not 
always result in high total out-of-pocket expenditure, due to the relatively small magnitude of 
these payments or the presence of complementary private insurance. In some CEE countries, 
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formal cost-sharing (for commodities and services) co-exists with widespread informal 
payments. This results in a high burden of out-of-pocket expenditures for patients and in 
barriers to health care use. Relatively high out-of-pocket spending can be also observed in 
some CEE countries where formal cost-sharing is not applied for services, but patients bear 
high costs of pharmaceuticals, or meet other payment obligations (except for informal 
payments also quasi-formal charges, payments for services in a private sector). Thus, the 
room for the extension of cost-sharing in these countries is limited. 
The results of quantitative analysis indicate that a different set of factors affects total out-of-
pocket expenditures, the spread of informal patient payments and the scope of formal cost-
sharing in European countries. The level of out-of-pocket payment (as % of GDP) is related 
to the economic indicator (the share of public expenditures in total health expenditures). 
Informal patient payments are a multi-cause phenomenon, influenced by governance, 
economic and social-cultural factors. The presence of obligatory cost-sharing for health care 
services is associated with governance factors, i.e. the countries with cost-sharing for services 
are those with a greater capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies, and countries with a more extensive system of check and balance. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis shows that a driving force for the implementation of 
cost-sharing is often the economic need. The results lead to the conclusions that building a 
consensus on cost-sharing might contribute to more stable cost-sharing policy.  
Given the results of the analysis presented in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 we explore the 
acceptability of cost-sharing for health care services among the main health care system 
stakeholders, i.e. health care consumers, health care providers, policy makers and insurer 
representatives in six CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Ukraine). To outline their opinions and expectations from cost-sharing policy in their 
country, we analyze qualitative data collected in 2009 in focus groups discussions and in-
depth interviews, as well as quantitative data gathered among the same participants. 
The results show that there is a rather weak consensus among the main stakeholder groups on 
the presence and role of cost-sharing in the six CEE countries. Health care policy makers and 
insurers strongly advocate patient charges. Cost-sharing is seen as a source of funds for 
health care, particularly in countries where resources for health care are low. Policy makers 
expect also that patient payments would change consumers’ behavior towards more efficient 
use of health care resources. Health care providers also acknowledge the importance of 
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reducing unnecessary use of health care services, but their approval of charges is driven by 
the perspective of financial profit from the payment system and a low administrative burden. 
Health care consumers are generally against cost-sharing for health care services. Our results 
indicate that the low acceptability of fees among consumers follows from the poor quality 
and access to health care services offered in the public health care system in these countries, 
combined with the low transparency and accountability. Health care consumers have no trust 
that the implementation of obligatory formal patient payments would benefit patients, i.e. 
improve health care and reduce other patient payment obligations (informal, payments for 
privately purchased health care). There are also concerns about patient inability to pay the fee 
and thus, adverse equity effects. 
In Chapter 5, we explore consumers’ inability to pay for health care services in CEE 
countries. The analysis is based on the quantitative data collected in 2010 in nationally 
representative surveys in the same six CEE countries as those analyzed in Chapter 4 (i.e. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine). Data are collected following 
the same methodology which allows for cross-country comparison. We present evidence on 
the frequency and level of patient payments for out-patient and hospital health care services 
and on the two indicators of inability to pay which represent different groups of strategies to 
cope with inability to pay: the need to borrow money and/or sell assets (representing 
strategies aimed at meeting health care costs) and foregoing health service utilization (a 
strategy to avoid costs).  
The results presented in this chapter confirm that paying for health care services in CEE 
countries is frequent. Even when formal cos-sharing for health care services is not 
implemented, patients are often confronted with other forms of payments (informal, quasi-
formal). However, we observe that there are significant differences in frequency, level and 
types of patient payments between the countries. Patient payments for health care services are 
very common in Bulgaria (reported by more than 70% of out-patient service users and more 
than 60% of hospital care users). Most of these payments are formal and comparatively small, 
which could be expected, as Bulgaria is the only country among the six analyzed, with a 
universal system of formal co-payments. Patients very often pay for health care services also 
in Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania. In contrast to Bulgaria, consumer expenditures on health 
care services in these countries include often informal payments which are relatively high. 
The percentage of users who report paying for health care services is lowest in Poland (where 
approximately 80% of users do not pay for services at all) and Hungary. Our results indicate 
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that Ukrainian and Romanian patients face the greatest burden of payments and difficulties to 
meet the costs of health care services. For example, in Ukraine more than 40% of consumers 
who pay for hospital services report borrowing money or selling assets to cover the payments 
and more than 60% of those who are in need of using health care, report foregoing at least 
one visit or one hospitalization due to inability to pay.  
We also observe that there are significant differences in payments and in the inability to pay 
across socio-demographic groups of respondents. Patient payments are determined by health 
care needs, on one hand (i.e. paying is more frequent among those with poor self-perceived 
health status and with chronic condition), and the ability to pay for better quality and access 
to services, on the other hand (i.e. higher-income individuals pay more frequently). Further 
the results show that, individuals who have greater needs and those with a low ability to pay 
for services (i.e. those with low income) more often forego using health care services and 
more frequently borrow money and sell assets to cover payments, compared to healthier and 
wealthier groups.  
Based on our results, we can also conclude that the choice of a strategy in response to 
payment difficulties might be affected by the ability of households to mobilize financial 
resources (e.g. younger respondents and those with a university education have greater ability 
to borrow money or sell assets), as well as the type of health problems and related costs, e.g. 
in case of inability to pay for out-patient services consumers more often apply strategy to 
avoid the cost (foregoing care) than to meet the cost (borrowing money/selling assets), while 
the opposite is true for hospital care.  
As our study (presented in Chapter 4) reveals that consumers’ opposition towards cost-
sharing in CEE countries to a large extent can be explained by poor quality of health care 
services, in Chapter 6 we investigate willingness to pay for publicly financed health care 
services which are provided with good quality and access. Just like in Chapter 5, the analysis 
draws upon data collected in the representative surveys conducted in 2010 in six CEE 
countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Ukraine). We elicit information 
on the consumers’ willingness to pay for two types of health care services, i.e. consultation 
with medical specialists and hospitalizations, using a stated willingness to pay technique, i.e. 
contingent valuation method. Stated willingness-to-pay data are compared with data on 
consumers’ past payments reported in the same study. We also investigate the reasons for 
unwillingness to pay, i.e. objection to pay and inability to pay. The differences between the 
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countries and across socio-demographic groups of respondents are presented and discussed in 
the chapter. 
The results confirm that consumers in CEE are willing to pay an official fee for publicly 
financed health care services that are of good quality and quick access. Nevertheless, our 
results show that the willingness to pay for services significantly differs across the six 
countries. The lowest shares of respondents willing to pay are in Hungary (66% for visits to 
specialist) and Poland (50% for hospitalizations). In the other four countries, a higher 
percentage of respondents express willingness to pay, reaching approximately 80% for visits 
to medical specialists in Romania and Lithuania and approximately 75% for hospitalizations 
in Ukraine and Romania. These results are in line with data on past payments reported by 
consumes in the six countries, i.e. Polish and Hungarian health care users report to pay less 
often than health care users in the other four countries. Among the respondents willing to pay 
for consulting medical specialists, the median amount, after correction for purchasing power 
parity, is the lowest in Ukraine (14 dollars) and the highest in Poland (27 dollars). The 
median willing-to-pay fee for hospitalization range from 192 dollars in Lithuania to 303 
dollars in Bulgaria. 
Although the majority of respondents is willing to pay for better and more accessible health 
care services, willingness to pay is limited by financial ability and to lesser extent by 
objection to pay. Inability to pay as the reason for their unwillingness is frequently reported 
in Bulgaria (by more than 70% of those unwilling to pay), Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania. 
The opposition towards paying for services is more frequently reported in Hungary and 
Poland. Inability to pay affects particularly those with lower income, no university education, 
worse health status or older age. These groups are more likely to be unwilling to pay due to 
their inability to pay or are willing and able to pay significantly lower amounts. On the other 
hand, the objection to pay is related to respondents’ gender and place of residence, i.e. men 
and residence of urban areas are more likely to declare to be against paying for publicly 
financed health care services.  
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter 6, we also discuss the usefulness of the contingent 
valuation method for cost-sharing policy making. We underline that the study is based on 
hypothetical statements that are sensitive to the information provided to the respondents and 
the results can be subject to various forms of bias, e.g. strategic bias when consumers 
misrepresent (understate) their true willingness to pay due to the concerns about the 
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introduction of fees. Moreover, given the various factors affecting consumers’ willingness to 
pay (types of services, consumers’ socio-demographic characteristics), it is challenging to use 
willingness-to-pay data to set up fee levels that reduce excess demand without preventing 
those in need from using necessary health care services.  
In Chapter 7 of this dissertation, the main findings are summarized and discussed from the 
perspective of policy and research. We draw conclusions on how to strengthen cost-sharing 
policy in European countries. 
Based on the results of the review of patient payment arrangements in European countries, 
we discuss the potential of cost-sharing to contribute to the sustainability of the health care 
systems. We argue that patient cost-sharing in European countries does not allow for 
generating substantial resources for the health care systems. To limit the adverse equity 
effects, countries introduce relatively low fees and apply various exemptions and reductions 
for vulnerable population groups. Cost-sharing has also little potential to improve efficiency 
in the health care system, i.e. reduce the utilization of unnecessary services without affecting 
the use of essential services. Most countries apply uniform fees for broad categories of 
services which do not adequately moderate the utilization of services and are likely to reduce 
both, essential and non-essential services. Thus, the benefits from the cost-sharing 
implementation might be outweighed by the negative consequences for equity and 
consumers’ financial protection. Cost-sharing arrangements in European countries should be 
reconsidered and new approaches should be applied, such as value-based cost-sharing which 
might more effectively moderate demand for health care services. Given the crucial role of 
health care providers in shaping the demand for health care services, cost-sharing should be 
aligned with supply-side measures to affect the behaviors of health care providers.  
In this chapter, we also focus much of our discussion on the findings which are relevant for 
CEE countries. We argue that cost-sharing policies in these countries should be based on a 
broader consensus among health care system stakeholders to ensure its acceptability and 
stability. In this dissertation, we provide some evidence which can facilitate building the 
consensus on cost-sharing policy in CEE countries. Namely, we observe that the acceptability 
of cost-sharing policy among health care consumers is condition upon the improvement in 
quality and access to health care services. Hence, CEE governments need to develop 
adequate cost-sharing systems which will contribute to better health care for patients. The use 
of resources from cost-sharing should follow the investment plans worked out taking into 
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consideration the expectations of health care consumers for better quality and access as well 
as the interests of health care providers. To be successful, the strategy needs to be supported 
by a system of quality control to monitor and maintain quality levels. 
When implementing cost-sharing for health care services, policy makers in CEE countries 
need to take account of the presence of different types of patient payments (formal for 
pharmaceuticals, informal and quasi-formal for services) which limit consumers’ ability to 
spend more on health care. Our results show that the introduction of formal payments for 
services will not reduce informal patient payments if reasons for paying informally are not 
addressed. Not only quality of care should be improved but there is a need for a greater 
government commitment to fight unregulated payments, to improve transparency and 
accountability in health care system and to change public attitudes towards these payments. 
Moreover, policy makers face the challenge how to design effective mechanisms which need 
to accompany the cost-sharing obligations to protect equity in health care. These mechanisms 
should be well-targeted at those who need protection and also transparent for patients and 
providers.  
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Dopłaty pacjentów do opieki zdrowotnej w Europie 
 
Tematem niniejszej rozprawy doktorskiej są dopłaty pacjentów do świadczeń opieki 
zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych. Rosnące koszty opieki zdrowotnej i 
jednocześnie ograniczone zasoby dla tego sektora, stanowią wyzwanie dla decydentów 
politycznych – jak  zapewnić stabilność finansową systemu opieki zdrowotnej przy 
jednoczesnej realizacji jego głównych celów, takich jak ochrona zdrowia populacji. 
Odpowiedzią na to wyzwanie mogą być dopłaty pacjentów do opieki zdrowotnej (tzw. 
współpłacenie). Uzasadnienie dla wprowadzenia współpłacenia pacjentów jest dwojakie. Po 
pierwsze, zobowiązanie pacjentów do płacenia w momencie korzystania z opieki zdrowotnej 
daje możliwość generowania zasobów finansowych, a tym samym przesunięcie części 
kosztów opieki zdrowotnej od publicznego płatnika do konsumentów. Po drugie, oczekuje 
się, że zwiększenie odpowiedzialności konsumentów za finansowanie opieki zdrowotnej 
przyczyni się do zmiany ich zachowań, tj. zmniejszenia korzystania ze świadczeń 
niepotrzebnych i o niskiej wartości, co przyczyni się do bardziej efektywnego wykorzystania 
zasobów opieki zdrowotnej oraz do ograniczenia wzrostu jej kosztów. Niemniej jednak 
wprowadzenie dopłat może ograniczyć dostęp do koniecznej opieki zdrowotnej lub 
prowadzić do zubożenia wśród wrażliwych grup społecznych, takich jak osoby o niskich 
dochodach lub przewlekle chorzy. 
Pomimo toczących się debat i istniejących obaw o negatywne skutki, dopłaty pacjentów do 
finansowanej ze środków publicznych opieki zdrowotnej są powszechne w Europie. Kraje 
Europy Zachodniej w następstwie znacznego wzrostu wydatków zdrowotnych już w latach 
sześćdziesiątych i siedemdziesiątych zaczęły stosować dopłaty pacjentów jako narzędzie 
kontroli kosztów. W krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej rola konsumentów w 
finansowaniu opieki zdrowotnej wzrosła natomiast po upadku komunizmu. W krajach tych w 
okresie transformacji szeroko upowszechniły się dopłaty pacjentów do leków i wyrobów 
medycznych. Zobowiązanie pacjentów do płacenia za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej, takich 
jak porady ambulatoryjne czy hospitalizacje, wzbudzało natomiast sprzeciw społeczny i 
okazało się politycznie trudne w wielu krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Niemniej 
jednak niedofinansowanie systemów opieki zdrowotnej w okresie postkomunistycznym 
doprowadziło do rozpowszechnienia się różnego rodzaju nieregulowanych opłat pacjentów 
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(nieformalnych, quasi-formalnych) za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej, które nadal 
funkcjonują w większym lub mniejszym stopniu w niemal wszystkich krajach tego regionu.  
Zmiany demograficzne w krajach europejskich wskazują, iż w przyszłości prywatne źródła 
finansowania opieki zdrowotnej mogą zyskać na znaczeniu. Potrzeba wprowadzenia 
mechanizmów zapewniających większą stabilność finansową systemu opieki zdrowotnej jest 
szczególnie widoczna w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, które już teraz borykają się z 
problemem deficytów finansowych ich systemów zdrowotnych. Prowadzenie polityki w 
obszarze dopłat pacjentów, która odpowiadałaby zarówno na istniejące wyzwania, jak 
również na oczekiwania społeczne, jest trudnym zadaniem i wymaga podejmowania działań 
w oparciu o analizy empiryczne. Istniejące dowody naukowe, które ułatwiłyby prowadzenie 
skutecznej polityki w tym zakresie są jednak ograniczone. 
Mając na uwadze potrzebę dalszych badań w obszarze dopłat pacjentów do finansowanej ze 
środków publicznych opieki zdrowotnej, w niniejszej rozprawie doktorskiej określono dwa 
cele badawcze. Po pierwsze, celem pracy jest przegląd systemów opłat pacjentów w krajach 
europejskich i identyfikacja czynników wpływających na kształt tych systemów. W analizie, 
obok formalnych dopłat do publicznie finansowanych świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej, zostały 
uwzględnione także opłaty nieformalne pacjentów. Analiza opiera się na dostępnych danych 
wtórnych i obejmuje większość krajów europejskich, w tym zarówno kraje Europy 
Zachodniej, jak i kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Po drugie, celem rozprawy 
doktorskiej jest dostarczenie dowodów naukowych dotyczących możliwości zastosowania 
mechanizmu dopłat pacjentów do świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej w krajach Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej, uwzględniając trzy aspekty: akceptację współpłacenia pacjentów przez 
głównych uczestników systemu opieki zdrowotnej, istniejące bariery finansowe w 
korzystaniu ze świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej oraz skłonność konsumentów do płacenia za 
świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej. Analizie zostały poddane dane jakościowe oraz ilościowe 
zgromadzone w oparciu o tą samą metodologię w latach 2009 i 2010 w sześciu krajach 
Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, tj. Bułgaria, Litwa, Polska, Rumunia, Ukraina i Węgry. Kraje 
te, choć łączy podobna przeszłość związana z przynależnością do bloku państw 
komunistycznych, różnią się pod względem rozwoju gospodarczego, cech systemów opieki 
zdrowotnej, a także doświadczeń z dopłatami pacjentów. W Bułgarii obowiązkowe opłaty 
funkcjonują od 2000 roku jako element wprowadzanego w tym samym roku systemu 
powszechnych ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych. Na Węgrzech system dopłat pacjentów 
obowiązywał w latach 2007-2008, jednak został wycofany na skutek sprzeciwu społecznego 
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wyrażonego w referendum publicznym. Natomiast w pozostałych czterech krajach, w tym w 
Polsce, w momencie przeprowadzania badania nie istniał system obowiązkowych dopłat 
pacjentów do publicznie finansowanych świadczeń zdrowotnych. 
Niniejsza praca jest podzielona na 7 rozdziałów. Rozdział 1 jest rozdziałem 
wprowadzającym, następnie Rozdział 2 i Rozdział 3 odnoszą się do pierwszego celu 
badawczego, a w Rozdziałach 4-6 zaprezentowano analizy dotyczące drugiego celu 
badawczego. Najistotniejsze wyniki zostały podsumowane i poddane dyskusji w Rozdziale 7.  
Rozdział 2 zawiera przegląd systemów dopłat pacjentów do publicznie finansowanych 
świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej funkcjonujących w 27 krajach Unii Europejskiej (UE) 
(wszystkie kraje członkowskie UE w 2008 roku) w latach 2007-2008. W analizie 
uwzględniono także zmiany w polityce współpłacenia począwszy od roku 1990. Przegląd 
został dokonany w oparciu o dostępne dane, takie jak regulacje i przepisy krajowe, raporty 
naukowe, międzynarodowe bazy danych oraz publikacje w czasopismach naukowych. 
Analiza stanowi połączenie jakościowych i ilościowych metod badawczych. 
Wyniki przeglądu pokazują, że w większości krajów UE pacjenci są zobowiązani do 
wnoszenia opłat, kiedy korzystają z finansowanych ze środków publicznych świadczeń 
opieki zdrowotnej. Systemy współpłacenia są dość zróżnicowane, co w części może być 
wyjaśnione specyfiką systemów zdrowotnych poszczególnych krajów. Najczęściej stosowaną 
formą opłat są opłaty ryczałtowe (stała opłata za np. wizytę ambulatoryjną lub dzień 
hospitalizacji). Dopłatom towarzyszy szeroki wachlarz instrumentów chroniących wrażliwe 
grupy społeczne tj. limity płatności, zwolnienia z opłat lub niższe opłaty. Wyniki przeglądu 
wskazują także, iż dopłaty do świadczeń stają się coraz powszechniejsze w Europie, co jest 
efektem wzrostu presji finansowej oraz problemów w zapewnieniu stabilności finansowej 
systemów opieki zdrowotnej. Czynnikiem hamującym decydentów politycznych przed 
wprowadzeniem dopłat, czy nawet decydującym o ich wycofaniu, jest często silny sprzeciw 
społeczny.  
Przegląd systemów dopłat pacjentów do świadczeń zdrowotnych zaprezentowany w 
Rozdziale 2 został rozszerzony w Rozdziale 3, gdzie analizą objęto 35 krajów europejskich, 
uwzględniając oprócz dopłat formalnych, także opłaty nieformalne pacjentów oraz całkowity 
poziom wydatków bezpośrednich gospodarstw domowych na zdrowie. W celu wyjaśnienia 
istniejących różnic w finansowaniu opieki zdrowotnej przez pacjentów pomiędzy krajami, 
przeprowadzono ilościową analizę porównawczą, uwzględniając trzy grupy czynników: 
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ekonomiczne, polityczne i kulturowe. Analiza ilościowa została wsparta opisem doświadczeń 
wybranych krajów europejskich we wprowadzaniu formalnych dopłat pacjentów do 
świadczeń zdrowotnych.  
Wyniki analizy wskazują, że w większości krajów europejskich pacjenci muszą dopłacać 
zarówno do produktów farmaceutycznych jak i świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej. Szeroki zakres 
formalnych dopłat (zarówno do leków, jak i do świadczeń) nie zawsze jednak skutkuje 
wysokimi wydatkami gospodarstw domowych na zdrowie w danym kraju z powodu 
relatywnie niskiego poziomu tych opłat bądź występowaniu prywatnych ubezpieczeń, które 
pokrywają koszty współpłacenia. Z drugiej strony brak formalnych dopłat do świadczeń nie 
oznacza, że gospodarstwa domowe nie są znacząco obciążone wydatkami na zdrowie, gdyż w 
wielu krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej pacjenci ponoszą wysokie koszty leków bądź 
płacą nieformalnie i quasi-formalnie za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej. W niektórych krajach 
Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej pacjenci powszechnie płacą za świadczenia opieki 
zdrowotnej, zarówno formalnie, jak również nieformalnie i są to kraje, które charakteryzują 
się jednymi z najwyższych wydatków gospodarstw domowych na zdrowie. 
Na podstawie wyników przeprowadzonej analizy ilościowej można wnioskować, że obecność 
opłat nieformalnych jest zjawiskiem wieloprzyczynowym, na które wpływają czynniki 
ekonomiczne, polityczne i kulturowe. Istnienie dopłat formalnych do świadczeń jest 
natomiast powiązane z czynnikami politycznymi (jakość rządzenia). Wyniki analizy 
wskazują, że kraje, które wprowadziły współpłacenie za świadczenia charakteryzują się 
większą zdolnością rządu do formułowania i wdrażania skutecznych i racjonalnych 
rozwiązań. Dodatkowo w krajach tych instytucje państwowe działają w większym stopniu na 
zasadzie równowagi i wzajemnej kontroli (checks and balances). Uzyskane wyniki prowadzą 
do konkluzji, że budowanie polityki dopłat w oparciu o konsensus oraz dowody naukowe 
może przyczynić się do większej skuteczności polityki oraz jej stabilności.  
Mając na uwadze wyniki analizy przedstawionej w Rozdziale 3, Rozdział 4 został 
poświęcony analizie opinii i oczekiwań głównych interesariuszy systemu opieki zdrowotnej 
(konsumentów, świadczeniodawców, decydentów politycznych i ubezpieczycieli) wobec 
dopłat pacjentów do publicznie finansowanych świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej. Analiza opiera 
się na danych jakościowych zgromadzonych w ramach zogniskowanych wywiadów 
grupowych oraz pogłębionych wywiadów indywidualnych, które zostały przeprowadzone w 
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2009 r. w sześciu krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Bułgaria, Litwa, Polska, Rumunia, 
Ukraina i Węgry). 
Wyniki analizy wskazują, iż opinie na temat obecności i roli dopłat pacjentów do świadczeń 
zdrowotnych są zróżnicowane. Decydenci polityczni i ubezpieczyciele w sześciu krajach są 
zwolennikami współpłacenia, które w ich opinii mogłoby stanowić dodatkowe źródło 
finansowania opieki zdrowotnej. Oczekują oni również, że dopłaty zmieniłyby zachowania 
konsumentów w kierunku bardziej efektywnego wykorzystania zasobów opieki zdrowotnej. 
Świadczeniodawcy także uznają argument redukcji nieuzasadnionego popytu za istotny, choć 
ich wsparcie dla współpłacenia jest w duże mierze uzależnione od uzyskania dodatkowych 
środków finansowych z opłat pacjentów. Natomiast konsumenci opieki zdrowotnej są 
generalnie przeciwni wprowadzeniu dopłat do finansowanych ze środków publicznych 
świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej. Brak akceptacji dla dopłat wśród konsumentów wynika z 
niskiej jakości i dostępności do świadczeń oferowanych w publicznym systemie w tych 
krajach, oraz niskiej przejrzystości w tych systemach. Konsumenci opieki zdrowotnej nie 
mają zaufania, że dopłaty przyczyniłyby się do polepszenia publicznej opieki zdrowotnej, w 
taki sposób, by nie było konieczne korzystanie ze świadczeń w sektorze prywatnym czy też 
płacenie za świadczenia zdrowotne nieformalnie. Istotną obawą tej grupy respondentów jest 
także brak zdolności finansowej do płacenia za świadczenia i w konsekwencji zmniejszenie 
dostępności do opieki oraz negatywne skutki dla zdrowia pacjentów. 
Przedmiotem analizy zaprezentowanej w kolejnym rozdziale (Rozdział 5) są bariery 
finansowe w dostępie do świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej w krajach Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej. Analiza opiera się na danych ilościowych zgromadzonych w 2010 roku w 
sześciu krajach (te same kraje, które były uwzględnione w badaniu zaprezentowanym w 
Rozdziale 4, tj. Bułgaria, Litwa, Polska, Rumunia, Ukraina i Węgry). Badania ankietowe 
przeprowadzono na reprezentacyjnej próbie mieszkańców ww. krajów według tej samej 
metodologii. Kwestie uwzględnione w badaniu to: powszechność i poziom opłat pacjentów 
za ambulatoryjną i szpitalną opiekę zdrowotną, oraz niezdolność do płacenia za świadczenia 
opieki zdrowotnej mierzona dwoma wskaźnikami tj. rezygnacja ze świadczeń (strategia 
ukierunkowana na unikanie kosztów) oraz pożyczanie i sprzedaż mienia (strategia 
ukierunkowana na pokrycie kosztów).  
Uzyskane wyniki potwierdzają, że pacjenci w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 
powszechnie płacą za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej. Istnieją jednak istotne różnice 
Summary 
176 
pomiędzy krajami w częstości, poziomie i rodzaju płatności. Opłaty najczęściej występują w 
Bułgarii. Są to w dużej mierze dopłaty formalne i stosunkowo niskie. Pacjenci często płacą za 
usługi także na Ukrainie, w Rumunii i Litwie. W przeciwieństwie do Bułgarii, wydatki 
konsumentów na świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej w tych krajach są często nieformalne i 
relatywnie wysokie. Odsetek konsumentów płacących za świadczenia jest najniższy w 
Polsce, gdzie około 80% respondentów, którzy korzystali ze świadczeń, nie płaciło za te 
świadczenia, oraz na Węgrzech. Wyniki wskazują, że konsumenci na Ukrainie i w Rumunii 
najczęściej mają trudności w płaceniu za świadczenia, np. na Ukrainie ponad 40% 
respondentów, którzy płacili za leczenie szpitalne, deklarowało pożyczanie pieniędzy lub 
sprzedaż mienia, aby pokryć te płatności. Wyniki analizy wykazały także, że niektóre grupy 
społeczno-demograficzne są bardziej narażone na niezdolność do płacenia za świadczenia, tj. 
częściej dotyczy to osób o gorszym stanie zdrowia oraz osób o niższych dochodach.  
Wyniki analiz prowadzą także do wniosku, iż wybór strategii w odpowiedzi na trudności w 
płaceniu za świadczenia może zależeć od zdolności konsumentów do mobilizacji środków 
finansowych, jak również problemu zdrowotnego, np. w przypadku braku zdolności do 
zapłaty za ambulatoryjne świadczenia zdrowotne częściej stosowaną strategią jest rezygnacja 
ze świadczeń, podczas gdy w przypadku opieki szpitalnej powszechniejszą strategią jest 
pożyczanie lub sprzedaż mienia.  
Mając na uwadze wyniki badań przedstawione w Rozdziale 4, które wskazują, iż sprzeciw 
konsumentów wobec dopłat do świadczeń wynika w dużym stopniu z niskiej jakości 
świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej, w Rozdziale 6 przedstawiono analizę dotyczącą skłonności 
konsumentów do płacenia za świadczenia o wysokiej jakości i dostępności. Skłonność do 
płacenia za dwa rodzaje świadczeń – wizytę u lekarza specjalisty oraz hospitalizację była 
badana metodą wyceny warunkowej (contingent valuation method). Dodatkowo 
zgromadzono dane na temat przyczyn braku skłonności do płacenia, tj. sprzeciwu wobec 
dopłacania do publicznie finansowanych świadczeń oraz niezdolności finansowej.  
Wyniki badania potwierdzają, że konsumenci w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej są 
skłonni płacić za świadczenia, jeśli zapewniona jest wysoka jakość i dostępność tych 
świadczeń. Najwyższy odsetek respondentów wyrażających gotowość do płacenia 
zaobserwowano w tych krajach, gdzie opłaty są już powszechne, tj. Bułgaria, Ukraina, 
Rumunia i Litwa. Konsumenci na Węgrzech i w Polsce są rzadziej skłonni płacić za usługi, 
np. w Polsce ok. 50% respondentów nie wyraziło gotowości do płacenia za opiekę szpitalną. 
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Przeciętna wartość opłaty (skorygowana o siłę nabywczą pieniądza) za wizytę u lekarza 
specjalisty, którą konsumenci byliby skłonni uiścić, waha się od 14 dolarów na Ukrainie, do 
27 dolarów w Polsce. Natomiast mediana deklarowanej opłaty za hospitalizację jest 
najwyższa w Bułgarii (303 dolary) i najniższa na Liwie (192 dolary). 
Brak skłonności do płacenia wśród konsumentów wynika z niezdolności finansowej 
konsumentów i w mniejszym stopniu ze sprzeciwu wobec dopłacania do świadczeń 
dostarczanych w ramach publicznie finansowanego systemu. Niewystarczające środki 
finansowe były często deklarowanym powodem braku skłonności do płacenia w Bułgarii, 
Ukrainie, Rumunii i Litwie. Problem ten dotyczy szczególnie osób o niższych dochodach, 
gorszym stanie zdrowia, niższym wykształceniu i starszych.  
W Rozdziale 7 zostały podsumowane i poddane dyskusji główne wyniki przeprowadzonych 
badań. W rozdziale zostały także sformułowane rekomendacje dla polityki w zakresie dopłat 
pacjentów do świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej, a także sugestie dla przyszłych badań w tym 
obszarze.  
Bazując na wynikach przeglądu rozwiązań, jakie kraje europejskie stosują w obszarze dopłat 
pacjentów do świadczeń, omówiono możliwość poprawy stabilności finansowej systemów 
opieki zdrowotnej poprzez zastosowanie współpłacenia. Systemy dopłat zastosowane w 
krajach europejskich nie pozwalają na generowanie znaczących środków dla opieki 
zdrowotnej. Dopłaty do świadczeń mają również niewielki potencjał poprawy efektywności 
w systemach opieki zdrowotnej i ograniczenia kosztów, ponieważ kraje stosują rozwiązania, 
które nie pozwalają na właściwe sterowanie popytem na świadczenia, tj. zmniejszenie 
korzystania jedynie ze świadczeń o niskiej wartości. Konieczne jest zatem zrewidowanie 
istniejących systemów współpłacenia oraz szersze zastosowanie innowacyjnych rozwiązań, 
takich jak dopłaty oparte na wartości (value-based cost-sharing).  
W Rozdziale 7 wiele uwagi poświęcono wynikom istotnym dla krajów Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej. Wyniki przeprowadzonych analiz prowadzą do konkluzji, że polityka dopłat w 
tym obszarze Europy powinna w większym stopniu być oparta na konsensusie w celu 
zapewnienia większej jej akceptacji i stabilności. W celu zwiększenia poparcia konsumentów 
dla dopłat konieczna jest poprawa jakości i dostępności świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej. 
Wyzwaniem dla krajów jest zatem opracowanie takich systemów dopłat, które 
odpowiadałyby na oczekiwania pacjentów (przyczyniały się do poprawy jakości i 
dostępności świadczeń), a także uwzględniały interesy świadczeniodawców.  
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Rozważając wprowadzenie współpłacenie pacjentów za świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej w 
krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej należy wziąć pod uwagę duże obciążenie 
konsumentów innymi wydatkami na zdrowie, tj. wydatkami na leki czy opłatami 
nieformalnymi i quasi-formalnymi za świadczenia, które znacznie ograniczają możliwości 
pacjentów do ponoszenia dodatkowych kosztów opieki zdrowotnej. Doświadczenia 
niektórych krajów europejskich wskazują, że wprowadzenie opłat formalnych nie ogranicza 
istotnie nieformalnych opłat, jeśli przyczyny płacenia nieformalnie nie zostaną 
wyeliminowane. Konieczne jest zatem większe zaangażowanie rządów krajów Europy 
Środkowo-Wschodniej w zwalczaniu nieformalnych opłat pacjentów, poprzez poprawę 
jakości świadczeń oraz zwiększenie przejrzystości i odpowiedzialności w systemach 
zdrowotnych. Ponadto, wprowadzeniu współpłacenia muszą towarzyszyć odpowiednie 
mechanizmy ograniczające negatywne skutki dopłat, które powinny być precyzyjne 
(ukierunkowane na tych, którzy potrzebują ochrony), a także przejrzyste dla pacjentów i 
świadczeniodawców. 
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